


MILITARY INTELLIGENCE
A NEW WEAPON IN WAR

Lt.-Colonel WALTER C. SWEENEY

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A NEW WEAPON IN WAR

BY

WALTER C. SWEENEY

LT. COLONEL, UNITED STATES ARMY



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PREFACE

THE following chapters contain a discussion of Military Intelligence based upon my personal experience, observation and study.

They do not constitute an Intelligence Service Regulations or a history.

They embody my own views, conclusions and deductions as to the functions, field of operations and place in the military machine, as well as in the life of the nation, of what I regard as a new weapon whose value to the country in peace as well as in war can scarcely be estimated.

I feel safe in expressing the opinion that no military activity is so shrouded in mystery or so generally misunderstood as that of Military Intelligence. For this reason, in preparing these chapters I have had in mind particularly the general reader who has no acquaintance with military phraseology or organization, but who is interested in finding out about Military Intelligence. In so far as possible I have avoided the use of technical military terms while telling exactly what Intelligence is and what it does.

The military policy of the United States set forth in the National Defense Act of July 4, 1920, indicates that we rely upon our citizens to provide the armed forces for the defense of the nation. In time of war practically any citizen may be called upon to serve the country. The more clearly the individuals who may compose the citizen forces of the nation understand the methods and means

for securing and using information of the enemy, the more likely are they to penetrate that greatest of all obstacles to military success, "the fog of war."

In time of peace the nucleus of our war-time citizen army is maintained in the Regular Army, the National Guard and the Organized Reserves. These three components make up the Army of the United States. Any discussion of Military Intelligence must prove to be of assistance to the officers and men of this "One Army," because it is vital to all of them to have a conception of the functions of each of the several arms, branches and services which make up the fighting machine. The more uniform this understanding the better.

W. C. SWEENEY,
Lt. Col., U. S. Army.

June, 1924.

PUBLISHER'S NOTE

There are few men in America with broader experience in Military Intelligence than Lieutenant Colonel Walter C. Sweeney.

Entering the regular army in 1899 from civil life as a second lieutenant of infantry, he served, all over the world, through the several grades to his present rank. He is a distinguished graduate of the Army School of the Line (1912), a graduate of the Army Staff College (1913) and a graduate of the Army War College (1920). He saw active service in the Philippines in 1900 and 1901 and in later years in the Moro campaigns; served on the Mexican Border during the troublous years of 1915 and 1916; and was instructor in the First Officers' Training Camp at Presidio, California, when America entered the World War.

By July, 1917, Colonel Sweeney—then Major—was in France with the A.E.F. Detailed to the General Staff, he was assigned to the Military Intelligence Division at General Pershing's Headquarters and was the Executive Officer of that Division during its organization period. From August, 1917, to July, 1918, he was Chief of the Censorship Section of the Military Intelligence Division—at the time when it was so vitally necessary to see that no information of value leaked through to the enemy. This censorship covered the press, letters, photography, telephones, the telegraph, wireless and other methods of communication; publicity and propaganda; visitors, etc.

"The Stars and Stripes," read by two million dough-boys, was originated and first published under the direct supervision of Colonel Sweeney, as Chief of the Censorship Section, Military Intelligence Division.

At his urgent request for duty with the fighting troops, Colonel Sweeney was relieved from duty at General Headquarters and after attending and graduating from the General Staff School at Langres, France, was attached to Headquarters, 5th Army Corps, during the St. Mihiel Offensive. In September, 1918, he was appointed Chief of Staff, 28th Division, and served in that capacity in the Meuse-Argonne Offensive and in subsequent operations up to the time of the Armistice. He remained on duty with the 28th Division until early in 1919, when he was again detailed for duty with the General Staff at G.H.Q., A.E.F. Since January, 1921, he has been on duty at 1st Corps Area Headquarters, Boston, as Intelligence Officer for the six New England States.

He was awarded the Distinguished Service Medal by the United States Government for service during the World War; the Legion of Honor, Officers' Grade, by the French Government; and received a citation from the Commander-in-Chief, A.E.F., for services in action September 28, 1918, near Apremont, France.

Colonel Sweeney's long and varied experiences make him thoroughly conversant with every phase of the Military Intelligence Division: with its formative struggles, with its objectives, and with its achievements; and his book on Military Intelligence is written by a man who knows his subject, who is a recognized authority in this new and important field.

CONTENTS

		PAGE
	PREFACE	v
	PUBLISHER'S NOTE	vii
CHAPTER		
	I. DEVELOPMENT OF MILITARY INTELLIGENCE .	1
	II. MILITARY INTELLIGENCE DEFINED . . .	13
	III. ORGANIZATION	30
	IV. PROBLEMS OF MODERN WAR	59
	V. INTELLIGENCE SERVICE IN THE WORLD WAR .	86
	VI. FUNCTIONS OF PERSONNEL	120
	VII. COLLECTION OF INFORMATION	141
	VIII. EVALUATION OF INFORMATION	162
	IX. DISTRIBUTION OF INTELLIGENCE	188
	X. SECRET SERVICE AND MAPS	206
	XI. CENSORSHIP	227
	XII. REQUISITES OF PERSONNEL	248

MILITARY INTELLIGENCE
A NEW WEAPON IN WAR

CHAPTER I

DEVELOPMENT OF MILITARY INTELLIGENCE

"In war everything is correlated. Every move has some reason, seeks some object; once that object is determined it decides the nature and importance of the means to be employed."

Need for Information

The World War saw the development of Military Intelligence in the home territory and military forces of every nation participating in the war. Hundreds of officers and men were detached from combat troops, assigned to the Intelligence Service, and placed on duty in all parts of the world. Many other hundreds were employed on Intelligence Service duty with combat troops. There were two reasons for this development. One lay in the necessity of keeping up with the scientific improvements in technical and special weapons employed in the prosecution of war. The other was found in the demands made upon the time and energy of commanders of modern fighting organizations which prevented them from giving personal attention to their many command duties.

There is nothing new in a recognition of the necessity of having ample information of the enemy upon which to base military plans. The successful plan of campaign always has been and always will be based upon knowledge of the strength, situation, plans and intentions of the enemy.

What is new, however, is that in recent years there has been such an increase in the amount of information of the enemy to be gathered, and so many changes in the

means and methods of collecting and utilizing it, as to make necessary the creation of an entirely new organization or system to keep track of it.

Possibly one of the earliest accounts of seeking information of the enemy is contained in the Bible. In the 13th Chapter of Numbers it is recorded that Jehovah directed Moses to send men to spy out the land of Canaan and to bring back information concerning the country and its people.

Since Biblical days the same necessity for having information of the enemy has existed. As commands grew larger and as the methods of combat became more complicated the amount of information needed became greater. In wars of the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries the several commanders of corps, divisions and other organizations of an army were accustomed to seek information of the enemy almost independently of each other. It was left for the twentieth century to bring this activity into a coördinated whole under the supervision of the highest commander.

The Information System

The organization of an Intelligence Service as a system for gathering and utilizing information of the enemy has been made necessary by modern conditions of warfare. Armies engaged have become so large, the exercise of command so complicated, weapons employed so numerous, and methods of handling and maneuvering troops so various, as to make it impossible to keep track of the enemy situation and correctly estimate his plans and intentions, without the use of an especially trained agency created and designed for these purposes. To be efficient such an agency necessarily must have an organization which will insure that information gained at any time

or at any place within the limits of the whole command shall be properly tested and valued and quickly and surely made known throughout the system and hence be made available to any commander who may need it. Such a system is provided in modern armies by the Intelligence Service which is a convenient term by which to designate the machinery that takes care of the mechanical part of the Military Intelligence function.

Intelligence Service Previous to World War

Before America entered the World War the Military Intelligence Service, as a coördinated and coöperating system, did not exist in our military establishment.

In April, 1917, War Department Intelligence activity was negligible. There was no Military Intelligence Division of the War Department General Staff. Intelligence Service duty in the War Department was regarded as a part of the War College function. What there formerly had been of a War Department Intelligence Service in personnel, as well as in maps, data and other material which it had gathered, had been absorbed into the War College. The Intelligence Service had almost disappeared as a separate activity.

The situation was similar throughout the army. While there were a few Intelligence officers in the Philippines, and some with troops at other places, their work was chiefly connected with mapping and topography, with reconnaissance reports, with maintaining lists of suspects, and occasionally with investigations of various kinds. Instruction as to the disposition of information of the enemy in time of war taught that messages and reports concerning the enemy were to be sent in to higher commanders if the matter contained in them was deemed of sufficient importance. The friendly inhabitant, the re-

turned spy, the surrendered deserter, and the so-called strategic patrols were still the main reliances for securing news of enemy movements.

There was no conception of the modern Intelligence Service which, with specially trained personnel, would make systematic and continuous effort to find out and record the strength, position, situation, and movements of the enemy, and which would utilize every possible means and method for making such information of value in operations. Nor was there a general appreciation of the need for the Army and higher commanders to have at all times prompt and complete information of the enemy from the combat troops in contact with him. Rather it was the idea that commanders of troops in contact should seek information of the enemy for their own use, and that higher commanders would get what they wanted by means of their own agencies, or would send specific orders to the commanders of the contact troops to get them some particular piece of information.

World War Experience

During the World War, under the name of Military Intelligence, there was built up in the American forces a carefully organized system represented by an Intelligence Service group at every headquarters from that of the battalion on up to include the War Department. These groups, composed of highly trained personnel, formed a network of coöperating agencies, coextensive with the military activity of the nation which systematically collected, evaluated and distributed information of the enemy for the benefit of the command as a whole. At the same time they supervised the operation of agencies which protected their own forces against enemy Intelligence activity.

The Intelligence Service was developed during the war because there was necessity for its use in military operations, just as, for the same reason, there were developed the Chemical Warfare Service, Air Service and other war making agencies which had not previously existed.

One result of our not having had an Intelligence Service organization before the World War was the lack of a clear conception of the use for such a Service. As a consequence, a great variety of tasks were imposed upon its personnel both in the War Department and in the American Expeditionary Forces. This multiplication of duties operated to confuse almost every one as to its true aims and objectives and in many cases handicapped Intelligence officers and prevented them from developing the Intelligence system to its full value.

The Military Intelligence Service during the World War was all things according to where it was functioning. Its personnel made investigations and conducted secret inquiries; sent out patrols and gathered information in enemy front lines; controlled circulation in army zones; censored letters and telegrams; reproduced maps and operated large printing plants; engaged in morale work in its own army; ran down spies, chased signals and watched suspicious people; conducted propaganda campaigns; gathered evidence of frauds in war-time contracts; published a great newspaper; systematically collected, evaluated, and distributed Intelligence of the enemy; provided for newspaper correspondents and censored press dispatches; investigated efforts to blow up industrial plants in the United States; received and entertained distinguished guests and visitors and escorted them over the battlefields; translated foreign publications; decoded and deciphered messages of all kinds, and discharged many other duties.

The list is incomplete, but it is sufficient to give an idea of the great variety of duties assigned to Intelligence Service personnel.

Very few officers comprehended its true functions or realized its place in the military machine, and it may be said that it is not yet clear in the minds of a great many just what duties it is supposed to perform and just how it is expected to play its part.

World War Lesson

One of the most important lessons gained from the World War was that a great loss of efficiency in the military machine was caused by failure to maintain good team play between commanders and their staffs and between members of the same staff. Some officers, who saw more Intelligence staff work than any other kind, have gained the impression that this was particularly true with regard to the relation of Intelligence officers to their commanders and to their coördinate brother staff officers. This lack of team play came about through failure on the part of those concerned to understand clearly their own duties and functions as well as those of their fellows. This, of course, was not the case with all commanders or all staff officers. It might well have been remembered that no headquarters could hope to be more efficient than its poorest member, any more than it could be expected that a chain would be stronger than its weakest link. The natural consequence of this lack of team play was that any command in which such a condition obtained suffered more or less in its efficiency, and as a result always paid a higher price in human life for its success or effort than would have been the case if there had been more complete coöperation and understanding between the headquarters personnel.

In the aggregate of a modern army of two to four million men such a loss of efficiency is staggering and it multiplies its costs rapidly as this condition exists in higher commands.

The fullest development of the Military Intelligence Service, or in fact of any organization or service, can be had only when it receives the maximum amount of co-operation on the part of every one in the military forces. The degree to which this coöperation is given will depend directly upon the amount of information and understanding concerning the subject possessed by the average member of the military forces.

Perhaps it was natural that the Intelligence Service should have been misunderstood and used wrongly or not at all, as was sometimes the case, because, as has been stated, it was a new thing to the American Army and its growth, like that of a mushroom, was almost over night.

However, there is an important field for it in modern military operations. Valuable as it was to us during the World War, it yet did not give anywhere near the return it would have given had its powers and limitations, its true purposes and sphere of usefulness, been clearly understood by the army at large.

Military Principle

There are a number of military principles which may be classed as immutable. Among these is that of Economy of Force. As a principle it may be construed to demand that the energy and activity of every individual and every organization within the military forces shall be expended for the sole purpose of winning the victory in the field so as to gain the ultimate decision in the war. This in turn requires that every individual and every organization shall be employed only on duties which directly or

indirectly contribute to that object, and conversely it decrees that there shall not be maintained within the military forces any individuals or organizations which do not serve that end.

There are, however, certain indispensable duties relating to the supply, operations and service of troops for which provision must be made. These require the assignment of personnel which otherwise would be available for combatant organizations. The continued development in weapons and instrumentalities used in combat, the improvement in transportation and methods of communication and the increasing requirements of food, ammunition, etc., make it necessary constantly to form new organizations for handling the new weapons, operating the new utilities, or furnishing the needed supplies. Whatever may be the purpose for which an organization is required, the personnel to compose it must come from the total manpower available to the nation and consequently must reduce the numerical fighting strength of the whole force.

The principle dictates that the number of such organizations shall be kept at a minimum.

The tendency always is to multiply overhead and add new units to the military forces, regardless of their fighting value. This disposition was noted in all armies in the World War. There was a constant struggle, for example, to make welfare and other similar organizations a part of the army. As a matter of principle this could not be done. Although they are desirable and, to a limited extent, necessary from a point of view of morale, welfare organizations are of little use to the army as a fighting machine. To take them into the army would ultimately mean the absorption into them of men capable of carrying rifles and doing combat work. This would

cause discontent and dissatisfaction as well as loss of combat strength. This tendency grows stronger as armies grow larger. It is necessary always to keep as low as possible the ratio of non-combatant men to combatant ones.

Test Applied

Every proposal to adopt a new weapon or to create a new service for which a new organization is necessary means either to reduce the fighting strength or to change it to some other form. The question always arises as to the value of the new weapon or service in view of the mission of the military forces—to win victory on the battlefield and the ultimate decision in the war. Before it can be adopted the powers and limitations of the new weapon or the value of the new service must be carefully examined to determine whether or not it demonstrates beyond doubt that the benefit to be derived from its adoption will compensate for the loss in actual combat strength it will entail.

This is the test that was constantly applied to the organization and expansion of the Military Intelligence Service during the World War. It is still subject to that test. If it is not an indispensable organization or service for the more efficient prosecution of war, it has no place in the military machine. It must render such return as will compensate for the number of men detailed to it and for the amount of energy expended in its operations or be discontinued.

On the other hand, if it is of sufficient value to be retained, then its organization, purposes and functions should be as familiar to the military men as are those of his own or of any other arm or branch.

Future Development

The development of the system for gathering information of the enemy was so much greater during the World War than ever it had been in former wars that there has come to be a general idea that the principal value of the Military Intelligence Service lies in its use under conditions of stabilized warfare. It has been suggested that future wars will not again be fought under such conditions and therefore that there will be no need for a highly organized system for obtaining Intelligence such as was then developed but that its operation in open warfare will again become a matter to be handled independently by local commanders.

There are two reasons why this view does not seem to be justified, first, because the development of innumerable, scientific weapons of war has been such as to require the highest type of expert or specialist to study their powers and limitations and to keep track of their development and their value in combination with the older weapons of war. For example, the effective fighting power of the army of former days consisting primarily of infantry with rifle and bayonet, supported by artillery with shrapnel and cavalry with shock action, could readily be kept track of and interpreted in terms of fighting power by the opposing commander without special technical knowledge. In war of to-day the weapons of an army are so complicated by the developed fire power of infantry weapons (including machine guns) and the several classes and kinds of artillery fire, supplemented by chemical warfare, air service and other modern weapons of combat, as to make it necessary, in order to have a measure of the fighting strength of the enemy army, to maintain especially trained personnel for the collection and study of information concerning each of them.

It is impossible for any one except a specialist to interpret the full significance of the activity of any one of the several arms and branches of a modern army. Each must have its own expert to study it. In addition to this the tactical significance of the combined activity of the several enemy arms must be studied and interpreted for the commander by an officer especially trained for and devoting his full time to such duty.

The second reason is that modern war will necessarily be fought by the "nation in arms." This is so because the development of modern warfare, due to the improvements in methods of communication and the increase in means of transportation, will not only permit but require the full fighting strength of each belligerent nation to be developed to its utmost for the successful prosecution of the war. The result of this will be the participation of such huge armies as to make inevitable the establishment of long lines of battle with flanks resting on impassable objects or so widely separated as to render turning movements or extensive maneuvers impracticable. As a consequence there will always be a portion of the armies engaged in so-called stabilized warfare. Such open warfare operations as there may be always will be carried on by troops which have been or soon will be in a stabilized situation.

The death-dealing power of modern weapons is so great that the pick and shovel with which to "dig in" will provide the only means whereby advancing forces may retain the positions which they have gained, or provide the holding power necessary on the flanks of attacking armies. In other words, in the broad picture of war of to-day, it is impossible to draw a line between stabilized and open warfare conditions as applying to a modern army. No matter what character of warfare may be

considered in theory, it will be essential in practice, in order to be successful, to have a coördinated system whereby the identity and fighting power of all enemy organizations and units may be established.

It may be well to recall to mind that while there is never a change in the basic principles underlying military operations, tactics, in the sense of the method or manner of combat, change constantly with the introduction of new weapons of war. The character of these new weapons in recent years, due to modern invention, has been such as to add more complicated and technical machines which invariably require new tactical formations for combat. Every offensive weapon must be met by a defensive one. Every improvement in an old weapon must be met by a like improvement or by knowledge of how to defend against it. To develop an effective means of defense it is necessary that the character and powers and limitations of the new offensive weapon be thoroughly understood. As a consequence expert personnel must be constantly at work gathering and studying every bit of information obtainable concerning each new enemy weapon and each change in methods of combat.

It must be apparent that under the conditions brought about by warfare of to-day, there can be no escape from the necessity of having an all-embracing system of Intelligence for keeping track of the enemy.

The Military Intelligence Service as a new weapon in war has come to stay because modern conditions have created an increasingly important field for its use.

CHAPTER II

MILITARY INTELLIGENCE DEFINED

"Experience in the American Expeditionary Forces has amply borne out the axiom that military operations can be carried out successfully and without unnecessary losses only in the light of the most complete and reliable information of the enemy. Experience has also proved that this object can be attained only by means of a carefully organized system for obtaining, coördinating, studying and disseminating such information, and for assisting in the preparation of military plans by applying the information on hand to the operation under consideration."

Terminology

The manifold and various duties performed under the name of Intelligence during the World War have given the term Military Intelligence such a general and indefinite meaning as to make it seem advisable, as a preliminary step to discussing the subject, to arrive at an understanding of just what is meant by it.

The terms Military Intelligence, Intelligence, G-2, Intelligence Service, and others have been used more or less indiscriminately to refer not only to the matter handled, but also to the organization and the personnel engaged in handling it. No distinction has been made in terminology to indicate whether in saying Military Intelligence reference is made to information of the enemy—the commodity; to the command agency which supervises and directs its handling; or to the system or machinery by which the activity is operated.

It is now the aim, without attempting to coin new

terms, to differentiate between those already commonly used and to indicate how they may be used so as to avoid confusion in the future.

1. The Commodity or Product

The commodity or matter handled is designated by the term Intelligence or its synonym Military Intelligence. This term has a restricted meaning as well as a general one. In its restricted sense which actually is its original one, Intelligence is information of the country or military forces of the enemy that has been collected, tabulated, measured as to its probable value, classified as to its reliability and made ready for use in military plans or operations. It is to be emphasized that information of the enemy does not become Military Intelligence until it has been subjected to these processes.

In its general sense the term refers to all matter dealt with by the Intelligence Service personnel including information of the enemy, topography, maps, publicity, counter-espionage, censorship and other related activities.

Three Types of Intelligence. Military Intelligence, as information of the enemy, for purposes of further description, may be considered according to its use as of three types.

The first type is Intelligence utilized by and of interest to the War Department. This may be called War Department Intelligence. It consists of information of every character which may affect the prosecution of war including information pertaining to the military, political, geographic and economic situation, and the psychology of the people of every country in the world. It is the broadest kind of national Intelligence for use in war.

The second type is Intelligence utilized by and of interest to commanders of tactical units in time of war for

planning and carrying on military operations in the field. It may be called Combat Intelligence. It has to do more particularly with Intelligence required by tactical commanders for combat operations, and generally is gathered by front line troops. It includes information concerning the strength, disposition, movements, armaments, equipment, and activity of enemy troops as well as that pertaining to the topography of the territory within the theater of operations and of enemy installations therein.

The third type may be described as Intelligence utilized by and of interest to the general headquarters of the armies in the theater of operations. It may be called G.H.Q. Intelligence. It includes within its scope elements of both War Department and Combat Intelligence. It has to do more particularly with Intelligence of strategical and broad tactical nature required for the preparation and execution of plans for major military operations.

Positive and Negative Intelligence. There are two further divisions in which Military Intelligence may be considered. These relate to the character of measures employed in dealing with it. One is known as Positive and the other as Negative Intelligence. Positive Intelligence signifies Military Intelligence gained by offensive measures in which the initiative is retained and the results of the work may be calculated. All activity and all measures taken to gain specific information of the enemy or of the theaters of operations are included in an understanding of the term. It implies an aggressive attitude and contemplates energy and initiative in making and prosecuting Intelligence projects.

Negative Intelligence signifies defensive Intelligence Service activity. The prevailing idea is to protect against the enemy Intelligence Service agencies so as to prevent

them from securing information concerning our military forces either from our troops or from our people. The term *negative* is rightly used because in the carrying on of such measures, which are included in the term *counter-espionage*, the results are always negative so far as can be known. It is impossible to judge of the value of protective moves to guard war plans or to determine the effectiveness of measures taken to counter the designs of the enemy. In this case the initiative lies with the enemy and no one can tell just what information he is after or what he actually gains.

Fixed and Variable. Positive Intelligence may be considered as of two types in order to be more clearly visualized. These relate to the kind of information sought.

One type which may be described as Fixed or Permanent Intelligence, includes information relating to geography, topography, enemy works, trenches, emplacements, and other such things that may be of use to commanders, staff officers, or staff departments in making up their programs for movements and supply of troops in operations. It is in the nature of information which may be shown upon a map and which contributes to knowledge of the situation, dispositions and installations of the enemy rather than to his plans or intentions.

The other, which may be called Variable or Movement Intelligence, includes all classes of information from which deductions may be made of the probable plans or intentions of the enemy. It embraces all movements and changes in the dispositions and situation of the enemy troops which may be significant of his plans. It notes all enemy activity of unusual nature, particularly that of wireless, artillery, infantry and other arms, branches, or services which might be of value in estimating the enemy plans and intentions. This Intelligence is of such a type

as to be conveyed more readily by a report than by a map.

Both Fixed and Variable Intelligence are acquired as a result of the activity of Intelligence Service agencies and both are recorded, tested and classified as to fact by personnel of that service. Fixed Intelligence is distributed by the Intelligence Service into prescribed channels. Variable Intelligence, along with the Fixed, is studied by the commander and his Intelligence officer and the results, expressed in terms of conclusions as to the plans and intentions of the enemy, are used by the commander in arriving at a decision as to his own plans.

2. The Command Agency

The command agency responsible for dealing with Intelligence is the Second (Intelligence) Division of the General Staff, which is also known as the G-2 Division. Every military command from the War Department down to include the tactical division has a General Staff group of four divisions. These are designated as the First, Second, Third or Fourth Division of the General Staff.

The chief of any one of these divisions is known as the Assistant Chief of Staff for Personnel, Intelligence, Operations and Training, or Supply, as the case may be. His title is abbreviated in ordinary usage to read, A.C. of S. G-1, G-2, G-3 or G-4.

The chief of each of these General Staff divisions is responsible to his commander for carrying on the duties assigned to his particular division. For example, G-2 is responsible to the commander in the field of Intelligence activity. G-3 is responsible to the commander in the field of activity of Operations and Training of the troops of the command.

At brigade, regimental and battalion (or equivalent)

headquarters the staff officers are assigned in a manner analogous to the staff at higher headquarters so that the functions of the four General Staff divisions are covered.

The terms B-2, R-2, Bn-2 and S-2 are used to designate the chief of the Intelligence group respectively at the headquarters of brigade, regiment, battalion and squadron.

The term "The Intelligence officer" or "The G-2" is employed to designate the chief of an Intelligence group at any headquarters.

"An Intelligence officer" signifies an officer on Intelligence Service duty not necessarily a General Staff officer or the chief of an Intelligence group. Such an officer might be performing duty connected with any one of the service functions prescribed for the personnel of the Intelligence Division of the General Staff.

The Intelligence Division of the War Department General Staff is the agency charged with the broadest responsibility in connection with the Intelligence Service function. It includes general supervision over all Intelligence activity and special responsibility for the handling of War Department Intelligence.

The Second (Intelligence) Division of the General Staff at G.H.Q. of the theater of operations is the agency charged with general supervision of all Intelligence Service activity in the theater of operations. It has general responsibility in regard to handling Combat Intelligence and special concern in collecting and utilizing G.H.Q. Intelligence.

At army, corps, division and lower headquarters in the theater of operations the Intelligence Division of each has general supervision of all Intelligence Service activity in commands subordinate to its own and special responsibility for the operation of the Intelligence Service per-

sonnel at its own headquarters in handling Combat Intelligence.

3. *The Machinery or System*

The term Intelligence Service designates the machinery or system interwoven into the military machine through groups belonging to the several command headquarters to carry on the particular functions assigned to the Second Division of the General Staff.

The personnel composing the Intelligence Service operates in handling the commodity—Military Intelligence—under the direction and control of the agency—the Second Division of the General Staff.

In the organization of the Intelligence Service no lines are drawn between its members to distinguish between those belonging to the command agency and the machinery. The distinction is noted here merely to assist in making clear the Intelligence function. All officers and soldiers of the regular army or national guard on duty with the Second Division of the General Staff or with Intelligence Service groups of commands lower than the division are detailed to the Intelligence Service from the other arms, branches and services of the army. All of them then belong to the Intelligence Service regardless of the character of Intelligence duty they are performing.

The National Defense Act makes provision for a Military Intelligence Service in the Officers Reserve Corps and permits the commissioning of reserve officers directly into it. When these officers are called to active duty they become a part of the Intelligence Service personnel without further orders.

National Effort in War

In all struggles of humanity to achieve a goal the ob-

stacles encountered interfere with accomplishment. The more complete our understanding of the powers and limitations of the obstacles, the more effectively will we be able to organize our resources to meet them and the greater will be our chances of being successful. The obstacles to be overcome in the greatest of all struggles of humanity, that is in war, may be measured for any belligerent nation by a determination of the possible fighting strength of its enemies. Having the measure of the obstacles the effort required to gain success may readily be determined and provided for.

Experience has shown that a nation will be able to prepare for and prosecute a war with a degree of efficiency, economy and probability of success which will be found to be in direct proportion to the state of its knowledge of its enemies.

Army Effort in War

The same is true with regard to the operation of armies on the field of battle. With them the "fog of war" is merely another term to designate the obstacles which stand in the way of success. With an approximate equality in other factors that make for success in war, the decision in battle will go to that army whose commander has the more accurate and complete information of the strength, position, plans and intentions of the other.

Mission of Intelligence Service

The Military Intelligence Service in a general way may be considered as being charged with gaining information of the obstacles which stand in the way of success in war. These necessarily include all information essential to a full and complete understanding of the powers and limitations of actual or possible enemy nations or armies.

The information thus secured to be of use must be in the form of classified Intelligence placed at the disposal of those who need it in military operations and available in time to serve their purposes.

Other Obligations of Intelligence Service

There is another aspect to be considered in connection with the mission of the Intelligence Service. This is that it has been required to assume the duty of protecting its own country and military forces against the efforts of enemy Intelligence Service agencies to secure information.

The theory upon which this requirement is based apparently is that Intelligence Service personnel, knowing how it operates and how it handles its own agents within the country and in the military forces of the enemy, will be able better than any other agency to guard against like activity of the enemy.

Therefore the mission of the Second (Intelligence) Division of the General Staff includes responsibility for the initiation of adequate measures to protect against enemy Intelligence Service activity.

In addition to the foregoing several other functions were assigned to the Intelligence Service during the World War. These included censorship, publicity, the procurement, reproduction and distribution of maps, investigations of graft, fraud, etc. Since these have only an indirect connection with the duty of gaining information of the enemy, it is believed that the development will be to turn them over to appropriate services already existing or to newly organized services to handle, leaving the Intelligence Division only the General Staff function of prescribing the policies for their operations. This matter will be discussed in later chapters.

War Department Intelligence Service

The Military Intelligence Division of the War Department General Staff may be regarded as the national agency for gathering Intelligence. Through its various sources for acquiring information and by its systematic handling of what it gathers, the fighting strength of possible enemy nations is determined. The information collected and utilized by this agency is known as War Department Intelligence.

The field of activity of the War Department Intelligence Service is the whole world because under conditions of modern warfare every country and every people may become factors in the prosecution of war.

The War Department Intelligence Service gathers information of foreign nations for use in the preparation of war plans; studies the aims and ambitions of foreign governments and maintains an up-to-date estimate of the possible war effort of the various countries of the world. It examines proposed war plans from the point of view of the enemy so as to be able to give an opinion as to their effectiveness and as to the counter-measures which the enemy might take to offset them.

Its work is accomplished by means of constant peacetime study and investigation of data of statistical nature, reports from agents and information from all available sources.

War plans are based upon what it is estimated the enemy will be capable of doing. The study and preparation of war plans must take into consideration the same general type of study of our own nation as that made of other nations. Our country must be examined carefully in the same way as that of a foreign nation in order to gain an idea of what we may be capable of doing, because the war plan of a foreign nation will be based upon

its own War Department's estimate of what we will be able to do.

When war is started all enemy countries become closed to the activities of the War Department Intelligence Service. The main source of information concerning them is then found within and through the enemy's armies. Under these conditions the great bulk of the information of use to the War Department can be gathered best by its own troops in contact with enemy troops. Therefore, in time of war the principal activity in collecting information of the enemy is transferred from the War Department to the headquarters of the commanding general of the forces in the theater of operations. The amount of work it is possible for the War Department Intelligence Service to do toward gaining information of the enemy during war is thus restricted to that which can be done through neutral and allied countries and possibly through agents working into the countries of the enemy and his allies.

The War Department has not such great need for information relating to the immediate military situation as has the commanding general of the forces in the theater of operations, but it has need for information relating to the situation within enemy countries with regard to other factors. This information therefore, to as great extent as necessary and possible, must also be gathered by Intelligence Service agencies with troops in the theater of operations.

The War Department Intelligence Service for these reasons in time of war leaves to the General Staff for Intelligence at the headquarters of the commander of the armies in the field the duty of gaining information of the enemy through contact with the hostile armies. It then concentrates itself upon the duty of assisting in the study

and preparation of war plans, of gaining what information it can through neutral and friendly countries, and of preventing the enemy from gaining information of the military situation within its own country.

Combat Intelligence Service

The Military Intelligence Divisions of the General Staff with the headquarters of the various commands in the field provide the machinery through which Combat Intelligence is gained and prepared for use in time of war.

The activity of Combat Intelligence Service personnel with troops in time of peace, or when outside the theater of operations in time of war, is confined to the training of its personnel with a view to having it proficient in active military operations. It has no other peace-time duties.

G. H. Q. Intelligence Service

The Intelligence Division at the General Headquarters of the forces in the field is responsible for operating its Intelligence Service agencies in the collection and utilization of G.H.Q. Intelligence. It gathers Intelligence from Combat Intelligence Service sources as well as from the War Department Intelligence Service. It must be prepared to collect such War Department Intelligence as may be called for by the War Department Intelligence Division.

The Intelligence Service

The Intelligence Service, the machinery designed for collecting and converting information of the enemy into Military Intelligence and supplying it to the command, may be visualized as a service in a similar sense as is the Quartermaster, Ordnance, Medical, or any other Service. Like all of them it has its representatives on duty with, or

belonging to the various organizations of the command, sometimes clear down to the lowest elements. The Intelligence Service, under the control of the Intelligence officer on the staff of the commander, is charged with the supply of Intelligence to the command. In the same way the other services—Quartermaster, Medical, etc.—under the control of their respective service representative on the staff of the battalion or other commander, furnish their particular supplies to the command.

The relation of the staff officer for Intelligence is analogous to the relation of the staff officer of any other service to the commanding officer so far as the supply function of each of them is concerned. The responsibility for the efficient operation of every service lies in the commander, not in the staff officer who operates it within the command. The staff officer acting as Quartermaster, or as Ordnance officer, or as the Intelligence officer performs his service of supply duties for the command not in his own name or by his own authority as a Quartermaster or Ordnance officer, but in the name of and for his commander.

The conception of the Intelligence Service as having a service of supply function is essential if its place and responsibilities are to be clearly comprehended.

There is another analogy between the Intelligence Service and the Supply services. All of them (including the Intelligence Service) deal in commodities of some kind required by the military forces to assist them in their operations. As a rule Supply services receive their products already manufactured and ready for issue. Some services, however, like the Ordnance and Chemical Warfare, because they require experts to supervise the work, procure their own raw material and manufacture it themselves.

The Intelligence Service also requires experts and specialists to handle much of its raw material and convert or manufacture it into the product.

The raw material for nearly all supply services is procured and manufactured in home areas and the finished products are distributed through the various levels of command from the higher to the lower on down to the troops and eventually to the front line troops.

The Intelligence Service, however, must procure the bulk of its raw material, information of the enemy, from its front line troops and must send it back from lower to higher headquarters to be converted into the finished product, Military Intelligence.

Whenever raw material is secured by a front line battalion by a raid or otherwise, it is at once started back on its way to be turned into the finished product. The Intelligence Service personnel at battalion headquarters extracts from it that part which it is able to convert into Intelligence in its small plant and sends the rest of the information on up to regimental headquarters. There the Intelligence Service personnel takes out and converts into Military Intelligence that part which it is able to handle and sends the rest on up to division headquarters. This procedure is followed by the Intelligence Service personnel at each successive headquarters until the particular lot of raw material has all been used up.

Sometimes the raw material secured will be of no use to any headquarters below that of an army, and again it may be of interest only to corps and lower headquarters. In other words, the information may be of strategical nature alone, which would interest only army and higher headquarters, or it may be of tactical nature which would be of use only to corps and lower headquarters, or again it may contain matter of both strategical

and tactical value and hence may be of interest to all headquarters.

There is always an Intelligence Service plant somewhere which is able to convert into Intelligence any bit of information of the enemy that may be secured. No matter how trivial the information may seem to be, it should not be ignored. Its value can only be determined by having it converted into Intelligence and this can be done only at the plant appropriate to its nature.

The Intelligence Service differs from other supply services because of the nature and use of the commodity which it handles. This is so closely related to the command function as to be a direct responsibility of each commander in connection with the security and operation of his troops. The personnel of the Intelligence Service is an integral part of each command, and although parts of it are in close touch with similar agencies in adjacent commands they owe their first allegiance to their immediate commander rather than to a Service.

Commander Responsible

It is the commander who is responsible for collecting and evaluating the information of the enemy and for distributing it in the form of Intelligence to higher, lower, and adjacent headquarters. His Intelligence officer with the Intelligence Service personnel are the instruments through whom he discharges these duties.

For these reasons and for others that will be discussed later, the Intelligence Service cannot be constituted or organized in the same manner as other services which have their personnel enlisted in one central organization or service, and assigned or attached to the various commands and units for duty as required.

Problem of Commander

The theory that the problem of every commander consists of three elements, the correct estimate of each one of which is equally vital with the other two in order to solve his problem correctly is universally recognized. These three elements are: (1) his mission; (2) the strength, situation, plans and intentions of the enemy; and (3) the strength, state of readiness, situation, etc., of his own forces.

Regardless of the size of the command and regardless of the distribution of duties made by the commander within his staff, these three elements are always present in his problem. Experience has shown the necessity of giving due consideration to each of them.

To take care of the enemy element, modern military organization provides an Intelligence division of the General Staff, coördinate with its other divisions, whose primary mission is to solve that part of the commander's problem which relates to the strength, position, plans and intentions of the enemy. To do this effectively each commander must have a competent General Staff officer for Intelligence with an Intelligence Service personnel capable of collecting, evaluating and distributing Military Intelligence.

Relation to War Plans

War Plans, or Combat Orders, prescribe the measures to be taken to translate the decision of the commander into military action. The decision is based upon careful consideration by the commander of the elements which go to make up his problem. The mission of the commander tells him what result he is expected to achieve. The Military Intelligence data tell him what opposition he will meet and what obstacles he will have to overcome.

Consideration of his mission, of the Intelligence, and of the fitness, state of readiness, etc., of his own troops, will enable him to make a decision as to what he proposes to do. More detailed study will be needed to enable him to calculate exactly how many troops will be required, what measures as to details of personnel and supply must be taken and what maneuver or movements of his troops appear to be best to carry his decision into effect.

Military Intelligence, therefore, is of vital importance to the War Department General Staff in arriving at decisions in the preparation of war plans. It is also vital to every commander in the theater of operation in coming to combat decisions and in preparing the detailed orders for the use and maneuver of his troops in battle.

CHAPTER III

ORGANIZATION

"Faulty plans are generally the result in war of insufficient knowledge of the state of affairs on the enemy's side, more particularly as regards his strength, his morale, his positions, and his plans."

Team Work

One of the striking lessons of all wars is found in the necessity of having the greatest possible coöperation between the component elements of a military body in order to get the best results from its operations. The lesson is learned by those fighting in the front lines through unnecessary and excessive losses and by those in the rear and home areas through frequent failure to gain successful results from even the most simple plans in which separate agencies are involved.

Every arm and branch of the military forces must do its part in the operation of the military machine in order that every other may be able to carry on its share. The successful operation of the whole machine is dependent upon the smooth functioning of its many parts. There is no field of human endeavor in which team play has so important a place or in which the failure to practice it is so costly as in the military team. It must always be kept in mind that the price exacted for inefficiency in military operations is paid in the coin of men's lives and of human suffering and not alone in money. While the failure of one member may not mean defeat for the whole, it always means that some other member, or members, will be required to pay an extra price to gain the team objective.

In the military team the members are the arms, branches and services. They may be divided into those which do the actual fighting—the infantry, cavalry, artillery, etc., and the administrative, supply and technical services which furnish all of those things necessary for carrying on the combat and maintaining the army. All team members are assigned to their appropriate and specific duties and all must be regarded as equally important to the success of the whole.

To insure the fullest team play and hence the greatest efficiency it is essential that each member thoroughly understand not only his own part but also the part of each and every other member of the team. He must know how his own play fits in with that of every other one of them.

Military Organization

The formation of the military team is accomplished by what is called military organization. It is fashioned on lines that have been developed through centuries of warfare. It has necessarily been changed in its details in order to meet the test of war under the conditions brought about by the development and improvement of weapons, but its basic principles remain the same even though their application differs with new weapons and methods of combat.

Simplicity and uniformity are necessities in military organization because of the difficulties of command, supply, transportation, maneuver, and every other matter connected with the handling of troops in battle.

The ultimate object of military organization is to win battles.

The company (battalion, regiment and brigade) of infantry must be the same in its prescribed strength, arma-

ment, equipment, as every other company (battalion, regiment and brigade) of infantry. In the artillery and in every other arm or service, each unit must be the same as every other corresponding unit. The same principle applies to the organization of divisions and higher units. In the infantry division a specified number of infantry, artillery, engineers, signal corps, and other units of the various arms and branches are grouped together into one body under one commander. The division is the smallest self-contained unit capable of independent maneuver and action. It is also the most convenient unit for purposes of supply. In order to serve these purposes the composition and strength of each division are always approximately the same.

While the corps is made up of a prescribed number of divisions, its mission ordinarily will determine the number of divisions assigned to it. Sometimes a corps will have two divisions while a neighboring one will have six, but the number of divisions actually with the corps is a temporary matter. Every corps normally has its authorized and prescribed number of organizations, which are a permanent part of it, in what are known as Corps troops. Likewise the number of corps within an army will vary, but each army, like the corps, has its normal quota of Army troops. War Department Tables of Organization will show how carefully the foregoing principles are observed.

Object of Organization

Military organization is designed in such a way as to enable the commander of the whole, or the commander of any subordinate unit, to control and direct the movements and actions of every part of his command at all times. To accomplish this it is necessary to bring each individual

person within the military forces into a definite place under the commander.

Having this in mind it is seen that there must be a basic unit or element, upon which to build. Such a group is found, in the infantry, in the squad which consists of seven men under the command of a corporal. A number of these groups, generally three or four, are brought together and placed under a commander to form the next higher unit, which in the infantry is the section under a sergeant. A given number of these latter units are likewise combined and placed under a commander to form the next higher unit, the platoon under a lieutenant. These in turn are treated in the same way to form the next higher unit, the company under a captain.

This process is continued by forming battalions, regiments and so on to the extent necessary to complete the organization of the total number of individuals within the forces. Regardless of what the number may be, each commander will be found to have only from four to nine subordinates with whom to deal.

Command


The will of the commander of the whole is conveyed by means of orders to commanders of the next subordinate units, who likewise convey their orders on down the line.

In this way it is possible for the commander of the whole and the commander of each element to control and direct the movements and actions of each part and element within his sphere of command. This control and direction is known as the exercise of command.

Commander Responsible

Each commander is responsible for the efficiency, train-

OUTLINE GENERAL ORGANIZATION OF FIELD FORCES



ing and supply of his command and is accountable to his next higher commander. Command is thus exercised through and by the commanders, from the commander-in-chief all the way down to the commander of the lowest unit. The channel through which this control is exercised, that is, from commander to commander, is known as the chain of command. It is to be noted that, except for the lowest one (who gives his orders to individuals who execute them), every commander deals with some other commander, and that the responsibility for the things done as well as for the things left undone within a command rests solely upon the shoulders of its commander.

Command in Former Wars

In former days of small armies and limited battlefields, it was practicable for the commander personally to exercise his command functions with the assistance only of an administrative, technical and supply staff to which were delegated many of the duties pertaining to the operation of the various services of supply, and the execution of administrative and personnel matters to which the commander himself had not time to attend. The commander generally could give personal attention to the tactical handling and maneuver of his troops. He was able to see the entire battlefield and frequently to survey the enemy forces, reconnoiter their position and note their dispositions. He could keep in mind the situation of his own forces, their strength and dispositions, and therefore could make his decisions and plans, and issue the necessary orders for their movements to meet the enemy. Armies lived off the country or were subsisted from short distances, and the supply problem (including that of munitions) was not a very complicated one, nor had it relatively so much to do with tactics and strategy as it has

to-day. Administrative matters were such as could be supervised by the commander himself, for there were comparatively few questions of administration which required much time for their solution. Personnel matters, without the present day demand for specialists, were solved largely through personal acquaintance or knowledge of the officers or men concerned.

Command in Modern War

The situation of the division and higher commander in war of to-day has been completely altered by the increased size of armies and the consequent complexities of command. Administrative and personnel matters require special organization and system to handle them. Supply has become a complicated matter involving the economic resources of the whole country. In fact it has become a problem of how best to utilize the entire industrial power of the nation. Tactical action, as well as strategical measures, are intimately connected with supply and are largely influenced by its possibilities.

Battlefields and theaters of operation embrace immense areas in which it is impracticable for a division commander personally to survey or reconnoiter even the small part occupied by his command, while it is impossible for higher commanders to do so. New weapons and instrumentalities for the prosecution of war have added so many arms, branches and services to armies as to make it necessary to have experts to keep track, in a systematic manner, of the developments of the enemy forces along these lines.

Likewise his own command has grown to be so complicated by its many elements as to make it necessary for the division and higher commander to have an additional agency to assist him in keeping track of its various elements and in preparing orders for their movements.

From these and other considerations it is seen that modern conditions have added such a multiplicity of details to the exercise of the command of a division and of higher units as to make it physically impossible for any one man to give attention to the broader phases of his duties of command and at the same time personally attend to the innumerable and burdensome details required by his command responsibility.

The General Staff

This has brought about the assignment of a group of staff officers in addition to the administrative, technical and supply staff with which these commanders were already provided. This additional group, known as the General Staff, is charged with assisting the commander in the exercise of his command functions.

The members of this group must be able to plan the disposition of the elements of the command, to take necessary measures for their supply, to prepare orders for their use in battle, to secure and supply information of the enemy, to attend to personnel matters, and to look after many other duties which formerly were attended to by the commander in person.

As a matter of comparison between former and present day armies it may be noted that Napoleon at Marengo had a force of 28,000 men, the equivalent in numbers of one modern division, while General Pershing used some twenty-five such divisions in the Meuse-Argonne offensive alone, and had a total of about two million men under his command in France.

A General Staff group consists of a Chief of Staff and four Assistant Chiefs of Staff. The division is the smallest command to which a General Staff group is assigned.

The Chief of Staff is the principal assistant, chief ad-

viser and representative of the commander. He is the coördinating agent who insures the proper functioning of the whole machine and is the medium for the transmission of the will of the commander to staff and troops.

The four Assistant Chiefs of Staff are assigned to duty as chiefs of the four coördinate divisions of the General Staff. The separation into these four divisions has been arrived at by a determination of the four distinct functional fields of command, namely: Personnel, Intelligence, Operations and Training, and Supply.

These four divisions are not watertight compartments nor independent agencies. The separation into divisions is made solely for the purpose of securing that simplicity and smoothness of organization which are essential to the efficient discharge of the duties imposed upon the commander.


General Staff Basic Principles

It is necessary that the relations and functions of the General Staff be clearly explained in order to understand the place of the Intelligence Division of the General Staff in the military machine. With this in view the following quotations from publications of the General Service Schools at Fort Leavenworth, Kansas, are here inserted:

“The true mission of the general staff is not to command the technical and administrative branches nor to perform functions pertinent to staff agencies, but, on the contrary, the general staff is a tactical service itself, specially trained to furnish detailed assistance in its own specialty of troop leadership.”

“The general staff officer in this sense is primarily trained in the leadership of troops of the combined arms, trained in practical values, and when he comes to coördi-

TYPICAL ORGANIZATION OF A COMMAND HEADQUARTERS



nate the branches, it is purely in that direction that he should influence them, not by attempting to do their business for them."

"Even the G-1 and the G-4 sections of the general staff, which handle primarily questions of personnel and logistics, deal with the technical and administrative branches chiefly from the strategical and tactical point of view, keeping personnel and supply matters closely in touch with the strategical, tactical and training plans and coördinating their activities along these lines."

"The training necessary for the general staff officer to qualify for any section of the general staff is the same as that required for tactical command and is based fundamentally on handling line troops of the combined arms."

"We also see it stated frequently that the commander and his general staff form the 'composite mind' which directs the division, corps, etc. This is correct if we consider the general staff as practically a part of the commander's mind in that it relieves him of much fatiguing study of details, placing before him all information in such thoroughly digested form as will enable him to come to a sound and prompt decision without having to consider an infinite number of details, and then seeing that his decision is carried through to a conclusion. Viewed in this light, the third section is that part or lobe of the commander's mind which thinks operations and training thoughts, the fourth section the lobe which thinks logistics thoughts, etc. But we must make no mistake in using the term 'composite mind' and assume that the general staff shares with the commander the functions of command. The mind which actually directs the division or other unit is not a 'composite mind.' It is the mind of one man—the commander."

"It is apparent from the foregoing discussion that the functions of the general staff cannot be embraced in a definite list of duties which it performs, but its most important functions may be summed up, in a general way, as follows: The general staff is the adviser of the commander furnishing him full information on which to base his plans and decisions, and in such digested shape as will relieve him from the fatiguing study of details. It coördinates the agencies within the division—the various branches and technical agencies—wherever there is duplication, or competition, or combined action on the part of two or more of them. It controls or directs, in that it is the mouthpiece of the commander, the agency which formulates and issues in his name the orders and instructions necessary to carry out his plans and decisions. It supervises by seeing that these orders and instructions are carried through to conclusions. It foresees the needs of the command in all that relates to personnel, intelligence, operations, and supply. It prepares strategical, tactical and training plans in accordance with the commander's decision. It enunciates and carries out all policies, decisions and basic plans of the commander, and coördinates their execution by supplementary or complementary plans, decisions and orders. Finally, it assists the commander and, like all other staff agencies, it serves the troops in all things which will increase their combat efficiency."

General Staff Duties

From the foregoing quotations it is seen that the General Staff assists the commander in the exercise of his inherent, personal, command functions as distinguished from those functions of command which generally are

delegated to those staff officers who are charged with the operations of administrative, technical and supply staff departments and services.

The most important things to be noted about the General Staff are:

(1) That its duties are those which formerly were performed by the commander in person.

(2) That its duties are not in any sense duties which were already being performed by other staff agencies.

(3) That the General Staff is intended primarily to relieve the commander of the burdensome and numerous details connected with the coördination of the activities of the various elements of the command so that his tactical and strategical plans may be served in the most efficient manner.

(4) That the General Staff is not within the chain of command.

In Units Lower Than Divisions

In brigades, regiments, and battalions, or their equivalents, the functional division of staff duty is preserved and the principle of organization of the General Staff group is applied. One staff officer may perform the duties prescribed for two or more of the divisions of the General Staff and may also perform administrative, technical or supply staff duties at the same time.

Relations Between General Staff Officers

The relations between the heads of the General Staff divisions are not those of separate agencies working towards different ends, but are those of a team in which all are pulling together towards the accomplishment of the same objective.

It is impossible to place too much emphasis upon the

necessity of having the most cordial coöperation and most harmonious relations between the several members of the General Staff group. While this is particularly true of the relations between G-2 and G-3, it is essential that cordial relations exist within the whole group.

General Staff Qualifications

From the very nature of the duties required of them, officers detailed to the General Staff must be competent to discharge the duties of each and every one of its four divisions.

Under the conditions of our service in the World War this necessity was either lost sight of or was impossible of compliance because of the shortage of officers qualified for General Staff duty.

Officers were often detailed specifically from higher headquarters for duty as G-1, G-2, G-3, or G-4, at lower headquarters. In such cases they were generally selected because they were specialists in personnel, in intelligence, in tactics, or in supply. In many commands the Chief of Staff and G-3 were the only qualified General Staff officers and often the G-3 was not so qualified but was a specialist in some particular class or kind of work.

The detail of a specialist to the General Staff does not qualify him to discharge the duties of a General Staff officer. His tactical training, knowledge of command functions, experience and professional qualifications, not his specialist accomplishment, are the considerations which determine his fitness for General Staff duty.

If an officer on the General Staff can do efficient work in only one of its divisions, making due allowances for unfamiliarity, etc., he should not be on General Staff duty. His services will be of much greater value as a specialist in his own particular line.

An Infallible Test

There is an infallible test which division and higher commanders might use to determine the fitness for General Staff duty of the four assistant chiefs of staff, and that is to rotate them in their duties so that each one of them may demonstrate his ability to discharge the duties of any one of the four divisions.

There are many advantages to such a rotation of duty in the G group. Not the least of these lies in the development of a mutual appreciation of the difficulties, trials, and tribulations of the work of the other G's, of which possibly in the past there had been no realization. However weak it may be, it still must be recognized that it is human for every G, particularly if he is a specialist, to think that the work of his own Division is more important than that of any other G. Nothing will make for correcting this weakness quicker than will a rotation of duties.

Organization Intelligence (G-2) Division, General Staff

In the conception of its organization we must constantly bear in mind the fact that the direction and supervision of Intelligence Service activity is a responsibility of the commander. It is a part of his personal, inherent command function.

He is provided with a General Staff officer to supervise and carry on Intelligence Service duties for him because he cannot give his personal time to them. Hence when G-2 responsibilities and duties are referred to, the responsibilities and duties of the commander, to whom G-2 belongs, are meant. G-2 exists solely as part and parcel of his commander.

The development in warfare has been such that Intelli-

gence Service duties must be performed in a systematic manner :

First, because of the increase in the volume and the technical nature of the information.

Second, because definite conclusions as to the plans and intentions of a modern army are gained from a study of the composite of many accumulated facts concerning it and not from a few incidents which may from time to time be discovered.

Third, because of improved methods of communication which make time the measure of the value of the Intelligence supplied to higher commanders.

Since the enemy uses modern and rapid methods of communication for transmitting his orders for movement and action of his troops, it follows that the organization of the Intelligence Service must be such that word of enemy activities shall be communicated to the appropriate commanders by at least as rapid means as are employed by the enemy to start his operations.

Practically all of the information of the enemy within the theater of operations comes from and through the front line troops. It rests upon their commanders to get this information back to higher commanders with all possible dispatch. It has been found that the multitudinous duties of the commanders of front line regiments and battalions are such as to prevent them in person from handling the details imposed by the demands of such prompt transmission. This duty is therefore properly performed by each commander through his G-2.

Purpose of Organization

The organization of the Intelligence Service must be such as to insure

(a) That advantage may be taken of any and every opportunity to secure information of the enemy.

(b) That information gained by any element of the command, or at any place within the area occupied by the command, may be promptly tested as to reliability, estimated at its probable value as to fact by experts and specialists and interpreted as to tactical significance expressed as conclusions by the Intelligence officer, G-2, of the command.

(c) That information so valued along with the conclusions may be made available as soon as practicable to every one who may need it.

(d) That adequate provision may be made for counter-espionage necessities.

(e) That any other duties assigned to the Intelligence Service may be cared for.

The more efficiently these purposes are served, the more successful should be the military operations, because the side which has more and better information about the other will have the advantage.

Principles of Organization

The same principles of simplicity and uniformity are applied to the organization of the Intelligence Service as are practiced in basic military organization itself.

Since the mission of the commander may differ from time to time, there must be a certain flexibility of organization which will permit of enlarging or decreasing the personnel to meet the particular requirements of any situation. Such a situation may arise when a division or a corps is assigned to a special mission which would cause it to assume some of the duties which ordinarily would be discharged by a higher headquarters.

The organization of the Intelligence Service is based

upon the duties which pertain to it. It may be noted here that the chief of each Intelligence Service group, the G-2, has a dual function to perform. First, are those duties which pertain to his General Staff functions, and second, those which relate to his function in connection with the control and supervision of the Intelligence Service.

With regard to the first function, it is sufficient to have in mind that G-2 is a General Staff officer who is to be regarded as the lobe of the commander's mind which thinks information of the enemy and uses it as required and needed by the commander. As to the second function, it must be remembered that the Intelligence Service is composed of experts of various kinds and of specialists who operate under the supervision and direction of G-2 within the sphere and throughout the extent of the jurisdiction and responsibility of his commander.

Objects of Intelligence Organization

To emphasize what is essential in the organization of the Intelligence Service so as to gain a more complete comprehension of its objects it is advisable to consider it for a moment in its relation to the military machine as a whole.

We may picture the Intelligence Service as consisting of a personnel of officers and enlisted men divided into groups or units according to the accepted principles of military organization. These groups or units are distributed throughout the entire extent of the military forces of the country with one of them assigned and belonging to every command headquarters from that of the battalion all the way up to the War Department. Each group is under a chief who is on the staff of the commander of the battalion or higher organization to which the group is assigned. The strength and composi-

tion in personnel of each group is determined in such a manner as to best meet the Intelligence necessities of its particular headquarters. The chief of each group in the field is in quick communication with the chief of every adjacent group. The personnel of all groups is animated by a common desire to gain, value and distribute information of the enemy to their own immediate commander and adjacent Intelligence Service groups, and to prevent the enemy from gaining information concerning its own forces.

Looked at in this way it is evident that the organization and distribution of the Intelligence Service results in a network of personnel thrown over and interwoven into the military machine for a definite purpose. It is in the nature of the nerve system of the body so that if any part of the net comes in contact with, or gains any information concerning the enemy, the results will be promptly transmitted through the system to the places where needed.

Group Organization

The strategical and tactical requirements of the commander determine the internal organization of the Intelligence Service group. Thus the group at the War Department is occupied in gaining Intelligence which is essentially of a strategical nature. The same is true of the group at the general headquarters in the field (G.H.Q.), and to a lesser extent at each army headquarters. At corps, division and lower headquarters, however, the group is primarily concerned with gathering Intelligence of a tactical nature.

The four general classes of duty of the Intelligence Service, as prescribed at present, furnish a convenient guide for internal organization into sections. Such a

division is readily adapted to the size of any group and the demands made upon it. The four sections are:

- (a) Military Information
- (b) Espionage and Counter-espionage
- (c) Topography and Maps
- (d) Censorship, Press, etc.

The Military Information section is concerned with information of the enemy. Its chief activity, in Intelligence Service groups with troops, is in the field of Combat Intelligence.

The Espionage and Counter-espionage section is the Secret Service part of Intelligence. The Espionage subsection gathers information of the enemy for the use of the Information section. The Counter-espionage subsection has for its duty that of protecting its own forces against the efforts of the enemy Intelligence Service to gain information.

The Topography and Map section is charged with formulating policies in connection with the preparation of topographical information, map reproduction and map supply.

The Censorship and Press section has to do with all measures of censorship and with those matters relating to propaganda and publicity designed to assist the military forces, and to prevent the publication of matter which might hurt our cause or be of benefit to the enemy.

At army and higher headquarters, the personnel of the Intelligence Service group is divided among these four sections. The lines between the sections are clearly drawn at such headquarters, because each section has its full function to perform. The assigned personnel is highly specialized and performs no duties except those pertain-

ing to its own particular section. At corps headquarters the lines between sections begin to fade out. At division headquarters the lines are less distinct and the same personnel may perform duties relating to any one or all of the sections. By the time the battalion group is reached the division into sections has disappeared and the entire personnel is engaged in duties which pertain practically only to those included in the Military Information section of the higher headquarters. If any Intelligence Service duties pertaining to the other sections should be required, the organization is sufficiently flexible to provide for them.

Each of these four sections at higher headquarters is divided into an office force and a field force. In addition the Intelligence Service group at army and higher headquarters has an executive, or administrative section designed to assist the Chief of Intelligence, G-2, in coördinating the activities of the other sections.

War Department Group

The War Department group is organized so as to take care of the Intelligence Service duties pertaining to the whole military establishment of the country. Its organization is not prescribed. It must be flexible enough to meet the requirements of its mission in peace as well as in war. It is the only group which is active in time of peace. All other groups in time of peace are concerned only with training their personnel so as to be prepared to function efficiently in time of war.

In principle the War Department Intelligence Service group is organized in time of peace with only the number of officers and clerks that are required to carry on the systematic accumulation of permanent information concerning foreign nations needed for the preparation of

war plans and for the prosecution of war under any conditions that may arise. Ordinarily this information is gathered from maps, statistics, publications, military attachés, special agents and other available or convenient sources.

If war comes, the War Department Intelligence Service must be ready to make a tremendous expansion in order to meet its wartime duties. These will require it to furnish its armies with Intelligence of the enemy's military situation, to coöperate with other departments and agencies of the government, and to establish and supervise the necessary counter-espionage measures against the activities of the enemy Intelligence Service. The organization of the War Department Intelligence Service in time of war will be determined by the circumstances and character of the war, the location and extent of the theaters of operations, the number and strength of enemy nations and many other factors.

Intelligence Organization at G.H.Q.

The organization of the Intelligence Division of the General Staff at a general headquarters (G.H.Q.) of forces in the field cannot be prescribed in time of peace unless the particular circumstances of the war are known in advance and the whole plan of operations is definitely determined. Even under such conditions the organization would be a special one which probably would not meet the needs of any other G.H.Q. However, a general plan for its organization may be made. Such a plan always should include provision for the four sections into which the Intelligence Service is functionally divided, since the Intelligence Division at any G.H.Q., under the present assignment of duties, must be prepared to take care of them.

Organization and Personnel at Lower Headquarters

The organization of the Intelligence Division of the General Staff at army, corps and division headquarters, and the personnel required for duty with each group, will vary according to the Intelligence requirements of the commander and staff of the unit. These requirements will depend upon the mission and the particular circumstances under which the command is operating.

A general outline of the organization and an estimate of the personnel required for army, corps and division headquarters Intelligence Service groups is given here as a matter of interest and in order to give an idea of their composition and size.

The estimate of personnel, which does not include officers who might be serving as understudies to those on duty, was made by a board of experienced Intelligence Officers convened by G.H.Q., A.E.F., in February, 1919.

SECOND DIVISION, GENERAL STAFF, OF A FIELD ARMY

A. *Personal Office of the Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2.*

- 1 colonel, General Staff—Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2.
- 1 lieutenant colonel, General Staff—Assistant.
- 1 field clerk—Chief clerk, in charge of office, records, etc.
- 1 enlisted man—Filing clerk.
- 2 enlisted men—Orderlies.

B. *Message Center*

- 1 first lieutenant—In charge.
- 3 field clerks—Stenographers and typists.
- 3 enlisted men—Typists.
- 4 enlisted men—Orderlies and messengers (2 horsed, 2 with bicycles).
- 2 enlisted men—Motorcyclist messengers.

C. *Enemy Order of Battle*

- 1 captain—In charge.

- I first lieutenant—Assistant.
- I second lieutenant—Assistant. Maintains Intelligence maps and other data in offices of Commanding General and Chief of Staff.
- I enlisted man—Draughtsman.
- I enlisted man—Clerk.

D. *Enemy Activity, Circulation and Movement*

- I captain—In charge.
- I enlisted man—Draughtsman.
- I enlisted man—Clerk.

E. *Ground Observation Stations*

- I first lieutenant—In charge. This officer belongs to and carries on observation work under the directions of subsection D.
- 42 enlisted men—Observation stations (provisions for six).

F. *Airplane Reconnaissance*

- I captain—In charge.
- I enlisted man—Clerk.

G. *Enemy Works*

- I captain—In charge.
- I first lieutenant—Data concerning the location of our own and the enemy front line; interpretation of photographs.
- I first lieutenant—Examination of captured maps; keeping of town files and sector dossiers; interpretation of photographs.
- I second lieutenant—Supervision of work of restitution of airplane photographs; supervision of the preparation of Intelligence maps; supervision of map filing and distribution; interpretation of photographs.
- I enlisted man—In charge of all files and of the distribution of maps and photographs.
- 6 enlisted men—Restitution of Intelligence plan directeurs from photographs and general drafting work.

H. *Artillery Information*

- I captain—In charge.
- I enlisted man—Draughtsman.

I. *Radio Intelligence*

- 1 captain—In charge.
- 1 first lieutenant—Assistant.
- 6 field clerks—Code and cipher experts. Translators.
- 3 enlisted men—Clerks.

J. *Examination of Prisoners and Documents*

- 1 captain—In charge.
- 4 first lieutenants—Corps of Interpreters.
- 4 second lieutenants—Corps of Interpreters.
- 3 enlisted men—Stenographers and typists.
- 14 enlisted men—Interpreters. Office assistants and assistants at the prisoner-of-war cage.

K. *Branch Intelligence*

- (a) At the airdrome of the day reconnaissance group:
 - 1 first lieutenant—Branch Intelligence Officer.
 - 2 enlisted men—Draughtsmen.
 - 1 enlisted man—Clerk.
 - 1 enlisted man—Orderly.
- (b) At the airdrome of the night reconnaissance group:
 - 1 first lieutenant—Branch Intelligence Officer.
 - 2 enlisted men—Draughtsmen.
 - 1 enlisted man—Clerk.
 - 1 enlisted man—Orderly.

L. *Espionage and Contre-Espionage*

- 1 major, General Staff—In charge.
- 1 first lieutenant—Assistant.
- 2 enlisted men—Clerks and typists.
- 12 enlisted men—Intelligence Police.

M. *Topography and Maps*

- 1 lieutenant colonel, General Staff—In charge. This officer is a member of the G-2 organization.
- 1 battalion of Engineers—Attached to G-2. This organization furnishes all draughtsmen, flash and sound ranging detachments and the personnel for the ground observation posts of the army, in addition to retaining in hand the skilled personnel needed for the performance of its own peculiar duties.

N. *Propaganda and Press Matters*

- 1 captain—In charge. Press matters.
- 1 first lieutenant—Propaganda.
- 1 enlisted man—Typist.

SECOND DIVISION, GENERAL STAFF, OF A CORPS

A. *Personal Office of the Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2.*

- 1 lieutenant colonel, General Staff—Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2.
- 1 major, General Staff—Assistant.
- 1 field clerk—Correspondence, filing, records, codes, ciphers, etc.
- 2 enlisted men—Orderlies.

B. *Message Center*

- 1 second lieutenant—In charge.
- 3 enlisted men—One stenographer and two typists.
- 6 enlisted men—Orderlies and messengers (2 horsed, 4 with bicycles).
- 3 enlisted men—Motorcyclist messengers.

C. *Enemy Order of Battle*

Examination of Prisoners and Documents.

- 1 captain—In charge.
- 1 first lieutenant—Assistant. Corps of Interpreters.
- 1 second lieutenant—Corps of Interpreters.
- 1 field clerk—Stenographer and general office work.
- 4 enlisted men—Interpreters and assistants.
- 2 enlisted men—Draughtsmen and clerk for battle order.

D. *Enemy Activity, Circulation and Movement*

- 1 first lieutenant—In charge.
- 27 enlisted men—Observers.

E. *Airplane Reconnaissance*

- 1 first lieutenant—In charge.

F. *Enemy Works*

- 1 captain—In charge.
- 1 first lieutenant—Assistant. Airplane photographs.

- 1 first lieutenant—Geologist and topographer for field work and terrain data.
- 3 enlisted men—Restitution from airplane photographs.
- 2 enlisted men—Assistants in handling and in the general study of airplane photographs.

G. *Artillery Information*

- 1 first lieutenant—In charge.
- 1 enlisted man—Assistant.

H. *Espionage and Contre-Espionage*

- 1 first lieutenant—In charge.
- 3 enlisted men—Intelligence Police.

I. *Topography and Maps*

- 1 captain—In charge.
- 2 enlisted men—In charge of map distribution.
- 9 enlisted men—Mobile map reproduction train.
- 2 enlisted men—Dorel process.
- 7 enlisted men—For general draughting work.

J. *Branch Intelligence*

- (a) At the airdrome of the Corps Observation Group.
 - 1 first lieutenant—Branch Intelligence Officer.
 - 2 enlisted men—Draughtsmen.
 - 1 enlisted man—Clerk.
 - 1 enlisted man—Orderly.

SECOND DIVISION, GENERAL STAFF, OF A DIVISION

A. *Personal Office of the Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2.*

- 1 major, General Staff—Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2.
- 1 captain—Assistant.
- 1 enlisted man—Clerk, stenographer and typist. In charge of office, records, codes, ciphers, etc.
- 1 enlisted man—Orderly.

B. *Message Center*

- 1 second lieutenant—In charge.
- 2 enlisted men—Stenographers and typists.

3 enlisted men—Orderlies and messengers (1 horsed, 2 with bicycles).

2 enlisted men—Motorcyclist messengers.

C. *Enemy Order of Battle*

Examination of Prisoners and Documents.

1 first lieutenant—In charge. Corps of Interpreters.

1 second lieutenant—Corps of Interpreters.

2 enlisted men—Interpreters.

D. *Enemy Activity, Circulation and Movement*

1 first lieutenant—In charge.

20 enlisted men—Observers.

E. *Enemy Works*

1 first lieutenant—In charge.

1 second lieutenant—Assistant.

2 enlisted men—Draughtsmen.

F. *Artillery Information*

1 second lieutenant—In charge.

G. *Topography and Maps*

1 first lieutenant—In charge.

1 enlisted man—In charge of maps.

2 enlisted men—General draughting.

BRIGADE—REGIMENT—BATTALION

The following outlines of the organization and approximate personnel of the Intelligence Service of the infantry brigade, regiment and battalion, and of the Information Service of the artillery brigade and regiment, are given merely as guides. Tables of Organization for wartime units prescribe the personnel by rank and numbers but give no detailed information as to the assignment of duties. Tables of Organization are subject to change and have not been strictly followed.

Infantry Brigade

- 1 captain—Brigade Intelligence Officer.
- 1 sergeant—Draughtsman and clerk.
- 1 sergeant—Interpreter and clerk.
- 2 pvts. 1st Cl.—Orderlies.

Infantry Regiment

- 1 captain—Regimental Intelligence Officer.
 - 1 sergeant
 - 2 corporals
 - 12 pvts. 1st Cl.
- } Observer Group.
- 1 pvt. 1st Cl.—Orderly.
 - 1 sergeant—Interpreter and clerk.

Infantry Battalion

- 1 lieutenant—Battalion Intelligence Officer.
 - 1 sergeant
 - 4 corporals
 - 12 privates 1st Cl.
- } Scout Group.
-
- 1 sergeant
 - 2 corporals
 - 12 privates 1st Cl.
- } Observer Group.

Artillery Brigade

- 1 captain—Brigade Intelligence Officer.
- 1 sergeant—Draughtsman and clerk.
- 2 pvts. 1st Cl.—Orderlies.

Artillery Regiment

- 1 lieutenant—Regimental Intelligence and Information Officer.
- 1 sergeant—Draughtsman and clerk.
- —Artillery Observer Personnel.

CHAPTER IV

PROBLEMS OF MODERN WAR

"Wars, like those waged in modern times, are not fought with weapons alone, for politics, and particularly economics, play a far greater part than in wars of bygone days."

Purpose of This Chapter

It is the purpose of this chapter to discuss certain general aspects of the relations between nations which have a definite bearing upon the causes of war and which should be regarded as the foundations upon which the Intelligence Service must build if it is to perform its function of furnishing the War Department with the information required for the preparation of war plans. The discussion is as brief as is consistent with conveying an understanding of the effects of present day conditions upon the causes and conduct of war.

War and Civilization

It has been stated that combat between organized groups of men—that is, war—started with the dawn of civilization because civilization was made possible when human animals, manifesting an intelligence superior to that of brute animals, combined together for the mutual protection of their food supplies and for the purpose of acting in concert in hunting down and securing their food. This combination enabled them to do other things than merely hunt for and guard their food supplies. It made easier the struggle for existence, and at the same time

gave men an opportunity to improve themselves, their habitations and surroundings and thus gradually to become civilized.

History of Wars

History reveals that there have been wars since the beginning of the record of human activities. It pictures war in its various stages, down through the centuries, as ever enlarging and increasing in the size of the communities taking part as belligerents. In the earliest times families made war on other families, later village opposed village, then came wars between cities, afterwards between provinces, then between states, and later still between nations. Finally in our day wars are carried on between groups of nations in combination against other groups of nations.

It may not be true that history repeats itself but in spite of "the moral law," "the new understanding," "the conscience of mankind," "the new state of mind," and the many other new things heralded as having come about since the World War, there are no signs or indications that history is not to continue to record the story of wars. While it has shown the ever-increasing size of wars, due to the larger communities participating in them, history has not as yet revealed anything which changes the basic or fundamental relations which existed between men before civilization started, and between the families, villages, cities, provinces, states, nations and groups of nations, which successively have occupied the stage as enemies in war since civilization has been known.

The conception that life is a struggle for existence applies equally to the life of the individual and of the community, whether it be the small village or city of ancient times or the nation of modern days. The progress of civi-

lization has not seemed to affect these primitive relations. In fact, it may be stated that in spite of the advance and progress of centuries, it is still necessary to be prepared to defend civilization to prevent it from tumbling down about our heads.

Future Wars

Civilization has probably advanced far enough to prevent there being any wars between nations in the future for other than purely economic reasons, although racial or religious prejudice may arouse people to the fighting point. But, so long as, between the several nations, there exists a different state of well being, comfort, standard of living or whatever words may be used to describe the state of civilization of a people, there will be strivings, on the part of those peoples not so well off, to gain for themselves and their nation a state of civilization at least as high as that enjoyed by the inhabitants of other nations with whom they come in contact. Such strivings sooner or later will bring the nation into conflict with the aims of some other nation. If diplomacy fails to reach a satisfactory compromise or solution there will be war.

Nation in Arms

Because of the absence of a super-power, able to punish nations for their disregard of the rights of other nations or to protect nations against the encroachments of others, each nation is compelled to hold itself ready to fight for its rights and necessities if it expects to survive. By reason of the immense military power that may be brought to bear upon it by enemy nations, each nation to-day must be prepared to exert its full strength in the prosecution of war. Modern war has developed the "nation in arms" in every sense of the word.

Place of War

The logical deduction from the foregoing consideration and from the teaching of history is that war is a phase of international relations.

The practical lesson from this conception as applied to the external relations of the United States is: that the United States in time of peace must be prepared to transform itself at any time into a state of war. To do this rapidly and efficiently it must possess all possible information concerning foreign nations which might become its enemies.

The processes by which the foreign relations of the United States are carried on are, first, that in time of peace the State Department, under the President, carries on international relations by use of its instrument—diplomacy; second, that in time of hostilities the War Department, in the sense of the war making powers under the President, carries on these relations by use of its instrument—war.

Function of the State Department

It is the function of the State Department to have such full and complete information regarding the situation, aims and ambitions of other nations as will enable it to carry on its diplomatic dealings and intercourse with them in the interests of the United States.

Functions of the War Department

When war comes the War Department is expected to produce its war plans for the organization of its military forces and its measures for prosecuting the war. Such plans and measures necessarily are based upon information of the enemy. Therefore, whether or not the State Department functions in this respect, the War Depart-

ment must have sufficient information for the preparation of its war plans and for perfecting its measures for the prosecution of the war. It would be inexcusable in these days of easy communication between nations, for the War Department not to have full and complete information which might be needed in war.

State and War Departments

While the fullest coöperation between the State Department and War Department no doubt always exists there is such a wide difference in the scope and character of the information needed by each of them, due to the different uses made of it, that it is necessary for each to maintain its own system for gaining and recording information concerning other countries.

Aims and Ambitions of Nations

Every nation has its aims and ambitions. They may not be voiced by the national government, but they must exist or the nation will decay and become the prey of other nations.

The aims and ambitions of a nation may be born out of the desires or necessities of its people or may be based upon national greed and selfishness. Whatever their origin, they are always sure and certain guides to the course of action that a nation will take in its international dealings.

An accurate estimate of the aims and ambitions of a nation may be gained by the careful study of its history, its geographical location and surroundings, its political system and form of government, its military system, its state of preparedness for war, its requirements in foreign trade and commerce, its economic situation, the standard of living of its people, their psychology, and various

other factors. Such an estimate will be more trustworthy if it is measured by the situation of our own and other countries as determined by similar studies.

Statesmen, knowing the aims and ambitions of other nations, ought to be able in most cases to secure their national objectives through diplomacy and conference without recourse to force of arms. At the very least they should be able to foresee an approaching clash of vital interests which threaten war in time to warn their people and to have them fully prepared to meet it before the catastrophe is upon them.

United States Relations

From the very nature of its government the relations of the United States with other nations are chiefly confined to forwarding its trade and commerce. Diplomatic intercourse is maintained in order to secure an equality with other nations in opportunities to buy and sell commercial products. The United States is not concerned with extending its political domination along with its commerce and it has never manifested a desire to seize the territory of other people in order to gain trade advantages. One of its cardinal policies is to foster self-government among the peoples of the world.

Other Nations

With many other governments foreign intercourse frequently is conducted with the possibility of gaining new territory, in the background. Sometimes there is present a willingness to exploit other lands and peoples and bring them under political domination, regardless of the wishes of the inhabitants, in order to gain exclusive trade privileges. One of the results of this willingness to subjugate other nations is to offer to such predatory governments a

constant temptation to use military force in order to gain their ends. Often it becomes a question of what will be the cost and what will be the return. Considerations of right or wrong apparently do not enter into the calculation at such a time nor does justice or square dealing have a voice. It is purely a question of strength and ability to win that decides their course.

Causes of War

National aims and ambitions based upon greed and selfishness always present a possibility of war, but not the only one because to-day, with the enormously increased population of the world which has spread out into all known habitable areas, another possibility has developed.

With the rapidly increasing population in the United States it seems probable that it will some day operate to involve us. This cause of war may be considered as follows:

The inhabitants of a community or nation must eat, must be clothed, must have houses to live in, must have furniture, household effects, automobiles and all of the other things which go to make up their state of comfort or standard of living. In order to have the things necessary to maintain this standard they must have sufficient land and resources from which to produce and manufacture the commodities, which, by trade and exchange, they may transform into the things they require.

There is a limit to the number of people that can be supported on a square mile of ground at a given standard of living. When this limit is exceeded by a nation, more land must be secured or the standard of living must be lowered.

In every country at some time or other it will be found

that due to the steady increase of population within fixed boundaries it is necessary to face such an alternative. Possibly matters may be arranged without interfering with the aims and ambitions or the necessities of other nations. Lands close by may be found to which the excess population may be sent or more manufacturing activity may be developed within the national boundaries. But occasionally, in trying to solve this problem of its necessities, a nation will find another nation in a similar situation, trying to acquire more land or sources of raw materials, or additional markets for its manufactured goods and the vital interests of the two nations will clash.

Such a condition will require that the interests be compromised in some way, that one of the nations give up its aims, or that there be an appeal to force of arms. The necessities of a growing people constitute vital interests. The failure to satisfy them means the decline of the nation. Those who profess to believe that war can be prevented by treaties, alliances or proclamation or avoided by refusing to fight, ignore these fundamental economic conditions and shut their eyes to the fact that in this world it is still necessary for the nation as well as for the individual to fight for life and existence.

Alliances

If two nations whose interests clash are approximately equal in size and strength, equally determined and ambitious to carry out their aims, equally prepared to fight for what each considers to be its vital interests, the chances are that a compromise will be effected, because no nation will initiate war unless there is a good chance to win. Unfortunately for the peace of the world, nations are seldom equal in the qualities mentioned or in the many other

things that go to make up their possible effort in war. In some things they may be equal and in others they may strike such a balance as will give them an approximate equality which will make each of them realize that it probably cannot win a decision in war. Such a situation, however, is exceptional because nations looking ahead, foreseeing their necessities or foreseeing a clash of vital interests with some other nation, have developed the custom of forming alliances with other nations in order to make themselves superior in war strength to their rival. This generally has the effect of forcing the rival nation, in turn, to form an alliance of its own with some other nation. While this may serve to restore the equality, it frequently has the effect of overbalancing the relative strength and the first nation must seek additional allies. This process which may be regarded as an application of the principle of the balance of power, went on in Europe previous to 1914 until nearly every government in Europe and Asia was committed to one or the other of the two great groups of Allies.

Balance of Power

While the practice of this principle of the balance of power may make for peace, because of the fear on the part of any nation of starting a war, it is certainly responsible for the evil of maintaining large military establishments by the nations involved as allies. Also it often places the preservation of peace in the hands of the ruler of almost any small and insignificant country who may start a great world war by making war on an equally insignificant neighbor who is a member of one of the opposing allied groups. It is due to the growth of this custom of making alliances and of maintaining the balance of power that wars of to-day are waged between

groups of nations because the instant any one of the allies becomes involved all the others on both sides must take up arms.

Armies in Former Wars

Heretofore war has been fought by armies rather than by nations. From the point of view of Military Intelligence the information necessary for the successful prosecution of a war was chiefly that which related to the enemy army and did not necessarily include that relating to the enemy nation as a whole. Even in comparatively recent times armies have been off in the theater of operations, fighting and carrying on their campaigns, while the mass of their people were at home pursuing their ordinary vocations, frequently being only casually interested in the military operations. It was possible to use only a part of the resources of the nation for the war effort, and compared to present day conditions, only a small part of the population could be employed in providing supplies for the fighting army.

Transportation—Communications

Modern war has changed all of this, partially for the reasons given above, but more especially because of the great development in means of transportation and the scientific improvements in the methods of communication. These factors make it possible to utilize the entire military resources of the nation for the prosecution of war, and, because it is possible, it becomes necessary if success is to be gained.

The size of the military forces that can successfully be employed in military operations is limited to the numbers that can be organized, supplied with clothing, food, munitions and other necessities and maneuvered in battle under

the control of one commander. The practical difficulties in supplying large bodies of troops have been overcome by modern transportation facilities which not only permit railways to be built almost with the speed of marching armies but also provide motor transportation able to travel faster than armies and therefore to keep the armies supplied at all time. The physical obstacles to the exercise of command have been eliminated by modern communications which provide the telegraph, telephone, wireless and other means of rapid communication, by which to send orders and directions for coördinating the movements of large and widely separated elements.

To-day from a strictly military point of view of practical operations there is no limit to the size of the military forces that may be controlled by one commander.

Economic Factor

The limiting factor in the size of a command to-day is found in the sum total of the economic resources of the nation itself, of its allies and of neutral countries from which supplies may be obtained throughout the duration of the war.

Economic resources which will permit of supplying ten millions of men in the items of food, clothing, equipment and munitions must also permit of providing the necessary means of transportation so that the supply may be kept up, and of furnishing the requisite means of communication so that direction and control may be exercised by one commander.

The maximum fighting strength of any nation, therefore, may be calculated by a determination of its economic resources or, more strictly, military resources. The difference between economic and military resources is that the first named includes every economic resource of the

country, whether or not it may be of use in war, while the second includes only those items possible to convert into war uses or essential for the use of the population during the war. Due to the developments of science in the utilization of resources for war purposes, the difference between the two terms is constantly growing less.

Military Resources

The chief item in military resources is man-power. That for providing fighting men as well as that for providing labor for industrial activity must be considered. Production must be greatly increased in war because, in addition to the needs of the military forces, the ordinary needs of the population must be satisfied. Hence in calculating man-power it becomes necessary to take into account not only the number of males of all ages but also to include females of all ages, for experience proves that the latter are capable of performing many of the duties in industry ordinarily performed by men. The same is true to a certain extent in regard to boys and old men. Therefore an estimate of the ultimate man-power of a nation includes a classification by age and sex of every man, woman and child within its boundaries.

Important items of military resources include food supplies, agricultural possibilities, raw materials available for the manufacture of munitions, equipment, clothing, etc., transportation of every variety both land and sea and the limits to which it may be increased, communication instruments and materials out of which they may be manufactured, and innumerable other items essential in the making of articles needed in war. Nitrates vital in the manufacture of explosives, for example, are necessary in quantity for the production of munitions. The nation

which cannot control a sufficient supply of them cannot prosecute a modern war.

Other Factors

While the maximum strength of the fighting forces that can be raised and maintained by a nation, may be determined by a study of the economic and military resources, the maximum war effort which a nation will put forth under given conditions cannot be estimated without careful consideration of certain additional factors which frequently operate to prevent the full development of the fighting strength. These factors are those which relate to the military situation, the political situation, and the psychology of the people.

Military Situation Factor

A study of the military situation includes a consideration of the military power, the military system by which the country plans to raise its war forces, the state of training, organization, supply arrangements and readiness of reserve or second line forces, and other purely military considerations which will give an idea of the military development that may be anticipated and the time in which it may be accomplished.

Military Power

Military power may be described as that part of the military resources which have been converted into form for immediate use in war. An untrained man, not enlisted, nor assigned to a military organization, nor trained in the duties of a soldier, is a part of the military resources. But when he has been enlisted, assigned to a unit, and trained as a soldier, he becomes a part of the military power. Copper in the ground which may be

mined and made into wire or iron which may be made into steel and then into a gun or rifle, is classed in military resources. But copper already mined and made into wire and placed, for example, where it belongs in a field telephone instrument, or iron made into steel and then into a gun and issued to troops, is part of the military power.

The distinction is thus seen to be that military resources are things in their raw material shape, while military power is made up of those same things after they have been converted into shape and put into their proper places ready for immediate use in military operations.

How Military Power Protects

It is the failure to understand this very simple distinction which causes so many people to be deceived when they talk of war in connection with the United States. The statements, that we can raise a million men over night, that we are so big that no nation will attack us and so rich that we cannot be defeated, and many others of such character, are ignorantly made by those who fail to understand or to appreciate the difference between military resources and military power. They do not stop to consider that the fighting strength of a nation is determined, for any particular moment, by its military power, that is, by the extent to which its military resources have been converted into fighting strength. They refuse to recognize that the country may be defeated or at least made to suffer great losses by an enemy who possesses fewer resources but greater power, long before it can raise the necessary military power to defend itself. In other words they cannot seem to understand that time is the essential element in the process of converting military resources into military power.

The Russo-Japanese War is an example of such a situation. Japan with greater military power defeated Russia, a country with probably ten times the military resources of Japan, before Russia could raise the necessary military power to defend itself. Japan dared to attack Russia because she realized the difference which has been explained. Germany dared to force the United States into the World War because the United States, though immensely strong in military resources, was pitifully weak in military power. China to-day is an example of a country, with immense military resources but without any military power, which is helpless before the demands of other governments having fewer military resources but greater military power.

Political Factor

In former days, when only a part of the military resources of a nation was necessary for the prosecution of military operations, a war could be carried on by the rulers regardless of whether or not it was approved and backed up by the whole nation. To-day since it is requisite that the entire nation give up everything else and devote its energies to winning the war, the war must be one for which the people will fight. This consideration makes it necessary to take into account the political situation of a nation. It is essential to determine the type of its political system, whether despotic or liberal, to ascertain what power rests in the government, whether or not it will be able to force its people to give full support to the particular war under consideration, etc. The political relations of the nation with other nations and its alliances are important factors. Its neighbors, whether or not these would be a threat or a help to it in case the nation engaged in the war; the geographical location of the

country with regard to the possible theater of operations; neutral nations whose external political relations possibly would force them into the war; and many other considerations must be taken into account in determining how much of a war effort will be made by a nation under a given situation.

Psychological Factor

The psychology of the people will give many indications of the probable war effort. A study of its many aspects may greatly assist in calculating the value of the troops, both individually and collectively. Racial antipathies and hatreds, temperament and climatic disposition, religious antagonisms or similarities, historical friendships or enmities, and many other characteristics will tend to indicate the probable action and reaction of the mass of the people under the assumed conditions and will be of great value in estimating their war effort.

The Four Factors

These four factors, *economic, military, political, and psychological*, must be considered and studied as a whole in order to gain an accurate estimate of what the war effort of any nation is likely to be in any given situation.

United States in the World War

In spite of their peaceful disposition and their sincere desire to confine their foreign relations to trade and commerce, the people of the United States have been unable to avoid war.

When nations become engaged in war they are fighting for national existence to-day, to a much greater extent than in former days, and as a consequence they will go to

much greater lengths to win the decision. A belligerent will not hesitate to involve a nation, weak in military power, in the war if by so doing it will increase its own chances of winning. This was illustrated by the events which drew the United States into the World War. The Central Powers apparently deemed the United States more dangerous to themselves as a neutral than as an enemy. The reason for this evidently was that the United States which had no military power had great military resources available for sale to any belligerent who could come and purchase them. Germany could not do this but the Allies could and as a matter of fact were purchasing them in ever increasing quantities. By making the United States an enemy the Central Powers at once became able to attack shipments of supplies from the United States to the Allies and at the same time forced the United States to convert to its own uses a large part of the resources that before had been on the market available for the Allies to buy. Of course the Central Powers were counting on being able to defeat the Allies before the United States could convert sufficient of its resources into military power to become a factor in the war as a combatant enemy. Fortunately, the Allies were able to take a new lease on life and prevent the enemy from gaining their expected decision long enough to let us get our armies into the theater of operations and to become the deciding factor in the outcome.

However, it was more than a year after we declared war before we had sufficient military forces in the field to be of any use to the Allies.

To Keep Out of War

The situation would have been quite different, however, if we had looked forward in 1915 and realized what we

were forcing the Central Powers to do. Even in 1916, if we had prepared ourselves to defend our right to sell our goods to those who could come and buy them we would probably not have been compelled to enter the war. For example, if by that time we had converted enough of our resources into military power to be of immediate fighting value to the Allies, the Central Powers would not have permitted us to have any excuse for entering the war, because then we would at once have become a factor in the war and they would not have risked our entering it. They would have been compelled to take such other measures as they could to prevent our resources being made available to the Allies. It is clear from this that the weakness of the United States in military power forced it into the war.

The German Estimate?

The Intelligence Division of the Great German General Staff was said to have made an estimate of the military situation of the United States, which, briefly, was to the following effect:

Political. That the United States would not adopt the selective service or draft system and therefore would not be able to raise a sufficient number of men in time to become a military factor in helping the Allies.

Economic. That even if she did raise a sufficient number of men, she would be unable to provide clothing, equipment, munitions, matériel, and other supplies for them and most important, would be unable to transport them to the theater of operations in time to have them become a factor.

Military. That even if she did raise and equip, munition and otherwise supply such a force she would be unable to organize and train it for modern war because

there were not enough officers in the American regular military forces experienced in war of to-day to complete the necessary organization and training in time to make the army a factor.

Psychological. That even though she did do all these things and got the forces equipped and trained, and transported to France, it was probable from a study of the American public and of the American government that it would be found that the American people would not support the war, and, in short, that Americans would not fight.

Why They Made It

Careful consideration of the situation of the German nation, of the Allies, and of the general military situation, when coupled with the above estimate of the military capacity and probable war effort of the United States was such as to cause the German government and its military advisers to risk having the United States enter the war. This is evident from the fact that the German government went right ahead and made its rulings as to neutral ships, where they could sail and how they must proceed, and did the other things that finally forced the United States to take up arms and declare war. The Germans dared to do these things only because they considered that the United States was too weak in military power to be able to exercise any military influence upon the ultimate result

What Might Have Been

If the estimate of the German Intelligence Service in late 1916 had been to the following effect, there would probably have been a different result:

That the United States has issued a draft call for a

million soldiers. She has them in process of being organized, equipped, clothed, munitioned and otherwise supplied, and has started to increase and to concentrate her ocean tonnage. She is rapidly building up her navy and if she is forced into the war she will be able at once to commence transporting an army to Europe. She is training these soldiers in modern war methods, in field exercises, in rifle and bayonet practice and in maneuvers of combined arms by divisional organizations. It is evident, by the spirit shown by the soldiers and sailors as well as the whole civilian population, that Americans are determined to protect their rights, that the nation will support the war and that Americans will fight. Finally, if America is brought into the war she will be a decisive factor within six months and we cannot defeat the Allies within that time.

If the situation had been such as to justify such an estimate by the German Intelligence Service the United States would not have been forced into the war. In addition to this, had the United States done as indicated she would have been in the position of a balance between the contending nations and could have done a real service to the world by bringing about a peace by the use of her economic and military position. At the same time there would have been no necessity for having to lose the life of a single American or to spend one-quarter of the immense sums expended in the war for the simple reason that America would not have been compelled to enter the war.

Any further consideration as to what America might have accomplished carries us too far into the realms of speculation and can be of no value.

The reported German Intelligence estimate is cited as an example of work which might have been done by the German Intelligence Service. That the estimate was

wrong in some particulars, especially in the conclusion that the American people would not support the war and that Americans would not fight, is evidence of the impression made by our lack of a national military policy. It gives an unflattering picture of how others might have seen us as a nation after an extended examination of our country and people.

That the estimate was approximately correct as to our political, economic and military situation is borne out by many facts. It was not until September 12th, 1918, one year and six months after we declared war that we were able to undertake any military operations. The great difficulties encountered before the draft measures were enacted into law indicate the narrow margin by which we were able to overcome the opposition to selective service. The unnecessary hardships and the great loss of life by sickness from exposure undergone before we could get our soldiers fully clothed and properly housed, and the strenuous efforts we had to make to get arms and ammunitions for them show the accuracy of the estimate of our economic situation. The time it took us to get our troops transported to France and the fact that we were hard put to get these troops trained for modern war almost justified the estimate of our military situation. We were so hard put in fact that in some of our battles we had casualties of infantry soldiers who had never fired a rifle. Thus we added many names to the already long list of unnecessary dead started in previous wars in which likewise we were unprepared.

The Error in the Estimate

The German estimate of their ability to gain a decision over the Allies within the next year, not their reported estimate of us, was their great error.

Our experience in being drawn into the World War, in which we suffered very great losses of men as well as immense losses in money, should serve to give us a national perspective, with regard to the value to ourselves, of what other nations think of us. If they think we are willing to fight and prepared to defend our rights they will not attack us. If they think we will not fight and if they know we are weak in military power, they will not hesitate to attack us if thereby their interests promise to be served.

War May Come

War generally comes about through the effort of some nation to take something away from some other nation. Possibly the war effort is made because of the necessities of a growing people, or possibly it is prompted by greed, selfishness, unworthy ambition or other ignoble sentiment or desire. Whatever may be the reason for the effort the nation attacked must be prepared to defend itself. That right is worth fighting for, that patriotism, love of country, willingness to fight to preserve the nation and a recognition that there are some things more unendurable than even a terrible war, are beliefs and ideals which a people must hold if they expect to preserve their country.

The Militarist and Pacifist

The militarist believes in utilizing military power for the accomplishment of national aims, regardless of the right or wrong of the case or of justice due the other nation. The pacifist recognizes no situation which justifies the use of military power to gain national aims and he also disregards the right or justice of the cause. Both militarist and pacifist are marked by their disregard of the right or justice of a cause. They are equally destructive

of the peace of the world and the progress and development of civilization.

The True Spirit

There is a middle course between these two which people should follow if they desire peace and prosperity. It is typified in the spirit of the Declaration of Independence and the Constitution of America. It embodies a recognition of international relations which sees things not as one would wish them to be but as they are. It deduces from such a view of these relations that the nation which will live in peace is most likely to be the one which attends to its own business and keeps itself free from promises to fight for other nations under any conditions at all; which practices the Golden Rule in its dealings with other nations; which seeks to sell what it has and to buy what it needs from foreign markets by the practice of business principles free from political pressure or interference in the business deal; which keeps enough of its military resources converted into military power to make any other nation look twice before it launches an attack, and finally, which uses principles of justice and right as its guides in all of its dealings with other nations.

The United States at War

The United States is not an aggressive nation. Its people desire to live at peace with the rest of the world. They do not want war. They want to trade with other nations and to have an equal opportunity in a business way in the world markets. They have always endeavored to practice justice and right in their relations with other nations. Yet they have a history of having had one year of war out of every six years of their national existence. That they have been unsuccessful in

their efforts to maintain peaceful relations has been due almost entirely to the failure to keep ready a sufficient amount of their resources, in the shape of military power, to command the respect of other nations with which they have had to deal.

No Need to go to War

There is no reason why the United States should ever have to go to war except because of an attack on its vital interests by some other nation or group of nations. The weaker the United States in military power the more likely is such an attack to come. The best insurance against it is not to follow the European idea of establishing a balance of power, but is to maintain such an amount of military power and such a spirit of willingness to fight for the right as will discourage any such attack being made. Since Americans are always willing to fight for the right, this peace insurance may be had by maintaining in full force and effect the provisions of the National Defense Act, as passed by Congress in 1920. The military power requisite for the above purpose will be provided if this should be done.

Lessons from the Past

Much of this may seem foreign to Military Intelligence but it is necessary to realize that any one who may be called on to study and report on what may be expected of some other nation, must comprehend the principles of action and the motives which govern individuals and nations. It may be assumed that those principles which will guide any particular nation in its actions to-day will depend upon those which have governed that nation in the past. If a nation has always played fair with other nations, has shown due regard for their necessities, and has

not subjugated weaker peoples for its own selfish purposes it will be safe to assume that it will not now start being unfair and unjust to other nations. But if it has done these things in the past and still holds sway over weaker peoples for trade advantages, then it is likely that it will take the same course of action again in spite of its promises, agreements, or treaties to the contrary.

It is essential that the aims and ambitions of the past, as well as of the present, of every nation be studied, because it is from an understanding of what they have done in the past that an intelligent idea may be gained of what the nation is likely to do in the future under similar conditions.

Likewise it is necessary that our own national plans, policies and intentions be known to the person making the study. The estimate of them, on the part of the foreign country, is one of the guiding considerations used by it in determining its own line of action.

National Policies and War Plans

If Germany had realized that we would fight, that we could and would go to the draft, and that we could train and equip and send into battle sufficient men to become the decisive factor in defeating her, she never would have made her plans as she did. The absence of a declared national policy on our part is an additional reason why Germany failed to estimate what we would be able and willing to do. Definite national policies are essential for proper national preparation in dealing with foreign nations either in peace or war.

Diplomatic Intercourse

The diplomat with a united and prepared people behind him, guided by definite national policies based on right

and justice, will be successful in his negotiations. No nation can rely upon expediency as a guide and expect to escape being placed in positions from which it will either have to recede or fight. On the other hand, where it retains the initiative by having its aims and ambitions clearly indicated in its national policies, it strengthens its representatives and also its national position because other nations will know where it stands. The United States has recognized and practiced principles of right and justice in its international relations and that fact is the only protection it has had in dealing diplomatically with other nations. The representatives of many other nations are given *carte blanche* to gain certain results and are empowered to trade to secure them. Our representatives cannot be given such authority because under our Constitutional government we wisely protect ourselves against the secret trading and dealings of diplomats by requiring the concurrence of two-thirds of the Senate in foreign treaties and hence we must make our proposals in the open. The greatest era of peace will come to the world when every nation is tied to a constitution which will minimize personality in government and maximize adherence to open dealings between nations based on written principles of right and justice.

Preparedness

In all dealings with other nations the diplomat who has the most accurate and most complete information concerning the aims and ambitions of the other nation will have the advantage. He will know what considerations will appeal to the other, what his weak points are and how to use them to forward the legitimate aims of his own people.

This is even more true with regard to preparation for

war. The nation which has an accurate estimate of the strength of the probable war effort of an enemy nation will be able to determine how much military power it will be necessary to raise in order to defeat him. The cost of war in blood and treasure due to wasted effort will be greatly reduced by the ability to estimate just what the enemy will be able to develop in military strength. If too little military power is raised the war may be lost before a sufficient amount can be brought into use. If too much is raised, the expense will be out of all proportion to the results achieved. Therefore one of the chief duties of the military advisors of the government is to give an accurate estimate of the aims, ambitions, probable war effort, and possible military strength of every nation in the world. This is a peace-time function of the War Department Intelligence Service in its broadest sense.

CHAPTER V

INTELLIGENCE SERVICE IN THE WORLD WAR

"From the character, the measures, the situation of the adversary, and the relations with which he is surrounded, each side will draw conclusions by the law of probability as to designs of the other, and act accordingly."

Intelligence Service in the United States

As a preliminary to a brief description of the activity of Intelligence during the World War the following outline of the history of the Intelligence Service in the United States is given.

In 1885 due to the request of the Secretary of War for information concerning the military establishment of a foreign nation there was created, as a part of the office of the Adjutant General, a bureau for the purpose of collecting military information. Its personnel consisted of one officer and one clerk.

In 1889 Congress passed an appropriation act authorizing the War Department to send officers abroad to obtain military information. This was the beginning of the military attaché system which has since played an important part in Military Intelligence work. The importance of gathering information of military nature was recognized and the bureau did a great deal of valuable work during the next few years. Its personnel was increased and apparently it was to be a permanent activity of the War Department. In 1903, when the General Staff was created, the bureau became the Second (Military Information) Division of that body.

In 1908, however, the division with its map collections, files and records, photographic gallery, library and personnel, was moved bodily to the War College building in Washington. The understanding is said to have been that this move was made simply to facilitate the use of the Intelligence material by the War College students and instructors and that it would not affect the organization or functions of the division in any way. However within a short time the division was consolidated with the Third (War College) Division to form a new Second Division of the General Staff. Its commissioned personnel was divided among the various committees of the new division, its clerical force was scattered, the library was united with that of the War College, the map collection was similarly disposed of, the photographic gallery was placed in charge of the Chief Clerk, and finally the records of the old Military Information bureau were consolidated and merged with those of the War College.

The result of this action was that from about 1910 the Military Intelligence Service consisted of nothing but a committee of the War College Division, General Staff, only two members of which were doing anything even remotely connected with Military Intelligence.

About one month after the United States entered the World War the first move was made to set up such a service. A Military Intelligence section was created as a part of the War College Division of the General Staff. To this two officers and two clerks were assigned. From that nucleus was built up the organization which functioned so efficiently throughout the war in the performance of War Department Intelligence duties. It was not, however, until August 26, 1918, that the Military Intelligence Division was created and designated as a separate and coördinate division of the General Staff.

The difficulties incident to having the Intelligence Division of the General Staff recognized and created a separate and coördinate division of that body, were not unlike those experienced in other countries participating in the World War. Because of the magnitude and importance of Intelligence work each of them found it necessary to provide a system to insure that all of the information of the enemy which could be gained would be scientifically valued and dealt with in a systematic manner by a single and separate agency composed of officers and men whose entire time and energy could be devoted to this duty. Experience indicated that officers charged with responsibility in connection with the operations of their own troops were inclined to judge of the plans and intentions of the enemy in the light of the desires and necessities of their own commander and his forces.

Development During the World War

In order to gain an idea of the great variety and immense volume of work done by Intelligence Service personnel during the World War, a brief description of the organization and duties of the Intelligence Division of the General Staff of the War Department and of G.H.Q. American Expeditionary Forces is here given.

War Department Intelligence

An extract from General Orders No. 80, War Department, dated August 26, 1918, establishing the Military Intelligence Division of the General Staff, reads as follows:

“Military Intelligence Division. This division shall have cognizance and control of Military Intelligence, both positive and negative, and shall be in charge of an offi-

cer, designated as the Director of Military Intelligence, who will be an Assistant to the Chief of Staff. He is also Chief Military Censor. The duties of this division are to maintain estimates revised daily, of the military situation, the economic situation, and of such other matters as the Chief of Staff may direct, and to collect, collate and disseminate military intelligence. It will coöperate with the Intelligence Section of the General Staffs of allied countries in connection with military intelligence; prepare instructions in military intelligence work for the use of our forces; supervise the training of personnel for intelligence work; organize, direct, and coördinate the intelligence service; supervise the work of Military Attachés; communicate directly with department intelligence officers and intelligence officers at posts, camps, and stations, and with commands in the field, in matters relating to military intelligence; obtain, reproduce and issue maps; translate foreign documents; disburse and account for intelligence funds; coöperate with the censorship board and with intelligence agencies of other departments of the government."

The following general description of the work of the War Department Intelligence Division during the World War is taken from publications of that Division and from lectures of the Director and other officers who were on duty with it.

MILITARY INTELLIGENCE DIVISION (M.I.D.)

The M.I.D. was organized so as to cover the whole world. Its problem was based upon the conception that the war was not being fought by military forces alone, but that there were also engaged economic, psychologic, social, political and even literary forces, and that a study

of these forces could not be confined to enemy countries but must be extended to include every country and people in the world. In addition to this the problem was considered to include as equally necessary the throwing of every possible safeguard about our own preparations for war and the discouraging of enemy agents who might in one way or another attempt to lower our morale, damage our industries, or debauch our soldiers. In short that we must protect against the foe within as well as against the foe without.

The problem which M.I.D. faced briefly stated was "to know as much about the enemy as possible and to prevent, if possible, the enemy's knowing anything about us."

The Director was provided with an Assistant Director and an Executive Assistant. M.I.D. was organized into a number of branches and sections, which were designated as M.I.-1, M.I.-2, etc.

M.I.-1 Administrative. The function of the chief of this section was the coördination of the activities of its several subsections; to visé communications not requiring the signature of the director or of his executive; to coördinate the work of all liaison officers; to be responsible for communications prepared for or received from the office of the Chief of Staff or Secretary of War.

M.I.-1-a. Personnel. Matters relating to appointments, enlistments, transfers, employment and promotion of Intelligence personnel. Divided into three branches:

Commissioned Personnel
Enlisted Personnel
Civilian Personnel

M.I.-1-b. Office Management. General charge of office building, correspondence and clerical force. Divided into four branches:

Records and Files
 Suspect Register
 Finance and Supply
 Guards, Watchmen and Visitors

M.I.-I-c. Publications. To edit, publish and distribute all summaries, reports, rosters, etc. The following list of publications was gotten out by this section:

1. Daily Intelligence Summary (Confidential)
2. Weekly Intelligence Summary (Secret)
3. Daily Report of Sections (Secret)
4. Weekly Report of Sections (Confidential)
5. Bi-Monthly Organization Report, Work and Activities M.I.D. (Secret)
6. Weekly Supplement to above including Press Reviews (Secret)
7. Monthly Directory (Confidential)
8. Weekly Bulletin for Intelligence Officers (Confidential)
9. Training Bulletin (Secret)
10. Library Bulletin (Confidential)
11. Occasional Handbooks, Books and Pamphlets of Instructions, etc.

The Positive Branch

This branch supervised and directed all agencies for the collection, collation, and dissemination of all material used in positive Intelligence activity. It was interested in securing all possible information concerning enemy and neutral countries to the end of furnishing the armies with prompt and accurate information of all kinds. In addition it was charged with the training of officers for

positive Intelligence duty. The branch was divided into the following sections with duties as indicated:

M.I.-2. Collation and Dissemination of Foreign Intelligence. This section was subdivided into seven subsections—combat, economic, monograph, political, psychological, dissemination and liaison.

The titles of the subsections indicate the character of work done by each of them.

M.I.-5. Collection of Foreign Intelligence and Supervision of Military Attachés. This section was divided into two subsections. One was charged with collecting information affecting the military situation coming from military attachés or special representatives, and forwarding it to M.I.-2 or other M.I.D. sections where it might be of value.

The other section was charged with the supervision of military attachés including their selection and instruction, and with correspondence, personnel matters and policies concerning them.

M.I.-6. Translation. General duty of making translations into English of matter printed in foreign tongues.

M.I.-7. Graphic Section. Charged with custody of map collection, distribution, drafting and reproduction of foreign and confidential maps and other matter for M.I.D.

M.I.-8. Cable and Telegraph Section. Among other duties sending and receiving telegrams and cables between M.I.D. and its Intelligence officers outside of Washington and to military attachés.

M.I.-9. Field Intelligence Instruction. Had to do with training matters connected with organization and instruction of Intelligence groups for new units formed in the United States. Supplied equipment, maps and material needed for training in Intelligence duties. Coöperated with Training Branch War Plans division, in

organizing, conducting and inspecting divisional and other Intelligence schools.

Negative Branch

This branch had as its duty to organize and supervise counter-espionage both in the United States and abroad. A body of agents was organized and assigned the duty of counteracting and suppressing the efforts of enemy agents directed against the civil population, the army and the industries of this country. In addition it was necessary to supervise plant protection, to represent the army on the Censorship Board and to give careful attention to such cases of irregularities in army contracts as might arise. Finally it was essential to maintain close coöperation with the many other agencies both civilian and governmental which had similar objects in view.

The branch was divided into the following sections :

M.I.- 3 Counter-espionage within the Army.

M.I.- 4 Counter-espionage among the Civil Population.

M.I.-10 Censorship.

M.I.-11 Passport Control.

M.I.-13 Graft and Fraud Investigations.

M.I.-3. Counter-espionage within the Army. As indicated by its name this section had as its function to organize, instruct and supervise the counter-espionage service within the military establishment. This section was divided into a number of subsections in order to facilitate office administration. By October, 1918, it comprised seventy-three officers and three volunteers and employed a clerical force of approximately one hundred.

To the original large field of activity assigned to the section were added the supervision of counter-espionage duties among civilians under military control and, for a

time, the investigation of graft in connection with the war army. Later the subsection handling cases of graft was made an independent section and designated as M.I.-13.

Field Organization. The problem of internal counter-espionage within military units was met by the publication of pamphlets of instructions for counter-espionage organization and work. Three such pamphlets were prepared and issued for the use of Intelligence officers. They were believed to present an adequate explanation of the organization and methods of operation of the Negative Intelligence Service.

There were at one time three hundred and ninety-five Intelligence officers of units, large and small, reporting to M.I.D. either directly or through Territorial Department Intelligence officers. A number of important cities in the eastern part of the United States were covered by special Intelligence officers, each with a more or less elaborate organization. In addition to these there were about twenty-one District Intelligence officers located at various centers in the west.

Control and coördination were exercised by M.I.D., without interference with the normal military command, by means of direct communication between the Intelligence officer concerned and M.I.D., and by means of direct communication between all Intelligence officers of units. Copies of all such lateral communications were sent to M.I.D., which in this way became a central reservoir of Intelligence information and was placed in a position to supervise and unify the work throughout the United States.

The instruction of Intelligence officers in the field presented many difficulties. It was partly accomplished through the manuals of instruction already mentioned. The experiment of bringing a few Intelligence officers to

Washington for special instruction was tried out in the latter part of 1917 and was repeated in September, 1918. Lectures were given by officers of M.I.-3, by experienced Intelligence officers, by representatives of the Judge Advocate General, the Department of Justice, and other agencies coöperating with M.I.D.

This plan of training was satisfactory so far as it went but obviously was impossible of application in the case of the great majority of Intelligence officers on account of the fact that they could not be spared from the many duties imposed upon them.

Trips of observation and instruction were made by M.I.D. officers with excellent results, but it was impracticable to spare the services of a sufficient number of experienced and competent officers from their duties in Washington to give this method a fair trial or to permit them to travel with any regularity in the performance of this duty.

M.I.-4. Counter-espionage among the Civil Population. It was the province of this section to discover and frustrate the action of enemy agents, both at home and abroad, who operated among the civilian population. The section investigated the activities of the enemy in propaganda, in sabotage and in the establishment of communications with their home country. It scrutinized the enemy's trade activities and financial transactions to ascertain if there were any which might impede our successful prosecution of the war. It sought to discover enemy influences among political, racial and religious groups and in other organizations. It watched individuals throughout the nation who, though not associated with the enemy, might nevertheless be engaged in activities likely to interfere with the progress of the war.

The section was divided into a number of subsections

each of which had some particular activity to look after. Advantage was taken of the territorial division of the United States into military departments and much of this work was done through the several Department Intelligence officers.

One of the most important subsections was that charged with maintaining "Liaison with Governmental and Civilian Agencies of Counter-espionage." It operated through many agencies including Intelligence officers with troops, Department Intelligence officers, Military Attachés in foreign countries, the Department of Justice, the State Department, the Office of Naval Intelligence and other similar ones.

In its Foreign Espionage subsection the attempt was made to discover the nature of the system of hostile espionage efforts and the persons prominent in establishing it. One of its principal duties was to ascertain the source of and to combat enemy propaganda against the United States and her allies in our own as well as in foreign countries.

The "Enemy Communications" subsection aimed to discover the channels through which enemy agents in the United States exchanged communications with their own governments. The passport regulations, which required the sanction of the military authorities to permit any one to enter or leave the United States, were of great assistance to this subsection in preventing communication by agents with foreign countries.

Other subsections were formed to take care of specific duties. Among them were "Labor and Sabotage," "Counter-propaganda," and "Religious, Political and Economic Organizations." The latter maintained strict surveillance over the activities of radical organizations of all kinds and

included surveillance of foreign racial groups throughout the country.

M.I.-10. Censorship. The Director of M.I.D. was designated as Chief Military Censor in July, 1918. This section was organized to conduct the activities which came to M.I.D. because of that appointment. It took over the entire censorship of newspapers, magazines, books, pamphlets and all forms of print likely to give information to the enemy or to injure public morale.

In addition to the foregoing, the section maintained a censorship on the announcements of the War Department. The effort was to have such supervision as would secure coördination and at the same time prevent one bureau from conflicting with another or betraying its secrets.

Thousands of government contracts were announced or withheld according to the necessities of the moment.

The censorship was centralized in Washington but had representatives at border and coastal points and worked everywhere in close liaison with the Naval Censorship, the Post Office Department, the Committee on Public Information and the Department of Justice.

Censorship was exercised primarily through the voluntary consent of the publishers of books, newspapers, magazines, etc., and of the officials in charge of the telegraph, telephone and other organizations or companies providing means of communication. The Censorship section through its various agencies requested of them that certain information be not published or transmitted. The general compliance and coöperation on their part indicated the high order of patriotism and loyalty to their country possessed by publishers of all classes and by those in charge of the various means of communication. Due to

their support this experiment in voluntary censorship may be classed as successful.

The "Executive" subsection was charged with the coördination of the various agencies of censorship. It was of no use to close one channel of communication and leave all others open, or to maintain censorship concerning some specific matter in one channel when the need for censorship in that particular matter had passed or had been suspended in other channels.

Coördination of its policies is thus seen to have been essential to the successful operation of the censorship.

Since information which the War Department might desire to suppress might be gained by the enemy by mail, cable, messenger, telegraph, secret wireless, newspaper, magazine or book, or might appear in a photograph, it became necessary to have all of these agencies and any others used for transmitting information, subjected to the supervision of the Censorship. The general division of M.I.-10 (Censorship) into subsections was such that while all of these agencies were looked after the matter given them was coördinated in accordance with definitely fixed principles.

The "Postal Censorship" subsection handled the greater part of the correspondence through M.I.D. representatives on the censorship committee located at many large cities and important points throughout the United States and its possessions. It also worked through censorship liaison officers in various parts of the world including the Base Censor A.E.F. and the American Military Attachés in foreign countries. It maintained close touch with the Post Office Department and the State Department and their numerous agencies and representatives engaged in mail matters and investigations.

The "Prisoner of War Mail" subsection controlled the

ensorship of mail of enemy prisoners in war prison barracks in this country. The censorship in connection with prisoners of war had two objects. On one hand it endeavored to prevent information of value to the enemy or that which might be harmful to the United States from being sent to enemy countries. On the other hand it gathered information concerning enemy countries from letters sent to prisoners of war or to interned enemy aliens. Much information with regard to economic conditions in enemy territory and the state of the enemy morale at home was gained in this way.

This subsection maintained a card catalogue of all prisoners of war and made particular note of those persons with whom they corresponded in the United States or Allied countries.

It handled and carefully examined all letters coming to or from prisoners written in unfamiliar languages or suspected of containing a message in code or invisible ink. Its other activities included notation of conditions at internment camps and in war prison barracks as evidenced by the letters from prisoners; control of mail of American prisoners of war in enemy countries and censorship of mail sent through intermediaries in neutral countries to or from prisoners of war.

The "Telegraph and Telephone" subsection carried on its duties with particular reference to the effort in enemy and neutral countries to transmit information from or into the United States by means of cable, telegraph or telephone. Information gained through these mediums by this subsection was distributed systematically through close liaison with the War Trade Board, Naval Intelligence, the Military and Cable Censorship and the State and Treasury Departments.

The "Radio Intelligence Service" subsection had for

its functions: To obtain copies of all radio messages from neutral countries which might be relayed into enemy countries; to detect and locate unauthorized stations in the United States able to transmit messages into foreign countries.

The "Press Correspondents" subsection had to do with the accrediting of correspondents to American forces in the theaters of operations; with receiving and caring for the expenses and guarantee money deposited by his newspaper for each correspondent and with the control and credentials of occasional correspondents. Americans who for some purpose or other desired to visit sectors at the front where United States troops were operating were also cared for by this subsection.

The "Censorship Precedents and Foreign Language Publications" subsection established and kept up a file of censorship precedents for the purpose of furnishing a guide for those who had to make decisions as to what could or could not be published.

The subsection examined articles submitted by periodicals or newspapers for censorship and if a new reason for passing or for rejecting articles of certain types was found and approved it was added to the file of censorship precedents.

This subsection also examined a percentage of the 1400 foreign language publications printed and circulated in the United States. When objectionable matter was found the subsection communicated with the editor and his explanation was examined. If there was no intention to offend the matter was dropped after the editor had been cautioned. If however the paper showed an attitude against the interests of the United States or its Allies the case was discussed with the Postal Department or the Department of Justice with a view to prosecution un-

der the Espionage Law or the Trading with the Enemy Act.

The "Photographic Permits and Censorship" subsection had jurisdiction of the issuing of permits, within the United States, for taking pictures of military subjects. It was charged with censoring photographs sent to it. It censored all moving pictures of military activities taken by the Newsreel Weeklies and gave directions for release, suppression or alteration as each individual case demanded.

This subsection also had the censoring of official pictures of the Signal Corps, the transmittal of releases to the Committee on Public Information and the transmittal of copies of all released photographs and of all of those withheld from publication to the Pictorial Section, Historical Branch War Plans division at the War College.

The "Daily Newspaper" subsection was charged with issuing a daily summary concerning the general policy of censorship as gained by an examination of daily newspapers, periodicals, books and other publications.

The summary contained a daily digest of important national events; described suspects and their status; cited radical acts; dealt with situations and activities of various sorts which might hinder the prosecution of the war; discussed enemy propaganda and aimed in general to give a daily view of the country at war.

It maintained a clipping bureau describing the progress of important cases before the courts of interest to censorship.

The "Censorship of Books" subsection maintained touch with publishers throughout the United States and threw its influence towards the prevention of publication of matter which might hurt our interests in the war. Publishers in general coöperated loyally with this subsection.

It supervised the efforts to keep the camps free from enemy propaganda and pacifist literature by means of which enemy agents and anti-war advocates were attempting to lessen the fighting power of the army.

The "Miscellaneous" subsection had charge of the work of examining, censoring and investigating propaganda articles which advocated measures prejudicial to the development of war activities.

Disaffected and disloyal elements soon came to know that the Censorship section of M.I.D. had them under constant surveillance. The beneficial results of this knowledge were demonstrated by the change from an openly defiant attitude to a conservative and cautious tone.

Another subsection of the Censorship section, known as "The Clipping Bureau," searched for material desired by officers of other subsections. It furnished these special clippings as well as clippings of economic, political or of general interest to the Censorship section, to officers of other sections of M.I.D. or to other divisions of the General Staff of the War Department.

M.I.-11. Passports and Port Control. This section maintained supervision over all persons about to leave or to enter the United States by land or sea. It gave to military attachés abroad and to port control officers, both in the United States and in foreign countries, information concerning persons leaving or entering the United States.

It maintained close liaison with the State Department and coöperated with it by investigating the antecedents of and advising in regard to the applicants who asked for passports.

It also kept in close touch with M.I.D. representatives and military attachés regarding the movements of suspects.

M.I.-13. Graft and Fraud Section. This section was charged with investigations of all cases of graft arising out of purchases of supplies for the Army and with assisting civil agencies of the Federal Government in preparing the cases for prosecution where such action was advisable. It handled many cases not of criminal nature and called attention of the chief of the corps or department to the irregularities or carelessness found in order that he might take the necessary corrective measures. Incompetency among inspectors, extravagance and the tendency of employees to slight their work were among the matters upon which reports were made.

Military Morale Section. This section was first organized as a part of M.I.D. It had general supervision of matters concerned with stimulating and maintaining morale in the military forces. Later this section was separated from M.I.D. and made into the Military Morale division of the War Department General Staff.

Military Intelligence in the A.E.F.

The following summary of its organization and activities is taken from the final report of the Chief of Intelligence of the A.E.F.:

Principles of Organization

The general theory of the function of the Intelligence Division of the General Staff in the American Expeditionary Forces contemplated that primarily it was designed to gain, analyze and distribute military information of the enemy; to interpret it for use in war plans and combat orders; and to protect its own forces against enemy Intelligence activity.

Intelligence officers studied information concerning the enemy to become thoroughly familiar with his organiza-

tion, tactics, habits and modes of thought. They were thus able to present the point of view of the enemy opposite them. They deduced the intentions of the enemy from information gathered by Intelligence agencies and prepared themselves to assist in the preparation of plans for operations by their ability to point out the effect that the enemy's dispositions, defensive organizations or intentions would have on them.

At the daily staff meeting at corps, army, or higher headquarters, the Intelligence officer presented an informal review of the enemy's activities of the previous twenty-four hours and answered any specific questions put to him, thus orienting the entire staff.

Officer Personnel

The initial personnel of Intelligence for all classes of duty had to learn its duties by experience and by observation of the Intelligence Services of our Allies. The demand for trained Intelligence officers soon exceeded the supply.

When there became available officers whose experience and training fitted them for work as instructors there was established an Intelligence School for officers for training in combat Intelligence duties.

The course of instruction covered three main fields:

1. The detailed study of the enemy army, its organization, recruiting system, strength and location of its units and all matters that would help an Intelligence officer to visualize the enemy's forces.

2. The examination of prisoners and documents. Theoretically, by means of books and lectures; and practically, by means of the actual examination of enemy prisoners and documents.

3. Topography, including the study, interpretation and restitution of airplane photographs.

Such subjects as the organization of our own army, the Allied armies and the several enemy armies, tactical principles and the development of tactical methods, were covered by lectures with a view to giving the students a well-balanced, though necessarily superficial, military background.

Intelligence Procedure

Intelligence Service organization provided that all units, from the battalion up, should have sufficient Intelligence personnel and material to render them independent in Intelligence matters along their own fronts.

A flow of information to the rear was maintained by making the Intelligence sections at the various headquarters interdependent. Each section after having noted the information desired by its own headquarters commander and staff transmitted all of the information received to the next higher headquarters and to adjacent headquarters if the latter were concerned. At each headquarters the Intelligence section studied and made immediate use of the information pertinent to the front of its own unit and drew their conclusions from it. The same information was made use of by the Intelligence sections at higher headquarters where it was coördinated and studied. Lower headquarters were then furnished the broader conclusions thus drawn and in this way were given the opportunity to verify the correctness of their own conclusions.

Intelligence at Lower Headquarters

The basis of Combat Intelligence was considered to be

the Intelligence personnel with line troops, that is, the regimental and battalion Intelligence sections. These units were responsible not only for obtaining information of the enemy on their own front but for arranging so that all troops on duty in positions favorable for observation of the enemy might turn in to the Intelligence Service all information gained in order that it might be started back through proper channels.

Each regimental headquarters was provided with an Intelligence officer and eight enlisted observers. Each battalion headquarters had an Intelligence officer and a detachment of twenty-eight enlisted men. These included fifteen scouts, eleven observers and two chief snipers. One or more of the scouts accompanied all patrols and raiding parties into the enemy's lines for the definite purpose of obtaining all possible information of the enemy that could be gained under the existing conditions.

The observers established observation posts (O.P.'s) in favorable positions well forward and kept up as constant observation of enemy territory and movements as practicable. The method of gaining information by observation was a most important one and frequently succeeded in operations when all other means had failed. Observation posts were maintained in war of movement as well as in stabilized warfare.

Listening-in sets were of particular value to regimental Intelligence personnel in getting information but mainly in stabilized and trench warfare where it was possible to devote considerable time to their installation and operation.

The artillery liaison officers at infantry regimental headquarters scrutinized all information gathered by Intelligence agencies and transmitted that of value to the

artillery, to their own commanders. In return they obtained from the Artillery Information officer with their own units such non-technical information as Intelligence could use.

Brigade headquarters, in the original organization, was not to constitute a link in the chain of the Intelligence Service. In practice, however, many brigade commanders found it necessary to detail an officer and some assistants to constitute a temporary Intelligence section.

At Division Headquarters

Division headquarters was provided with an Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2, who was a member of the General Staff group. In addition to the information received from regimental Intelligence officers, he obtained information from observation posts, established by his divisional Intelligence personnel, from artillery balloons and observation posts of the Artillery Information service of the divisional artillery, from neighboring divisions and from higher headquarters.

Prisoners and documents taken from the enemy were gathered together at the divisional collecting center for the first time after their capture. There they were classified and a limited number of prisoners were detained long enough to gain all possible tactical information of the enemy which might be of concern to the division.

The duties of the Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2, of a division included: (1) Military Information and conduct of Combat Intelligence, which constituted the greater part of his work; (2) Map Reproduction and Distribution; (3) Counter-espionage. These duties were accomplished with the aid of one assistant for Military Information, one topographical officer and one commissioned interpreter, with the necessary amount of clerical personnel.

At Corps Headquarters

The duties of the Intelligence section at a corps headquarters were similar to those in a division but with increased scope and application.

Prisoners and documents were forwarded by divisions to corps prisoner of war inclosures with a minimum of delay. There they were given a detailed examination for the purpose of discovering tactical information of immediate importance along the corps front.

Additional means of gaining information were provided at corps headquarters in the form of (1) aero squadrons for visual and photographic reconnaissances, (2) corps observation posts, (3) corps artillery information service, (4) balloons and (5) flash and sound ranging sections.

This multiplication of sources of information required a considerable increase in personnel over that necessary for a division.

The services of several officers and men were necessary for the interpretation, restitution and distribution of airplane photographs and the study of reports of visual observation missions by airplane. By restitution is meant the process of securing information from airplane photographs for use in correcting, completing or actually making topographic maps.

At Army Headquarters

At the headquarters of an army the duties of the Intelligence section took on a somewhat different character. Although Army Intelligence maintained observation posts and conducted aerial reconnaissances (including night reconnaissance) its duties primarily were not the direct gathering of information but rather the study, coördination and interpretation of the mass of information

transmitted from lower echelons. Experience proved that if lower Intelligence sections were efficient in maintaining a flow to the army of carefully selected and tested information, together with their conclusions, that Army Intelligence would never be uninformed regarding the general situation of the enemy. From this mass of information Army Intelligence, in the light of its fuller knowledge of all matters affecting the situation, deduced its conclusions, arrived at and disseminated its estimate as to the enemy's situation, plans and intentions.

Army Intelligence concerned itself with matters of a strategical nature rather than tactical, and collected information relating to the enemy's economic status, political situation, morale and kindred matter. Prisoners and documents were examined at length in order to gain all possible information from them.

Place of Intelligence Service

As a general principle of organization each Intelligence section was a part of the command to which it belonged and was responsible in the fullest sense to the commander on whom rested the responsibility of immediately transmitting information to the next higher echelon. Although the commanders were responsible for the conduct of the Intelligence Service within their units, the army and corps Intelligence sections were, in a measure, held responsible for the proper technical operation of the Intelligence Service. Another general principle was that each Intelligence section was responsible for Intelligence on its own front and to a depth within the enemy's lines proportionate to that front.

Thus the depth of the area kept under surveillance by the army was limited only by the radius of action of its

reconnaissance squadrons, the limits of the terrain visible from its observation posts and the amount and kind of information that could be obtained from prisoners and documents. It left to subordinate units a depth of some five miles. The division kept watch over the first two miles of this and the corps over the remaining three miles. These zones of responsibility were not hard and fast but overlapped to an extent sufficient to preclude the possibility of leaving any part of enemy terrain unobserved.

Intelligence at G.H.Q.

The Intelligence Division of the General Staff at General Headquarters (G.H.Q.-A.E.F.) was concerned with watching the enemy, not only along the whole Western front, but on the Russian, Macedonian and Italian fronts as well. These latter were included because success or failure on any of them affected the enemy's operations on the Western front which was the immediate concern of G-2, G.H.Q.

Owing to the distance from its War Department in Washington and the difficulties of communication with it, the Intelligence Division at G.H.Q.-A.E.F., was compelled to take over a part of War Department Intelligence function and give more attention to the economic and political situation of the enemy than would be expected if it was located more conveniently with regard to its War Department.

The French and British War Ministries performed this work for their military forces and furnished the Intelligence section at their respective General Headquarters in the field such information of this character as was needed for the prosecution of the war.

This duty imposed by circumstances upon the Intel-

ligence section at G.H.Q.-A.E.F., called for the services of a number of officers and men familiar with international politics. The result of their labors found expression in the Press Review and, when it covered subjects not treated of in the press, in the Summary of Intelligence.

The Second (Intelligence) Division, General Staff at General Headquarters, A.E.F., was divided into four main divisions:

1. Military Information, G-2-a.
2. Secret Service, G-2-b.
3. Topographical Map Supply, and Sound Ranging, G-2-c.
4. Censorship and Press, G-2-d.

G-2-a. The Military Information Section. This was divided into several subsections each of which handled a group of closely related subsections which may be briefly described:

Battle Order Subsection. The state of the enemy's military establishment, the location of his units with their strength and fighting value, developments in tactics, combat methods and changes in organization were concerns of this subsection. Graphs, charts and maps were used along with written data for the purpose of recording and disseminating information on these subjects. Histories of enemy divisions were kept up and sent to units when these divisions appeared opposite them. In general this subsection kept its own forces apprised of the location, strength and situation of the enemy army.

Enemy Defensive Organizations. This subsection kept track of information regarding the enemy's defensive organization, the state of his supply system, including dumps, narrow and standard gauge railways, roads, and

hospitals. It also noted information of movements and of increase or decrease in enemy works which might furnish indications as to enemy plans. All towns within the enemy's area and in the line of possible advance on the part of the American forces were listed and described as to accommodations, water supply, factories, food supplies, equipment, billeting space and other pertinent data.

Artillery Subsection. Concerned with artillery information of all kinds and character, including armament and matériel and tactics employed by enemy.

Wireless Interception. Codes and Ciphers Subsection. This subsection through its radio intelligence subsection obtained much important information by intercepting the enemy's wireless messages and decoding or deciphering them. An important part of its duty was that of locating the radio stations, of enemy armies, corps and divisions through the use of goniometric stations. Such information frequently gave valuable indications of enemy plans.

Aviation Subsection. This was charged with the task of following all phases of the enemy's aviation, its organization, activities, matériel, personnel, the location of its units and other such information.

Economic Subsection. This subsection made exhaustive study of enemy resources for the prosecution of the war. It was very important that the most accurate and complete information be had of the enemy's manpower, his equipment in both kinds and quantity, his armament and the number of reserves at his disposal other than those in the immediate theater of operations. Since much of this information came from prisoners and documents, the personnel of the subsection included a number of interpreters and translators. To this number were added men qualified to do general translation work for the whole G.H.Q. Staff.

Publication Subsection. This section was created in order to put the final conclusions into convenient form for dissemination. It published daily the four following documents :

(a) The Summary of Intelligence, a secret document, containing information of the broadest scope covering subjects which were of interest only to G.H.Q. This summary enabled the commanding general and the General Staff to keep in touch with political and military events on all fronts and in all parts of the world as well as with economic conditions in all countries.

(b) The Summary of Information, a confidential document, prepared for use at G.H.Q. and for distribution to units down to division headquarters. It pertained only to the Western front. It gave information designed to keep subordinate commanders and staffs fully informed on all subjects and parts of the front with which they might have to deal. In it appeared translations of captured enemy documents describing tactics and matériel with which our troops would be confronted in battle. A tabulated statement of the enemy's order of battle with changes that took place every twenty-four hours was included. Maps and charts to supplement the summary were used to convey as much information as possible.

(c) The Press Review. This was first a secret but later a confidential document distributed only to the General Headquarters Staff. It was intended to aid in following the trend of opinion on vital questions affecting the war as reflected by the press comments appearing in the newspapers of enemy, allied and neutral countries.

(d) The Summary of Air Intelligence, published for the purpose of keeping air units informed of the situation of the enemy's air forces and the developments in his aviation service.

The subsection charged with the publication of the foregoing documents also prepared the official communiqué and the daily cablegram report to the War Department. The latter was designed to elaborate the communiqué and to give a more detailed account of the events of the day.

The method of dissemination by means of summaries was practiced by Intelligence sections at all headquarters. At army and lower headquarters the Summary of Intelligence in effect was the formal report of the Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2, for the day.

G-2-b. The Secret Service Section. This section was assigned two main functions, espionage and counter-espionage. Counter-espionage was subdivided into military and civilian counter-espionage. The civilian subsection had as its main duty the discovery and suppression of enemy agents. This was accomplished in large part by the use of Intelligence Police, liaison with French and British authorities and utilization of information from various other sources, including units in the field. A control of the base ports and American areas not within the zones of the armies was established. In army areas civilian travel was controlled by the enforcement of circulation regulations adopted by all the Allies.

The military counter-espionage subsection fulfilled a function similar in the main to that of the civilian subsection. Its purpose was the discovery and suppression of hostile espionage within military units or in areas within the zone of the armies. The organization adopted in the United States was modified to suit conditions in France and established in those units in which it did not already exist.

The espionage subsection was engaged in the collection of military, political and economic information of the

enemy. It operated through established information centers in coöperation with the Allied services.

G-2-c. The Topographic, Map Supply, and Sound and Flash Ranging Section. The principal duties performed by this section were:

1. The supervision and coördination of topographic surveying.
2. The preparation, reproduction and distribution of maps.
3. The reproduction of Intelligence information by graphic means.
4. The establishment of artillery firing data.
5. Sound and flash ranging.

The development of aerial photography made it possible to carry on detailed mapping of territory held by the enemy and by the process known as restitution, to plot on maps the greater part of the enemy's trenches and artillery positions.

Modern staff work demanded such an increased amount of graphic representation and of type printing that it became necessary to establish large printing and map reproduction plants. In all of this work time was a vital element since information to be of value had to be promptly gotten out. Mobile printing trains, with presses and processes, mounted on trucks were organized to accompany corps and armies in their movements.

Drafting and printing of base maps showing the natural topographic features was done at G.H.Q. in Chaumont and at the Base printing plant in Langres. The latter, established and operated by the 29th Engineers, was one of the best equipped plants of its kind in existence. It had the most modern reproduction machinery and was

able to reproduce a large majority of the maps with which the American armies were supplied.

The total number of maps reproduced and used between July 1 and November 11, 1918, was in excess of five millions.

The study and restitution from aerial photographs and overprinting of the enemy's defensive organization on these maps to make the Battle Map, or Plan Director, and the establishment of artillery firing data, were performed by the personnel of the topographical sections of the several army Intelligence groups.

All topographical units reproduced Intelligence information for the headquarters to which they belonged.

Sound and Flash Ranging. This subsection was responsible for the organization, administration and technical supervision of the sound and flash ranging troops. Their employment in the field however was under the tactical control of the artillery.

G-2-d. Censorship and Press Section. This section was in charge of postal, telegraph, photograph, press and all other forms of censorship, the general control of press correspondents and visitors, and of propaganda and publicity matters.

Postal and Telegraphic Censorship. In order to decentralize the work of censoring written communications, letters, telegrams, cables, etc., from members of the A.E.F. it was necessary that the bulk of this work be done by the immediate commanders of organizations and by local commanders. In order to check the manner in which this censorship was carried on a percentage of all A.E.F. mail was sent at irregular intervals through the office of the Base Censor located in Paris with branch offices at other places. In general the local censorship was fair and ade-

quate. Provision was made whereby any soldier who wished to write about private or confidential matters which he did not desire to have censored by the officer immediately over him, could enclose the letter in a special blue envelope which was subject to examination only at the Base Censor's office. All letters written in foreign languages or addressed to foreign countries were also censored there. It is interesting to note that the Base Censor's office at one time had a personnel of 36 officers, 180 enlisted men, and 21 civilians. During its existence it censored and examined 34,129,875 letters, of which probably half were in blue envelopes. It censored letters written by Americans in the A.E.F. in 51 languages or dialects other than English.

Press Censorship. The general policy adopted for press censorship aimed to accomplish three broad results.

1. To prevent the enemy from obtaining information of our forces which would help him.

2. To give to the people of the United States, with the least possible delay, the maximum of information consistent with the limitations imposed by the first object.

3. To cause to be presented to the American people the facts as they were known at the time of writing without distortion of any kind, optimistic or otherwise.

In the application of these principles the effort of censorship was to exert a direct and definite influence for saving American lives by keeping from the enemy information which could be used to advantage in operations against our troops.

At army and corps headquarters there were assigned to the Intelligence Division of the General Staff one or more commissioned officers who were journalists before the war whose duty was to facilitate the work of the correspondent

in every possible way. Each evening they sent by telephone or telegraph to the field headquarters of the press section a summary of the activities of the day on their front. These reports were consolidated at press headquarters for the use of the correspondents so that they might visualize the particular part or activity, which they had themselves seen, in its relation to the whole.

There were thirty-six regularly accredited correspondents with the A.E.F. and at different times visiting correspondents to the total of four hundred and eleven. Accredited press correspondents had the status of officers and had full liberty to visit any part of the A.E.F. unaccompanied.

The Stars and Stripes. This was a weekly newspaper published under the Censorship and Press section (G-2-d). It was the official newspaper of the American Expeditionary Forces and was made up, written and published by officers and men of the A.E.F. It appeared for the first time on February 8th, 1918. Its success was immediate and its circulation increased from thirty-five thousand in February, 1918, to five hundred and thirty-three thousand in February, 1919.

The Stars and Stripes at all times reflected the spirit of the troops and greatly assisted in bringing about a sound understanding and appreciation of each arm, branch, corps or service in its relation to the others. It maintained a high standard and its editorial and news staff, by their devotion to the task set for them—to create and sustain morale—realized a high ideal in journalism and were of signal service to the army.

Propaganda. The object of the military propaganda work conducted by the censorship section was primarily to inform the private soldiers in the ranks of our enemies of the ideal for which the United States was fighting

and to impress upon them that no individual from among their number would suffer at our hands from any treatment not in accordance with those ideals.

An effective method of disseminating this propaganda was by means of leaflets dropped over the enemy's lines. On one leaflet was quoted the A.E.F. general order prescribing the treatment of enemy prisoners, and emphasizing that they would be given the same rations as American soldiers and would be accorded fair and humane treatment.

CHAPTER VI

FUNCTIONS OF PERSONNEL

"Industry and caution often play a greater part in this Intelligence Department than the gift of guessing secrets."

General Functions

In discussing the general functions of Intelligence Service personnel, it is necessary to emphasize again that the Intelligence Service is a new instrumentality designed to do its part in the prosecution of modern war. It is a military weapon which is scarcely beyond the stage of experiment in its organization and duties.

The original demand for an Intelligence Service brought about by modern conditions of war was for the collection, evaluation and distribution of information of the enemy. This demand was supplemented later, due to the experiences in war, by one which called for an agency capable of giving an accurate estimate of the plans and intentions of the enemy uninfluenced by any consideration of the necessities of its own forces.

These demands were met by the creation of the Second (Intelligence) Division of the General Staff. The sole reason for its creation lay in the necessity of having a definite agency charged with and responsible for keeping track of the enemy.

The Intelligence Service, like every other weapon in war, ought to have its energies concentrated to accomplish the object for which it is created and not have them dissipated by dispersion in lines which do not contribute directly to that object.

The determination of the plans and intentions of the enemy, the representation of the enemy point of view in the preparation of war plans and orders, and the checking of orders for the commander so as to be sure that no vital Intelligence of the enemy has been overlooked, are command functions for whose performance the chief of the Intelligence group, G-2, at each headquarters is responsible to his commander. They constitute the principal reason for having him on the General Staff. If he is merely to operate a service for the purpose of determining facts regarding the enemy situation, he should not be on the General Staff but simply be the head of a service charged with supplying facts concerning the enemy.

To interpret enemy dispositions and movements into terms of his plans and intentions requires officers trained in general staff duties, who can apply strategical and tactical knowledge in correctly determining their significance.

The decision as to the amount of energy to be expended and the measures to be employed in the collection of information of the enemy, in the determination of its value, in the manner of its use, in the extent of its distribution and providing protection against the activities of the enemy Intelligence Service within our military forces may be regarded as service functions.

The conclusion from the foregoing analysis of G-2 functions is that the Intelligence Division of the General Staff of each division and higher command must have as its chief a trained General Staff officer, competent to discharge the General Staff functions, and in addition must have a personnel of experts and specialists capable of performing their Intelligence Service duties under the direction and control of the chief.

The twofold function, that of determining the plans and intentions of the enemy, and that of supervising and

directing the operations of an Intelligence Service, must be recognized if the Intelligence mission is to be understood.

Counter-espionage

The duty of insuring adequate and necessary measures to protect our own military forces against the activities of the hostile Intelligence Service, or the function of counter-espionage, is, in theory, a logical duty for the Intelligence Service personnel to perform, because Intelligence officers and personnel presumably are most familiar with the espionage methods practiced by the enemy and therefore best fitted to counter them. The peculiar nature of counter-espionage duty however, makes it necessary to secure officers and men differently trained from those who perform Intelligence Service duties in connection with gaining information of the enemy. The result of this is to make it seem more logical for counter-espionage duty to be performed by the trained detective personnel of the Provost Marshal General's Department, under policies prescribed by Intelligence, G-2. A further discussion of counter-espionage appears in a later chapter.

Other Duties

The duties relating to map reproduction and supply, censorship, propaganda, publicity, entertainment and control of visitors, and other duties heretofore assigned to the Military Intelligence Division, strictly are not Intelligence Service duties. They were assigned to the Intelligence Division of the General Staff during the World War for a variety of reasons. Requiring them to be discharged by the personnel of the Intelligence Service made it necessary to secure a wide and varied class of officers and men for that service because each kind of duty demanded

a different type of officer or man and a special kind of training.

An examination of the various duties, other than those of seeking and handling information of the enemy, discharged by the Intelligence Service during the World War, gives the impression that all of them might have been performed as well either by newly organized operating agencies or by services already existing. This is no criticism of the manner in which the Intelligence Service personnel discharged these many duties. As a matter of fact, the duties were splendidly performed and the marvel is that they were so well done. But the fact that personnel of the Intelligence Service was required to do all of these things naturally prevented it from concentrating on its proper duties.

If operating agencies already existing or new services separate from the Intelligence Service were assigned to discharge them the policies relating to the functions and operations of the agencies or services so charged could be determined by the General Staff Division concerned in the particular activity, in the same manner that policies are determined for all other agencies and services.

Intelligence Duties

The duties assigned to the Intelligence Division of the General Staff under the original conception of its mission pertained exclusively to the enemy. Under that conception they would embrace:

1. To act as adviser to the Commander and Chief of Staff in all matters concerning the enemy and to keep them in close touch with the progress of events and the situation on the enemy's side of the line.

2. To collaborate in the preparation of war plans and combat orders by representing the enemy's point of view

in order to insure that, insofar as relates to Intelligence, no obstacles to success have been overlooked.

3. To direct and supervise the operation of the Intelligence Service in the collection, evaluation and distribution of Intelligence of the enemy.

4. To establish policies relating to map reproduction, supply and distribution insofar as relates to maps of territory occupied by the enemy.

5. To establish policies for counter-espionage, censorship and its related duties as required.

General Staff Duty

As previously explained, conditions of modern warfare require the use of the General Staff group by the division and higher commander because no one man is physically able to attend to the multitude of details imposed by the exercise of such a command.

The commander must use his own forces to overcome the enemy and fulfill his mission. To discharge his command responsibility he is provided with a Chief of Staff who is his mouthpiece and representative in the coordination of activities, and who, in turn, is provided with four assistants. The Chief of Staff, as well as his four assistants, are especially trained in tactics and in the functions of command. The four G's are assigned specifically to look out for the discharge of duties arising in the four functional phases of command duties distributed to the four divisions of the General Staff, namely, Personnel, Intelligence, Operations and Training, and Supply. These divisions are coordinate in their powers and position under the Chief of Staff.

Essential G-2 General Staff Officer

If G-2 does not possess the professional qualifications

and tactical training necessary for the efficient performance of General Staff duty, it will be impossible for him properly to discharge his Intelligence duties. He will not be competent to make a sensible or logical estimate of the situation of the enemy, or to determine the effect of the proposed orders upon the enemy because he will be unable to gage the tactical situation which the execution of these orders will bring about.

His understanding and knowledge of the organization, tactics, and methods of operation must be as thorough regarding his own forces as it is regarding the enemy forces. If he is unable to determine the effect of the tactical measures of his own forces, the same as G-3 is required to do, he is only a specialist on the enemy, and as such is fitted, possibly, to be a member of the Intelligence Service but not of the General Staff.

To be efficient he must be a trained military man, able to make proper deductions as to the tactical or strategical significance of the Intelligence, and to gage its effect upon the plans and intentions of his own commander. He must be competent to present to his commander his conclusions as to the plans and intentions of the enemy and picture to him the enemy element of the problem. He must have such a grasp of the tactics and combat methods of the enemy, his psychology, his organization, and his general intentions, as to be able to arrive at conclusions from the tidbits of news received. The commander checks over the data upon which the conclusions are based, and accepts them as his own or makes such changes as conform to his judgment, and then adopts them. Consequently G-2 must be so fortified in his military knowledge by tactical training and experience as to be able to demonstrate to his commander and to the other members of the General Staff that his conclusions are

sound and logical. If he is not able to do these things, he cannot succeed in his work.

Within organizations lower than a division the commander himself in all probability will have time to make his own deductions as to the plans and intentions of the enemy by a personal study of the information received. If he has not time to do it in person, his staff officer for Intelligence must do it for him.

Intelligence Service Duty

The development in the American Expeditionary Forces demonstrated that the operation of the Intelligence Service as an agency for gaining and distributing information of the enemy was similar in its methods to the operation of a supply service. The production of Intelligence from information gathered from many sources is accomplished by officers and men who are specialists and experts concerning the enemy but who do not require General Staff training or experience to do this work. It is largely a question of their operating the machinery for collecting information, of determining the reliability of the sources from which it came, of establishing and classifying facts, and of getting these properly distributed.

Collection

The commander of a division or higher organization in war of to-day is limited in his ability to make personal reconnaissance of the terrain over which his troops are to operate; first, because the area is too vast in extent for him to be able to get over it all, and second, because the long range and accurate fire of modern arms make it almost impossible for any individual to observe closely the enemy position and situation. This does not mean that he should not make a personal reconnaissance when-

ever and to such an extent as he can, but only that he must not depend solely upon such a reconnaissance to gain Intelligence of the enemy for the use of his command in battle. Without a definite system for gathering Intelligence, his only recourses would be to make such personal reconnaissance as possible, to study the map, and to use such information as his staff and subordinate commanders might forward to him, or as his scouts, patrols and observers might be able to acquire.

There is such a great amount of detailed information connected with a modern army, and there are so many sources through which it may be gained, that the commander cannot rely on his own efforts but must have specially trained personnel to collect the information in a systematic manner.

Evaluation

Such a large part of the information gathered is unreliable, inaccurate, trivial and unimportant, or without meaning until it has been compared with other known and determined facts, that it is necessary that experts and specialists qualified for the duty shall examine, test, and sift out all information received so as to be certain that the important and significant facts relating to the strength, location and movements of the enemy are duly classified and recorded. From the facts, as thus determined by these experts, the tactical deductions relating to the plans and intentions of the enemy are studied out in detail by the G-2 in person for later examination by the commander when making his study of his problem and formulating his own plans.

Distribution

Finally, since the collecting agencies will insure the

sending of all information to headquarters, and the evaluating ones will insure its being sifted and tested, there remains the duty of having the results communicated to the various persons who will benefit in the prosecution of their measures for operations by having this Intelligence in their possession. This leads to the inclusion in the Intelligence Service of personnel to perform this duty of distribution.

These duties of collection of information of the enemy, its evaluation, and the distribution of the resulting Military Intelligence, are accomplished by the Intelligence Service under the Intelligence officer (G-2) in such a manner as to insure that the greatest benefit shall accrue to the command as a whole, and that the fullest advantage will be taken of every opportunity to profit by gaining information of the situation, plans and intentions of the enemy. It is to be noted that officers on duty in the Intelligence Service in the capacity of specialists, or experts, are not necessarily performing General Staff duty. As a rule they are performing duty which is analogous in many ways to the duty performed by staff officers who belong to other services.

The Estimate of the Situation

One of the most important functions of the General Staff group is the preparation for the commander of what is known as the Estimate of the Situation. It is a statement of the problem of the commander prepared in the form of a logical presentation of the matter relating to it.

The Estimate may be submitted orally or in writing, depending upon the time available and the existing circumstances. In whatever form it is submitted, the sequence shown in the following form should be the guide.

The statement of the mission is prepared by the chief of staff or the commander. The estimate of the enemy is prepared by G-2 and the estimate of our own troops by G-3. The decision is made by the commander.

When a formal estimate is called for, it is generally consolidated by G-3. In this case he obtains a statement of the mission from the commander or the chief of staff and from G-2 the part of the estimate concerning the enemy and incorporates them in the Estimate.

ESTIMATE OF THE SITUATION

I. MISSION.

A. *Situation.*

- a. Strength and composition.
- b. Location and distribution, movements, troops within supporting distance.
- c. Physical condition, morale, training, equipment.

B. *Probable knowledge of our situation.*

- a. Observation.
- b. Reconnaissance.
- c. Prisoners, documents, inhabitants (friendly or hostile).

II. ENEMY, G-2 ESTIMATE.

C. *General factors.*

- a. Time and space.
- b. Terrain.
- c. Roads and railroads.
- d. Weather.
- e. Visibility (atmospheric conditions, cover or camouflage).
- f. Supply.

D. *Lines of action open to enemy.*

- a. Comparison of lines of action as influenced by:
 1. Situation.
 2. General factors.
 3. Special factors.

E. *Probable intentions.*

- a. General plan.

III. OUR OWN TROOPS, G-3 ESTIMATE.

A. *Situation.*

- a. Strength and composition (comparison with enemy).
- b. Location and distribution.
- c. Supporting troops (availability, strength and composition, location, time necessary to arrive).
- d. Physical condition, morale, training, equipment (comparison with enemy).

B. *General factors.*

- a. Time and space.
- b. Terrain.
- c. Roads and railroads.
- d. Weather.
- e. Visibility (atmospheric conditions, cover or camouflage).
- f. Supply.

C. *Lines of action open to us.*

Comparison of lines of actions as influenced by:

1. Our situation.
2. General factors.
3. Enemy's probable intentions.
4. Statement of advantages and disadvantages of each.

IV. DECISION BY THE COMMANDER.

General plan, expressed definitely and briefly.

In each particular case only such of the items in the subdivisions as are applicable are considered.

Commander's Decision

The first step for the commander is to clearly determine his mission. The second step is to arrive at a conclusion as to the situation of the enemy. As a result of expert study, analysis, and deduction of the Intelligence as to the strength, dispositions, armament, movements, activity, etc., of the enemy, G-2 has submitted as his part of the Estimate a statement of conclusions as to the plans and

intentions of the enemy based upon probabilities. The commander may do as he sees fit regarding the amount of personal examination he gives to the data upon which the G-2 conclusions are based. Ordinarily the personality, professional training, experience and abilities of the G-2 will determine for the commander the amount of confidence he will place in the conclusions, and also will decide the amount of time he will give to a personal study of the Estimate of the enemy before accepting it.

The third step for the commander is to arrive at a conclusion as to the situation of his own forces. It is a function of G-1, G-3 and G-4 to supply the information upon which this conclusion is based. Each one of them furnishes information regarding the conditions of his own particular activity. This is incorporated in the G-3 part of the Estimate of the Situation.

It may be noted here that the chief of the Third Division of the General Staff, G-3, is charged with keeping the commander informed as to the location, state of training and readiness for action of his own troops and with preparing the detailed orders for their employment in accordance with the decision of the commander. The chiefs of the First (G-1) and Fourth (G-4) Divisions attend to the details of and keep the commander informed concerning personnel and supply matters respectively in connection with his own troops.

The fourth step is the consideration of any other factors, such as time and space, terrain, weather, etc., which may enter into the particular circumstances of the problem.

The final step is for the commander to arrive at a decision as to the dispositions and measures he will take in order to accomplish his mission. The commander, after

careful consideration of the various factors set forth in the Estimate, announces his decision and directs his chief of staff to have the orders prepared to put it into effect.

Preparation of Orders

In the course of preparation of the orders by G-3, if there are any provisions or measures affecting the responsibilities of G-1, G-2 or G-4, the G concerned is consulted by G-3 and if there is need for coördination as between the apparent necessities or opinions of the chiefs of the General Staff divisions, which cannot be settled by conference between them, the matter is placed before the chief of staff for decision. It is one of his functions to compose the conflicting interests, bound to arise between the General Staff divisions.

The heads of the four divisions, working under the direction of the chief of staff, in this way attend to matters so detailed in their nature as to make it impossible for the commander personally to find time to handle them. It must be remembered, however, that these are duties which pertain to his personal command function and are those which he himself would, and whenever practicable still will, attend to in person.

Practically, wherever it is possible for a commander to make a detailed study of the information of the enemy, and to arrive at his own conclusion, he is at perfect liberty to, and probably will do so, whenever he can. In the same way he is at liberty to ignore the services of G-3 and to prepare his own combat orders, study out all the details, and do everything else that pertains to the matter if he can get the time and wishes to do it.

In case he in person did the work of both G-2 and G-3, his preparation of his orders in their details would constantly be checked up and made to conform to his detailed

knowledge of the enemy. In other words, the G-3 part of his mind would be checked by the G-2 part of it.

On the other hand, where he does not have time either to study out the Intelligence data or to make up his plans and orders in detail himself, the General Staff must do the work. The commander need only make a decision as to what he desires to do.

G-2 in Preparation of Orders

After the combat orders are prepared it is important that they be checked over with a view to testing them as to whether or not they conform to the decision, promise to accomplish the mission, and take into consideration the situation and the point of view of the enemy.

G-2 is not particularly concerned with determining whether or not the orders conform to the decision or promise to accomplish the mission. These are responsibilities of the chief of staff and the commander. G-2 however is vitally interested in whether or not the orders take into consideration the situation and the point of view of the enemy.

The decision of the commander was based upon the G-2 estimate of the situation, plans and intentions of the enemy. If the commander personally were to examine G-3's orders before approving them, he could, of course, do so only in the light of his knowledge of the enemy which formed the basis for his originally adopted decision. If, however, he desires to examine the orders in detail, he must be provided with more complete Intelligence data than were required for making his decision. Otherwise he cannot assure himself that they conform in their more specific directions to the situation of the enemy. Manifestly such a detailed examination should be made. The commander, the chief of staff, or G-2, are the only

ones competent to do it. Due to the many demands on the commanding general and his chief of staff, and to the impracticability of their mastering the mass of Intelligence data each time an order is issued, it will seldom, if ever, be practicable for either one of them to make such an examination. Therefore as a routine matter G-2 should be charged with this duty. To best accomplish it G-2 and G-3 should collaborate in the preparation of plans and orders in the same manner that G-1 and G-4 collaborate with G-3 with regard to personnel or supply matters.

The Intelligence officer does not fulfill his mission if he is content merely to gather the information, go to the work of evaluating it, and then leave it to G-3 to accept, reject, or ignore as he pleases. The interests of the commander cannot permit G-3 or any G to draw up combat orders and issue them without some check to insure that the deductions of the commander as to the situation, plans and intentions of the enemy are not thrown over and new ones put in their place. It is always possible that new deductions will be drawn by G-3 from his own sources of information or study regardless of G-2. These deductions consciously or unconsciously may be adopted by G-3 as the basis for the detailed instructions embodied in the order. Such a risk of basing plans of operation upon wrong conclusions is not taken in regard to personnel and supply matters relating to our own forces, and there is no reason why it should be taken in regard to the equally important element—the situation and intentions of the enemy.

The checking and testing from the enemy point of view require considerable time and careful study and where it is impracticable for either the commander or the chief of staff to do this in person the duty must devolve upon G-2. When G-2 and G-3 are able to collaborate in the original

preparation of orders, the examination and testing from the enemy point of view is completed as the orders are prepared.

The relations between G-2 and G-3 must be very close. G-2 provides every possible bit of information regarding the enemy and the territory within enemy lines, and assists in every way to make the enemy side of the problem clear. He is not an adviser to G-3 but a collaborator with him. As such he must be prepared to express his opinion of the effect upon the enemy of the measures proposed and must be held responsible that in the preparation of plans and orders the commander is fully protected in so far as Intelligence is concerned.

In the collaboration between G-2 and G-3 the former does not express an opinion in a spirit of criticism or fault-finding, but in a spirit of the most sincere effort to present the point of view of the enemy and his probable counter measures. They are members of the same team and are pulling together for the best interests of their commander and his troops.

If things are not going right between G-2 and G-3, or if the commander and chief of staff feel that they are not getting full benefit from the Intelligence Service, or are getting orders drawn by G-3 without due consideration of the enemy, then a switching of the duties of these two is recommended. If the G-2 is not competent to be a G-3, then he is not competent to be G-2 and should be relieved from the General Staff. Likewise, if G-3 cannot handle the G-2 work he is not a competent General Staff officer.

Ordinarily the G-3 plans and orders are based upon G-2 information and as a rule they will not contain any measures which have not been carefully considered by G-3 in the light of his consultations with G-2 and from his study of the Intelligence reports and situation maps. As

a matter of routine, however, G-2 should be made aware of all proposed plans and orders before they are issued in order that the commander may be assured that they have been tested from the enemy point of view and that an estimate has been made of the enemy reaction and counter measures.

Regardless of whether or not regulations require this collaboration in preparing orders, it is a wise practice to insist upon, with regard to G-2 particularly, because the commander thereby insures an additional check against the unusual case of a misunderstanding or miscalculation of the situation, plans and intentions of the enemy which might have been made by either G-3 or G-2.

Either this collaboration and teamwork must be practiced or it will be necessary to prescribe in regulations, as was done in the American Expeditionary Forces, that no combat orders shall be issued until an examination of them in the light of Intelligence, or of the point of view of the enemy, has been made by the G-2.

This duty of protecting the commander against the issuance of combat orders based on wrong deductions is one of the most important ones that G-2 has as a General Staff officer.

If the Intelligence Officer merely has the duty of furnishing Intelligence of the enemy, and has discharged his full duty when he has handed the information to the commander and to the staff, then there is no reason why he should be a member of the General Staff. His definite responsibility to the commander is the enemy side of the problem. He is a working member of the General Staff team with important, definite responsibilities and duties, and as such must be coördinate with the other members.

General Staff Team Work

As an example of this General Staff team work, let us suppose that the G-3 of a division in preparing combat orders includes directions that one of the infantry regiments will take part in the main attack and will then make another attack further on. G-4 discovers that the regiment will not have enough ammunition to do both these things and realizes that he cannot arrange to supply it. He tells G-3 so, but G-3 replies that he has merely complied with the commander's decision and will not change the order. What is G-4's duty? Supply is his responsibility to the commander. He does not fulfill his General Staff function by merely telling G-3 of the situation. He is not through when he tells G-3 what is wrong with the order. He must at once take the matter to the Chief of Staff who is empowered to coördinate the requirements of supply with the demands of operations.

Such a case is not likely to arise but it will serve as an example of the necessity for a clear understanding of why it is necessary to insist upon the General Staff principle of coördinate position of the four G's.

It must be accepted that G-2 has an analogous duty in regard to the plans or orders prepared by G-3, and an equal responsibility with G-1 and G-4 under the chief of staff in their preparation.

In case orders are prepared which G-2's knowledge of the enemy's strength and situation tells him will not gain the results desired, his duty is to advise with G-3 regarding the matter. If G-3 does not change them, then G-2 must present the question to the chief of staff for coördination.

The staff officers of units smaller than a division are governed in their relations to their commander by the same principles as are the General Staff officers of higher

commands. Therefore brigade, regimental and battalion Intelligence officers must perform similar functions to those of a division G-2, so far as the circumstances justify or demand it.

Conception of Intelligence Functions

Many times in France, officers who were commanding generals or chiefs of staff, or G-3's, were heard to make remarks to the effect that the Intelligence Service was of no use to them, that it functioned only for the benefit of higher headquarters, that they couldn't get anything out of it, or that the Intelligence Service personnel spent its time in gathering information which was of no use except for theoretical study. The result of such a state of affairs in many cases was an effort on the part of the G-3 or the commanding general to get his information as best he could without using G-2. The consequence of this was a loss of time and a duplication of effort which meant a loss of efficiency and necessarily a greater loss of life.

That such statements should be made showed not only that the Intelligence officer himself did not understand his functions, but also that the commanding general, or the chief of staff, or the G-3 whichever it may have been, was ignorant of what part the Intelligence Service was supposed to play.

The difficulty which usually arose between the commanding officer and his Intelligence officer was the very natural one that the commanding officer failed to realize that higher commanders were dependent upon him (the commander) for information. He often forgot that the transmission of information to higher headquarters was actually his responsibility and not that of his Intelligence

officer. On the other hand, many Intelligence officers, realizing the importance of getting all news back to higher headquarters, frequently came to regard themselves as equally or more responsible to the higher headquarters than to their own commanding officer. Some Intelligence officers in their anxiety to get all the Intelligence they could back to higher headquarters were inclined to forget their duty to their own commander and his troops.

Frequently because the attitude of their immediate commanding officer was to regard them merely as sleuth-hounds and gum-shoers through ignorance of the real function of the Intelligence Service and of how to use the Intelligence personnel, the Intelligence officer gradually lost interest in his own command and concentrated his efforts upon getting information back to higher headquarters, while the commanding officer with his G-3 endeavored to gain the information without considering G-2.

The success of G-3 is largely dependent upon his correct understanding of the functions of the other G's and his team work with them. His value as a G-3 to a great extent is measured by the degree to which he utilizes G-2 for collaboration in the preparation of his plans and orders. The basis of all plans is Military Intelligence and the detailed distribution of troops for combat is determined by the situation and location of the enemy elements as well as by the situation and state of supply of his own troops.

In some cases in the World War where G-2 was incompetent or where G-3 did not realize the G-2 function, the G-3 ignored the G-2 conclusions and utilized his own agencies to get information from other sources and supplemented it with facts from G-2. He then made up

his own conclusions as to the location, situation, plans and intentions of the enemy from these data and based his orders upon them.

Many regimental and battalion commanders during the World War used their Intelligence Service personnel for kitchen police, orderly, or other duties while they were training the rest of their command for front line duties. Afterwards they were surprised that their command could gain so little information about the enemy.

Later these same commanders blamed the Intelligence officer and his personnel for the failure to do the things expected of them. In these cases the regimental and battalion commanders deserved censure because of their neglect to have the Intelligence personnel trained in its duties.

At the same time there must have been neglect of duty on the part of the Intelligence officer of the unit. Had he presented to his commander the necessities for training his personnel, and had he handed the commander the schedules of the training he desired to undertake and fully explained his reasons for it, there is little doubt but that he would have been given ample opportunity to train his personnel.

Many examples might be cited wherein there was misunderstanding of the functions of the Intelligence Service, but enough have been mentioned to show the dangers of lost motion and wasted effort through failure to understand them.

CHAPTER VII

COLLECTION OF INFORMATION

"To have a quick eye for defiles and fords, to examine the priest and the postmaster, to have quick communication with the inhabitants, to dispatch scouts, to seize letters, translate and analyze them; finally to answer all the great questions of the Commander-in-Chief; such are the qualities of a good general commanding the outposts."

Three Fundamental Functions

In discussing the three fundamental functions of the Intelligence Service, collection, evaluation and distribution, it is essential to have in mind that there can be no arbitrary or rigid dividing lines between them. There is always a twilight zone in which the duties and responsibilities overlap so that it is difficult at times to determine clearly to which one of them some particular duty belongs.

These three general functions cover the activity of the Intelligence Service in connection with "The Information of the Enemy" section of the Intelligence Division.

At corps and higher headquarters distinct lines are drawn between the personnel assigned to each of these functions. The officer at such a headquarters charged with evaluating information of the enemy by verifying and testing it as to accuracy and reliability will probably have no knowledge of the method of its collection or the manner of its distribution. However, at a lower headquarters one officer may supervise or initiate the collection, then verify, value and classify the information, then

place the resulting Intelligence on the Situation Map and see to its distribution.

Whether one officer handles the information all the way through or not, there are always the three processes to which the information is subjected and it is the accomplishment of these which is discussed in this and the two following chapters.

War Department Collection

There are two general fields for the collection of information. One is that covered by the War Department Intelligence Service group. It includes the whole world except, in time of war, the areas embraced by the theater or theaters of operations. The War Department Intelligence Service forms a network, through its own personnel and through liaison with other governmental agencies, which extends everywhere. In time of peace the War Department Intelligence Division of the General Staff is concerned with collecting information relating to the possible strength and magnitude of the war effort of other nations. It seeks to gain information of economic, political, geographic and psychological as well as of military nature in order to estimate this effort.

Peace time collection by the War Department Intelligence Service is a process of acquiring information from statistics, current publications, visitors, agents and other sources. It serves its particular mission by gathering these data for use in the study and preparation of war plans and for permanent Intelligence files.

In time of war the War Department Intelligence Division of the General Staff expands to meet the situation. It takes on the specific duty of concentrating its resources and activities to gather together all classes of information concerning enemy country, or countries, for

the benefit of the commander of the troops in the field. It does not, however, cease to collect information concerning other countries. It is essential that every country be kept under observation at all times because of the possibility of any one of them being of use for the purchase of supplies by its own country or by the enemy, or of its becoming either an enemy or an ally in the war.

The War Department Intelligence Service group must rely upon its own armies in the field for the greater part of the information of the enemy after hostilities have commenced. The important and immediate information needed at that time by the War Department Intelligence Division is that relating to the mobilization and concentration of the enemy's military and naval forces. This can be gained best through its own troops as they come in contact with the enemy, because the troops of the enemy will be the most available, as well as almost the only source of information, left to the Intelligence Service for gaining information of enemy countries and peoples.

Theater of Operations Collection

The other field is that covered by the Intelligence Service personnel with troops. In each theater of operations the Intelligence Service, under the control of the General Staff officer for Intelligence at each of the several headquarters, is operated for the purpose of gathering Combat Intelligence of the enemy from every available source.

At the general headquarters of the commander of the theater of operations (G.H.Q.), the Intelligence Service widens the scope of its activity in gathering G.H.Q. Intelligence to such an extent as may be necessary to collect the particular Intelligence called for by the War Department.

The Intelligence Division of the General Staff at G.H.Q. has more of a strategical than a tactical rôle. It supervises and coördinates the collection of Intelligence by armies, corps, divisions and lower headquarters. From these and other sources G-2, G.H.Q., gathers the information from which he draws the conclusions that form the basis for estimates regarding enemy intentions. Political, commercial, economic, industrial, psychological and other considerations, as well as military information, must be taken into account in the final analysis of the enemy situation.

The great bulk of the activity of the Intelligence Service at all headquarters lower than G.H.Q., however, is confined to collecting information concerning the enemy's army, its location, strength, situation, plans and intentions, etc. In other words, these headquarters are almost entirely concerned with Combat Intelligence, which is mainly tactical in its nature.

Intelligence Plan

At each headquarters, from the battalion to the army, there will be found an Intelligence Plan for collecting information of the enemy. This is issued as the G-2 annex to field orders. Such a plan is based on the current needs of the unit concerned and upon the requirements of the G-2 annex of higher headquarters. In general, it is prepared in form similar to that of a field order. It provides for coördinating all available agencies for collecting and handling information of the enemy as a routine matter. One such plan issued at the beginning of a campaign should serve the command for the entire period of the campaign, or until there is such a change in the situation as to make it advisable to issue a new one. Directions for special reconnaissances to secure

particular information will not be included in the annex but will be incorporated in the body of the combat order itself or directed by messages or special orders.

It may be said that the Intelligence Service is interested in everything concerning the enemy and the country in which he is located. The more that can be found out about the enemy, the more there is from which to judge of his situation and from which to make an estimate of his plans and intentions.

Responsibility

Each front line commander is responsible for the collection and the proper handling of information of the enemy in the area opposite the front of his own command and overlapping a little on both flanks to a depth proportionate to his front. The depth of responsibility may be considered to be a distance approximately equal to the depth of his own command. Army headquarters is generally responsible for a depth which is limited only by its capacity to cover it. This is sometimes considered in stabilized warfare to be for a distance of at least twenty miles into the enemy lines. The army Intelligence Service leaves the nearest five miles of this to the corps, and these in turn generally leave the nearest two miles of the zone to the divisions. Each commander is concerned with the location of the reserve elements of the enemy forces opposing him and is responsible for guarding against surprise.

Priority

The duty of collection includes the determination of what information is needed and a decision as to the agency to be used to secure it. The Intelligence officer ordinarily must decide the order in which the several

demands for information are to be met. The tactical demands of the situation largely will determine the importance of gaining certain information before trying to gain some other. He must consider the several sources from which information may be gained and select the most promising and advantageous one for gaining it.

It is important to realize the fact that information of the enemy has no value until it has been classified and placed where it is needed. Time is the essence of its value. It is therefore essential that reliable and rapid means for the transmission of information be established under the control of the Intelligence Service in discharging its collection function.

Every commander determines what information of the enemy he needs by consideration of his own mission, the situation of his own command, how much he already knows about the enemy, and finally by the calls for information made upon him by higher headquarters.

The situation may be such that it will be necessary to make a reconnaissance in force, or send over a raid and possibly incur some losses or casualties in gaining the information desired or take other special measures to gain it. However, as a rule, the collection of information is a routine matter which is carried on at all times in a definite and systematic manner and in accordance with the Intelligence Plan. The decision as to what special measures are to be taken to secure particular information is made by the commander.

Information Desired

The character of the information desired will vary directly with the size of the command and the mission of the commander. The patrols of an infantry battalion seek to gather information relating primarily to the strength

and disposition of the enemy troops with which their battalion is in contact. The reconnaissance airplanes and other agencies of the headquarters of an army gather information relating to the political and economic as well as the military situation of the enemy army. The War Department Intelligence Service agencies seek broader information which relates to the ultimate war effort of the enemy powers.

It is impossible to make note of every class and character of information needed, but the following list will give an idea of some of the things always desired by the Intelligence Service within a theater of operations:

1. *Organization.* (a) Composition of all units from army down; (b) proportion of rifles and bayonets to men; (c) proportion of machine guns and special weapons to infantry; (d) proportion of mobile guns to batteries, battalions and regiments; (e) proportion of tractor and railway guns to artillery units; (f) staff organization; (g) proportion of auxiliary arms in division, corps and army to infantry; (h) proportion of artillery guns to infantry.
2. *Matériel.* (a) Rifles and armament of all arms used with range and character of projectile; (b) equipment carried by infantry soldier; (c) insignia worn by those of various arms and branches; (d) markings distinguishing regiments, divisions, corps and other units; (e) description of ranges and power of all auxiliary weapons; (f) kinds of guns, caliber, ranges, life, ammunition, class and kind; (g) artillery matériel, limbers, caissons, tractors, railway, etc.; (h) equipment of various kinds of artillery soldiers; (i) equipment of batteries, compa-

nies, troops and other organizations; (j) engineer equipment with infantry regiment; (k) with engineer regiment, with division, corps and army; (l) same for signal corps including equipment of all kinds for communication; (m) equipment for supply of light railways, trucks, wagons, etc., kind and character, markings; (n) airplanes, various kinds, powers and limitations, markings, etc.; (o) hospital equipment with all units; (p) new weapons of any kind; (q) kinds of gas and means of using it; (r) gas defense, kinds of masks; (s) camouflage; (t) tanks, kinds, number and armament; (u) anti-aircraft equipment system; (v) animal and truck transportation, proportions and character.

3. *Tactics.* (a) Infantry methods of movements and marchings, billeting or camping; (b) formations and dispositions used in attack; (c) formations and dispositions for defense; (d) means of communication within divisions and other organizations; (e) artillery formations in attack and defense; (f) artillery, cavalry and infantry coöperation; (g) cavalry armament, formations, attack and defense; (h) use of cavalry, dismounted action or shock; (i) combined use of troops in attack and defense; (j) airplane tactics, formations, flights; (k) bombing tactics; (l) methods of supplying food, ammunition and other supplies; (m) evacuation and hospitalization system; (n) replacement system by units or individuals; (o) use made of engineer troops; (p) gas tactics.
4. *Morale.* (a) Character and composition of ration; (b) methods of handling it; (c) sufficiency and nutritive power; (d) recreation; (e) hours of duty

per day; (f) amusements; (g) spirit in average enemy soldier; (h) belief as to nation's war motives? (i) susceptible to propaganda? (j) if so, on what line, high principle or ordinary considerations of food, comfort and safety?

5. *Troop Movements.* (a) Location of all elements; (b) movements of every kind; (c) disposition of elements in localities; (d) changes in dispositions; (e) map locations of observation posts, of batteries, machine guns, etc.; (f) landing fields for airplanes; (g) locations of hangars; (h) location of anti-aircraft batteries; (i) of observation balloons; (j) complete and up-to-date maps of area occupied by enemy; (k) rates of march of infantry, cavalry, artillery; (l) positions occupied, their extent, character and strength of garrisons.
6. *Topography of Country Occupied by Enemy.* (a) Natural features, including roads and railroads, permanent houses or other structures; (b) artificial features including enemy defensive works of all kinds; (c) large scale maps of front line, support and reserve areas occupied by the enemy; (d) smaller scale maps of rear areas; (e) airplane photographs of all areas.
7. *Enemy Order of Battle.* (a) Location of infantry elements by organizations; (b) location of machine guns; (c) of trench mortars; (d) of artillery positions; (e) location of alternative artillery positions; (f) of supply dumps; (g) of ammunition dumps; (h) of the several headquarters; (i) location of hangars; (j) of any elements of the enemy forces which will assist in giving a picture of the distribution and disposition of his forces.

Agencies Used

The agencies available for gathering information in the theater of operations increase in numbers and capacity with the size of the command because each headquarters has available all of the agencies in its subordinate commands in addition to agencies of its own.

Tables of Organization show that only three important groups of agencies are assigned directly to the Intelligence Service for the collection of information in the theater of operations. These are (1) battalion Intelligence scouts and observers, (2) observation groups of the air service, and (3) the several groups of ground observers belonging to the various headquarters. The chief agencies other than these are the troops themselves.

Collection of information in the theater of operations is a matter of observation, of reconnaissance, and, to a much less important degree, of espionage.

All units of a field army having Intelligence Service units, from the battalion to army headquarters, except the infantry brigade, are provided with ground observation groups. It is believed that brigade headquarters also should be so provided. Air observation groups assist in the collection of information for the division, corps and army Intelligence Service groups. The Information Service of the artillery furnishes valuable information through its observer groups.

The Intelligence Service utilizes troops and units wherever practicable. Ordinarily it is served by battalion Intelligence scouts and observers especially trained to secure front line information; by reconnaissance and observation of its own troops when on any kind of duty which permits them to gain information; and by its own ground observation stations and such air units as may be

assigned for day or night reconnaissance or for air photography.

Intelligence Service personnel is able to man a limited number of observation posts (O.P.'s) and to provide a few scouts to accompany patrols and raiding parties. It is necessary however to rely almost wholly upon the troops themselves to gain the necessary information, or at least to pave the way for gaining it. As a result it is an Intelligence Service principle that every individual and every element of an army is a potential agency for the collection of information. Any part or instrumentality of the military forces coming into contact with the enemy is expected to give some information as the result of such contact.

Sources of Information

The most important sources from which information is collected are infantry and cavalry patrols or units on the duty of security, pursuit and bombing units of the air service, the artillery information service, certain signal corps installations, and the observers of anti-aircraft defense. The following is a partial list of other sources from which information of the enemy is gained.

1. Intelligence units of higher, lower and adjacent organizations.
2. *Troops.* (a) Infantry and front line O.P.'s; (b) patrols and scouts; (c) raids and reconnaissances; (d) artillery O.P.'s; (e) artillery information groups; (f) airplane photos; (g) airplane observation; (h) airplane scouts; (i) combat squadrons; (j) balloon observation; (k) flash ranging; (l) sound ranging; (m) listening-in sets; (n) wireless

interception; (o) prisoners; (p) deserters; (q) documents; (r) cavalry on screening outpost or reconnaissance duty; (s) infantry on outpost or advance guard duty; (t) staff departments, services and troops of own command.

3. *Press.* Newspapers, magazines, periodicals, telegraph, telephone, cable and wireless of—(a) enemy; (b) neutral; (c) allied and our own country.
4. *Letters, postcards, etc.* (a) from enemy country; (b) to enemy country; (c) from and to allied or neutral countries from and to our own country.
5. *Spies and Agents.* (a) Into enemy country; (b) into enemy troops; (c) into neutral countries bordering enemy land.
6. *Visitors and Travelers.* (a) From and to our own and enemy country; (b) from and to our own and neutral country; (c) from and to neutral and enemy country.
7. *Special Agencies.* Military attachés, consular agents and diplomatic personnel in all countries but particularly those bordering enemy countries.

Observation

The principal means for securing information of the enemy lies in observation. It includes ground and air observation. Ground observation stations in almost all situations, but particularly in stabilized warfare, constitute the most satisfactory method for gaining information. One advantage possessed by this method over other means of collection lies in the fact that practically continuous observation may be maintained over enemy terrain. Probably the most successful observation work is done by determining "normals" and making deductions from changes in these. For example, every road or railroad

under observation from a station may be watched constantly during daylight hours. By recording the daily movements of traffic over a particular road or railroad a "normal" of traffic may be established. Any departure from this "normal" will indicate altered dispositions or a change of plan of the enemy. We may be sure that such a departure from the "normal" will mean something which we would like to know about, for the enemy will not be increasing or decreasing the normal amount of traffic in the battle zone unless he has some object in view. It may mean little or it may mean a great deal. The interpretation of the significance of a change from "normal" will be made by the Intelligence officer of the appropriate headquarters.

Its constant observation of enemy terrain enables the observation group to spot new construction of defensive works, artillery positions and other installations. Enemy airplanes, balloon and artillery activity in a given sector is also recorded by observation groups and "normals" are established for them in the same manner as for roads and railroads. Balloon observation gives a greater field of view than from the ground, hence it serves to uncover areas concealed from ground O.P.'s or too distant to be observed by them.

Reconnaissance

Agencies for collecting information by reconnaissance, such as scouts, patrols, airplanes, and others which go into or over enemy territory and make observations or take photographs are under the disadvantage of recording the situation as it existed at a particular place at a given moment. There is no way by which to measure the value of such information because there is nothing on which to base a deduction as to the significance of the

“detached” fact or situation reported. Collection by reconnaissance, therefore, lacks the continuity which makes ground observation posts of such value. However, reconnaissance by the several means available gives valuable results when coördinated.

Information gained by reconnaissance when used to supplement that collected from other sources and by other means is often conclusive in establishing facts regarding the situation or intentions of the enemy. It is probably most valuable when used for gaining some specific information needed to confirm a suspected or rumored movement or change of dispositions of enemy forces. The airplane, however, is the only agency available for making observations by reconnaissance in the rear areas of enemy territory. Night reconnaissance work by airplane to determine unusual activity by lights and fires shown by the enemy is sometimes most important in its results.

The Artillery Information Service. This is in the nature of observation of enemy artillery activity carried on by the personnel of the Artillery Information Service. Normals of artillery fire under given conditions are established in the several sectors. Valuable information as to enemy intentions is gained from the character, volume and intensity of his fire and the areas or targets fired on. Aerial observation and airplane photographs are constantly used in connection with artillery firing in gaining general as well as special information. The flash and sound ranging personnel and installations are very accurate in locating enemy artillery firing positions. The closest liaison, for the purpose of the exchange of information, exists between the artillery Information and the Intelligence Services.

Listening-in Sets. In effect these are microphones by

means of which within a limited range, ground telegraph messages of the enemy or telephone conversations over leaky telephone wires may be heard. They are often of value in our own front line areas as a means of establishing a censorship and checking up on the telephone conversations of our own troops. Telephone communications regarding the locations, operations and plans of our own forces are a constant source of danger to our own troops and must be guarded against.

Radio Intelligence. By means of wireless intercepting stations, information sent by enemy radio messages may be gotten. Communication by means of radio is becoming more common as its use is perfected. In the future it will undoubtedly be a most important factor in Intelligence work. Its weakness for use in the field lies in the fact that it is easily intercepted and as a result every message of importance must be sent in code or cipher.

Codes and Ciphers. The Code and Cipher section of the Intelligence Service at American G.H.Q. in France demonstrated that any code or cipher could be read. The question was simply one of the time required to read it.

Goniometric Stations. These were established for the purpose of locating enemy wireless stations. They are operated on the same principles as flash and sound ranging stations and are able to determine the kind and character of the stations located. Establishing the position of the wireless stations of enemy regiments, brigades, division and corps enables the radio Intelligence officer to plot the location of what may be called the enemy wireless net. Changes in the location of stations in this net, or increased or decreased radio activity, almost always precede some new activity on the part of the enemy.

Radio, artillery and airplane activity of unusual nature is always closely connected with "what the enemy intends

to do" and by close observation of these things it is always possible for the Intelligence Service to collect information which will be of value in indicating the enemy plans and intentions.

Prisoners and Documents. These constitute one of the most valuable sources for securing information of the enemy. Every action in which there is actual contact with enemy forces should result in acquiring prisoners and documents. The individual prisoner may have but little information. His knowledge will probably be confined to the organization, location and activity of his own immediate command, but every little bit of information will be of assistance. The information received from a number of prisoners when put together will frequently give a picture of the situation of divisions and larger commands.

The same principle applies to documents. A few postcards and letters, or maps and copies of orders will probably give little information, but when a large number of such documents from various commands are secured within a short period of time the resulting information may be of great value.

In so far as the collection agencies with front line troops are concerned, prisoners and documents represent information collected but not yet in shape to be recorded. It is essential that there be the least possible delay in getting prisoners and documents back to the higher headquarters where they may be examined and the information gained evaluated. As a rule there will be but little that the prisoners will know or that the documents will disclose which will be of value to the battalion, regimental or even brigade commander. These commanders therefore should expedite sending prisoners and documents to division headquarters.

Cavalry Intelligence. Cavalry commands are provided with Intelligence units the same as infantry. Their troops on outpost, advance guard or screening duties will be accompanied by Intelligence officers or personnel to collect information of the enemy. Such information will be handled in the same way as that gathered by other branches and distributed into the Intelligence Service net.

Press

The Intelligence Service groups at G.H.Q. and at the War Department are the chief agencies for collecting information from enemy, neutral, allied and our own press, and other publications. That collected from these sources by the Intelligence Service at lower headquarters is generally confined to what is found in captured documents.

Individuals

Spies, agents, visitors and travelers are seldom of value as sources of information to any headquarters lower than G.H.Q.

As a rule the War Department Intelligence Service is the only agency having to do with military attachés, consular agents and diplomatic personnel in the collection of information.

Advantage of Opportunity

Information of the enemy is collected in many ways and from many sources, and as a result will range, in the form of its receipt, from short and simple messages to long and complicated reports. It will sometimes contain only vague and uncertain reports and at other times will be made up of accurate statements of fact with complete evidence to support its reliability. The Intelligence officer on some occasions will find himself called upon for an

estimate of the situation of the enemy with only time enough to make a hurried reconnaissance before the operation is to commence. On other occasions there will be a long period of time in which every source of information may be thoroughly exploited and the most accurate and complete information gained.

Advantage must be taken of every opportunity to collect information at any and every place within the limits of a command. The Intelligence Service should be active at all times when in the presence of the enemy. It cannot afford to overlook any opportunity to gain information.

The information collected must at once be classified and made available to every commander who may need it for use in combat plans. To this end constant activity, initiative and energy are essential on the part of the Intelligence Service personnel in seeking information. Every bit of information gained should be utilized. A battalion in the front lines will gather much information which it cannot use but which higher headquarters will find of value. No information may safely be disregarded. If it is of no use one place, it must be sent on up until it reaches those who will be able to use it.

In theory, absolutely, and in practice to as great an extent as possible, Intelligence Service groups must be so coördinated and interlocked that Intelligence gained at any one place will promptly be made available at every place where needed in the command.

Recording Information

All information as soon as received at a headquarters is recorded in the Intelligence Journal. This may be in the form of loose sheets, or in a book. There should be entered in the record the hour and date of receipt, from whom or what source received, a brief note of the

character of the information and its disposition, including the time it was sent, means of transmission and to whom sent. If the information was evaluated at the headquarters where it is being recorded that fact should also be noted under the disposition column.

If sheets are used it is advisable to have a separate one for each day. It is important that the journal record for each day be filed in a safe place as soon as the entries for the day are closed. If the journal is kept in a book a new page should be used each day. The advantage of using sheets of paper instead of the book lies in the greater safety secured by filing the day's report where it will not be handled. In a book in daily use the reports of previous days soon become soiled, and any day's report may be torn out accidentally (or even intentionally) and lost.

Transmission of Information

There cannot be really effective staff work or efficient exercise of command unless coördinate members of the commander's staff and the commander himself thoroughly understand not only each his own part, but each the part of every other member. Only by the most perfect team work, in which each member is fully trusted to attend to his own duties, can success be achieved.

This was demonstrated over and over in all of the armies in the World War. Because commanders of lower units would not realize the absolute necessity of getting information of the enemy back to higher headquarters promptly, it was often necessary to instruct the Intelligence officers at lower headquarters to send it directly to the Intelligence Section at the next higher headquarters.

Much of the information collected is of such a nature

that a percentage of it is of little or no interest to the immediate commander of battalion, regiment or brigade. The delay incident to showing it to each one of the intermediate commanders personally before sending it on up to higher headquarters might be most costly. An apparently valueless bit of information might be the exact thing needed to confirm some very important suspicion or part conclusion which had been gained little by little from many sources by the commander-in-chief of the whole force. The mosaic or picture puzzle relating to the particular situation of the enemy might be made complete by information which would be most unimportant to a division or lower commander. Therefore, while all information pertaining to the command should go to his commander and all that is gathered should be available to him, the Intelligence officer should be authorized to send it back as promptly as possible after recording it without waiting for his commanding officer to examine it in detail. If a commanding officer has an Intelligence officer whom he cannot trust to sift the information and send back what ought to be sent, he should relieve him.

Means of Transmission

The following list includes most of the methods of communication which may be used for transmitting information:

(1) Messengers; (2) runners; (3) balloons; (4) airplanes; (5) telephone; (6) telegraph; (7) underground telephones; (8) radio; (9) pigeons; (10) dogs; (11) hand flags; (12) signal fires; (13) heliograph; (14) rockets; (15) flares.

The means selected for transmitting collected information to its destination should be the most rapid and sure that can be found at hand. Consideration of the circum-

stances such as the time required, convenience, accuracy, safety and necessity for secrecy of transmission, will aid very largely in deciding the means used. Whenever there is any question as to its safe arrival, information should be sent in by more than one means.

CHAPTER VIII

EVALUATION OF INFORMATION

"Information obtained from prisoners should be priced at the right value; a soldier sees nothing beyond his company, and the officer at most can give an account of the movements and position of the division to which his regiment belongs. Thus a general in command should not consider confessions torn from prisoners, except when they square with reports of the outposts, to justify his conjectures as to the position the enemy occupies."

Definition

By evaluation is meant the critical and systematic analysis of information of the enemy to determine its probable truth, value and importance. The process briefly consists of comparing the information with previously determined facts regarding the enemy. Evaluation properly conducted separates the false from the true, sifts the non-essential from the essential and puts each bit of information in its proper place in the picture of the enemy situation. The interpretation of the significance of facts concerning the enemy and the drawing of tactical conclusions from them regarding the plans and intentions of the enemy is sometimes considered a part of the evaluation function. It is believed that to give such a broad meaning to the term evaluation is confusing because thereby it is made to include the service function of establishing facts as well as the General Staff function of tactical deduction.

The experts or specialists charged with the study of

matériel, organization, movements, activity, and methods of combat of artillery, for example, will be able to establish certain facts regarding the location, character of fire, caliber of guns, movement, etc., of enemy artillery. From these facts the expert may from time to time form an opinion of their significance as indicating enemy plans and intentions. This opinion of course will be submitted to G-2 in the subsection report. Such an opinion however is incidental to the study of enemy artillery and is submitted to aid G-2 in drawing his tactical conclusions. G-2 arrives at the conclusions as to the probable plans and intentions of the enemy from a study of the composite picture of the enemy situation as a whole as gained from the reports of his several subsections and from intelligence received from other sources.

The terms interpretation, collation, verification and digestion are also used to denote the function of evaluation.

Results of Evaluation

The process of evaluation converts information of the enemy into Intelligence. It emerges from this process in the form of established facts of varying degrees of value. These values are expressed in several classifications such as: (1) Accepted as true; or verified. (2) Indicated and probably true; or partially verified. (3) Rumored and possibly true; or unverified. As additional information is received it is evaluated and the resulting intelligence is added to that already secured. Such of this as is affected is changed in its classification to meet the new Intelligence. There is thus a steady accumulation of new Intelligence and a constant addition to that previously received. This tends gradually to convert the older Intelligence in its classification to that noted as first

class, or finally to eliminate it from further consideration due to inability to fully verify it.

The Problem Presented

The object of evaluation is to gain a complete picture of the situation of the enemy. Practically it is often not possible to attempt more than an approximation of the complete picture.

In order to be sure that all information coming to the Intelligence Service group of any and every headquarters shall be properly evaluated a definite system for handling it is organized and made effective. All information is recorded and sent to the appropriate place to be evaluated and catalogued for distribution and for file. It is to be noted that Intelligence should be so filed and indexed as to insure that it can readily be found when any matter even indirectly connected with it is under discussion.

At lower headquarters information of every character may be recorded, evaluated (so far as possible) and distributed by the Intelligence officer in person. At corps and higher headquarters however the reception and evaluation process has gone far beyond the capacity of any one person to handle. This situation is met by the organization of the Information of the Enemy section of the Intelligence Service group into several subsections in which the assigned personnel specializes along well-defined lines according to the character of the information. To gain the best results one man or group of men must be allowed to study one single subject or group of closely allied subjects so that the most expert knowledge concerning every type of information may be developed. Each group of experts while working in close coöperation with every other group is yet held responsible that its special subject is thoroughly covered.

Grouping Subdivisions

Experience has shown that the following definite lines of specialization are satisfactory and productive of good results. The functions assigned to each may be changed in their scope to accord with any special circumstances which may make it advisable. The subdivisions here noted are those that probably will be required at an army headquarters. At higher headquarters additional ones may be necessary while there may be no need for some of these subsections at lower headquarters. In the same way new subdivisions may be created for special work. For example if the Chemical Warfare Service should develop to any great extent it might become advisable to create a special group or subdivision at army or even corps headquarters to specialize upon a study of the enemy methods, matériel and activity in that character of warfare.

1. Enemy order of battle.
2. Enemy works including topographical information.
3. Enemy activity and movement.
4. Artillery information.
5. Radio intelligence.
6. Airplane reconnaissance.
7. Prisoners and documents.

The officers and men of each group spend their entire time segregating from the mass of information received the information relating to their particular subject and in making a careful study of it with a view to gaining as complete knowledge as possible of the enemy activity and situation in respect to it.

General Principles

The evaluation of information of the enemy constantly presents the problem of fitting into place the particular bit of information just received. It is a constant picture puzzle operation in which the picture is subject to kaleidoscopic changes according to the character of information which comes in.

At each headquarters the Intelligence officer is charged with evaluating only so much of the information as relates to the area of responsibility of his commander in enemy territory. For example if the Intelligence Service group of a front line battalion should gain information that a new machine gun emplacement had been established in the defensive works of the opposing enemy battalion and also that the division reserves of the opposite enemy division had been shifted to another position it would be expected to verify and evaluate the information concerning the machine gun emplacement without delay and to forward at once to higher headquarters the information concerning the division reserves without attempting to evaluate it.

Question Answered

The function of evaluation contributes to answer the question, "What is the situation of the enemy?" The judgment of the Intelligence officer or of the specialist in answering his part of this question is good or bad according to his ability to determine the reliability of the sources from which the information comes and the probability of the correctness of the facts. This implies an ability to visualize the particular situation of the enemy in the circumstances pictured by the information.

The Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2, under all circumstances retains the responsibility for the evaluation of in-

formation. While the experts and specialists in the several subsections of his Intelligence Service group are charged with the study of enemy information and the determination of facts regarding the enemy situation the final decision as to accepting and disseminating these facts is in G-2's hands.

From a study of the facts gained by evaluation and the Intelligence received from other sources, G-2 draws logical, definite, tactical conclusions, which enable him to answer the question, "What are the probable plans and intentions of the enemy?"

Determining the answer to this and the succeeding question is not a part of the evaluation function. It is not an Intelligence service function to draw tactical conclusions but a General Staff one which G-2 as a trained General Staff officer is charged with performing. His tactical conclusions are not Intelligence but are deductions made from a study of Intelligence for the information and use of the commander.

From a study of the operation plans and orders of his own commander along with one of the enemy situation, plans and intentions G-2 is able to answer the question, "What difficulties will our proposed operations encounter and how may the enemy be expected to react if we put them into effect?"

The answer to this question can be made only after the most careful study of the elements mentioned by a trained General Staff officer who is thoroughly familiar with his own as well as the enemy forces, their methods of combat, general plans and psychology.

Establishing Facts

As a general rule Intelligence officers must be skeptical and slow to accept anything as true until they have veri-

fied it in every practical way. This is especially true in regard to something which one would like to have happen or which one believes is bound to happen. When for example the enemy has withdrawn from several parts of his line it is human to hope and expect that he is preparing to make a general withdrawal. The disposition is strong to put an interpretation upon his movements which will conform to what he is expected to do or to that which it is hoped he will do. Upon one occasion in France such an interpretation was reported to be the cause of incorrect conclusions which might have produced disastrous results. An attack based upon such a false conclusion was said to have been planned. Fortunately the true state of affairs was discovered and the attack was not executed.

The facts which G-2 accepts as true must be such as would be accepted by any fair-minded, trained military man if they were presented to him. There would be no hesitation in accepting as true information showing the location of an enemy battery if an airplane photo showed it clearly in the act of firing in that place. The report of an airplane pilot as to the location of a battery he had seen however would not be accepted as final unless he was known to have accurately identified the place on a map and even then it would be wise to check it by other agencies. If his report, however, was corroborated by a patrol leader and by an observer from an O.P. or by flash or sound ranging it could be accepted at once as correct.

It is the duty of the evaluating officer to secure sufficient evidence to make reasonable his conclusion as to the indicated fact. He must be prepared at any time to back up his conclusion by producing the evidence upon which he based it. Sometimes certain information will be capable of two or more conclusions concerning the fact.

Both of these should be carefully considered and an opinion as to which is most likely arrived at. Even in this case he should have some clear reason upon which to base his opinion and should not be guessing or following a hunch. If he has no reason for an opinion as to which conclusion is the more probable he should express no opinion and should be prepared to say why. In such a case his business is to go after more information so as to verify either one or the other of the possible conclusions.

Guesses and hunches have no place in the Intelligence Service. This applies to the experts and specialists who must come to a conclusion as to the truth of an indicated fact and also to G-2 in deducing enemy plans and intentions. Intelligence officers must realize that their problem is to answer the cold-blooded questions: What is the enemy's situation? Where is he located? What does he intend and plan to do? It is not a matter of what one thinks him to be doing, or where one guesses him to be or what one has a hunch he will do. It is facts which determine the conclusions. Facts based upon knowledge of happenings, accepted only after they have been verified, are the only foundations upon which logical deductions and conclusions based upon probabilities may be built. The officer who cannot keep this in mind at all times cannot be a successful Intelligence officer.

It is much better to make no report of enemy dispositions or movements than to make a wrong one. Where there is no report of enemy strength, dispositions and location there will be a reconnaissance and careful observation in the progress of an attack. When the report is made that such and such is the case on a particular front the attack will probably be conducted under the assumption that this information is true and there may not then

be exercised the care that there otherwise would be and the whole command may suffer accordingly.

Forecasting the Future

The Intelligence officer must refrain from prophesying. He must not attempt to forecast what the situation will be to-morrow because that situation will depend upon our own actions as well as upon those of the enemy. It is self-evident that the Intelligence officer cannot determine in advance the results of to-day's fighting—nor can he tell what action his own forces will actually take—although he may know the plans. Neither can he determine definitely what the enemy will do. There is an old principle which must never be forgotten. It is to the effect that it is safe to figure that the enemy will do that which will be most embarrassing to you. Since the enemy action will depend upon his information concerning our army, and we do not know how complete or accurate that is, it is plain that the Intelligence officer will be able to estimate only what action the enemy will take—not how successful it will be. This is not to be understood to mean that the probable plans and intentions of the enemy cannot be accurately gaged—because they can and must be. Such estimates however are based upon probabilities and are so recognized. While the Intelligence officer might guess right and might prophesy the future situation correctly a big percentage of the time, there will always be a certain amount of chance and sooner or later that chance will exact its toll and the command will pay the price for the weakness of its Intelligence Service in attempting to foretell events.

It is a very different matter, however, for the Intelligence officer to indicate from the information at hand, what appear to be the present plans and intentions of the

enemy. This is expected and in fact is one of G-2's most important duties. Upon this estimate the plans for his own forces are made by the commander.

To attempt to answer the question, "What will be the situation to-morrow?" is not a function of the Intelligence officer. It is quite misleading to state that "it is possible to forecast the future," even "reasonably accurately." This statement scarcely seems worthy of serious discussion yet it has been made and to "forecast the future" has been said to be one of the objects of the operation of the Intelligence Service.

That it is the unexpected that always happens in war is as true to-day as it has always been. The happenings of the future cannot be foretold from the situation in the past nor in the present. What will happen to-morrow will depend upon factors which enter the situation after the present. Changes of high commanders; altered ideals of legislatures and of peoples; accidents happening to high officials; some international incident adding an ally to the enemy's side or turning an ally away from them, in fact, an endless number of things might happen, without the slightest previous indication of their coming to pass, which would at once change the whole situation. So, while coming events do cast their shadows before them, it must not be forgotten that they are still only shadows.

There are so many factors of such variable character which may enter into and change the probable course of events that there can be no forecast of what the situation will be even in the immediate future which will be of any benefit to a commander or his staff in making up war plans or in issuing orders for combat.

1. Enemy Order of Battle

This section is charged with maintaining the battle order of the enemy located within the area of responsibility of the commander. It gathers every class of information which pertains to the strength, composition, organization, location and disposition of enemy units. A convenient distribution of duties is to subdivide the work into the following or analogous subsections:

- (a) Battle order map.
- (b) History enemy divisions and other units.
- (c) Qualifications, classification and general morale and fighting efficiency of enemy divisions and other units.
- (d) Enemy organization and strength of units.
- (e) Biographies of important enemy commanders.
- (f) Data pertaining to enemy plans and intentions.

Identifications. All of the foregoing subsections depend upon "identifications."

"Identifications" is the technical name for the evidence which tends to establish the location, at a given time, of an enemy unit. An identification may be a captured enemy; a dead or wounded enemy whose uniform or insignia discloses the presence of his command at a certain place at a certain time; a captured document such as a map, combat order, postcard, letter, newspapers, etc.

The presence of the German 5th Guard Division in support of the front line of the enemy in the Aire River valley in early October, 1918, was not known until after several hours of fighting when an identification was secured by the capture of an order giving its position and directing its action.

A commander at all times must know as accurately as

possible what enemy troops confront him. He must have an idea of their strength, armament and disposition in order that he may make proper use of his own forces to prevent surprise and to accomplish his mission.

In order to make sure of the identity of the enemy against him and to confirm and check up the enemy dispositions it is necessary frequently to gain new identifications. Abnormal or increased circulation in the rear zones of the enemy may arouse our suspicions especially in stabilized warfare to such an extent as to make it seem advisable to take special measures to secure identifications.

From the capture of a member of the enemy's army at a given time and place, the presence of his company in the immediate neighborhood may be strongly suspected. From this the presence of his brigade and division may also be inferred. It is evident, however, that none of these possibilities necessarily follows. The prisoners may have been detached and assigned to some other unit as was frequently the case in the latter days of the German army in France. The evidence furnished by the identifications must be compared with other things that may already be known about the particular unit and supplemented by an examination of the prisoner himself. In this way it is decided whether to accept the evidence as fact or merely to report it as suspected.

It may be said that by the use of identifications, it is possible to determine with considerable accuracy, the composition of the enemy's front line, and to a lesser and not so accurate extent, the disposition and presence of troops in support or reserve in his rear areas. It should be noted in this connection that the best and freshest identifications are usually obtained through the capture of enemy persons and documents by our own front line troops and

that the duty of supplying identifications is one of the most important ones performed by them.

Identifications by espionage reports, enemy newspaper items, letters, postcards and interception of wireless messages although less satisfactory than direct captures are excellent sources for gaining identifications and are valuable to corroborate other evidence.

(a) *Battle Order Map*. A practical method by which it is possible always to have a graphic picture of the situation of the enemy is to maintain a Battle Order Map showing the location and dispositions of the various units of the enemy forces.

The division is a convenient unit of the enemy army for corps and higher headquarters to use as a basic unit for this purpose. It is the smallest fighting organization ordinarily moved about and is yet large enough to include troops of all arms. The subordinate elements of a division are seldom transferred from it except for temporary use. The division is a definite tactical combat unit whose prescribed armament, composition, organization and equipment is uniform for all divisions. Lower headquarters for this purpose use enemy units appropriate to their own size. A division for example would keep track of the brigades and regiments of an enemy division opposed to it. A battalion would picture the companies of an opposite battalion.

The Battle Order Map is generally hung up on a wall for convenience in reading and posting it. On it by means of cardboard squares or tabs to represent enemy divisions or other units a graphic picture of enemy dispositions is kept. Pencil or chalk lines may be used to outline the areas under the enemy corps, armies and groups of armies. Large, color-headed pins are convenient to indicate the locations of enemy corps and higher head-

quarters. The fighting value of the enemy troops is indicated by using pieces of cardboard of different colors. The Battle Order Map supplies the greater part of the Intelligence which goes on the daily Situation Map issued by the Intelligence Service.

(b) *Division Histories.* Histories of enemy units recorded in card index or other convenient form are used to supplement the Battle Order Map. At corps and higher headquarters the enemy division is used as the basic unit for this purpose. Those higher headquarters also keep up histories of enemy corps, army and army group headquarters. A certain number of organizations known, in the case of the corps as corps troops and in the army as army troops, will always be found in all of these higher commands in addition to the divisions or other elements assigned to them. These will be included in the respective histories. Lower headquarters so far as practicable maintain histories of enemy units opposed to them appropriate to their own responsibility.

The history of every enemy division should be made up in time of peace if possible from peace time data and statistics as to its previous war service. This history forms a foundation upon which, after war starts, may be built the story of each division during the progress of the war.

In the history will be noted the part of enemy country from which the bulk of its personnel comes; the characteristics of the inhabitants of that part of the country; the date of organization of the unit; the amount of training it has had; its movements since mobilization; its engagements, marches, experiences, etc., its previous history, if any, in former wars; the names and histories of all officers including particularly the commanders of the unit itself and of the chief subordinate elements; its or-

ganization and composition; the serial numbers or names of all elements of the unit and their insignia and distinguishing marks and, in general, all items showing morale and fighting efficiency.

(c) *Fighting Efficiency.* It is interesting to note that experience has demonstrated that once a division (or fighting unit) has established itself as bad (or yellow) or as good (or red) it will almost invariably remain in that class. This has been found to be so even though years may intervene between wars and the entire personnel may have been completely changed several times in the interim.

By keeping a careful record of the identifications of any unit of the enemy's army for an extended period, studying the nature of the work it has done and other pertinent factors of its history there can be built up slowly a great amount of valuable information concerning it. In the case of a division such a study and record will give a general idea of its condition as to morale, training and fighting efficiency. In this way it is possible to classify enemy divisions and to award them what may be called a "fighting coefficient." From this the division is rated as a first class or shock division, or as a second, third or lower class one.

Combat divisions are delicate mechanisms whose finer psychological and physical fibres may quickly be damaged by difficult service. A division with a fighting coefficient of 100 per cent. after a few days of strenuous fighting may have that coefficient reduced to 50 per cent. or even lower. Other divisions under any circumstances may never reach a point where their fighting coefficient could be rated at 100 per cent. Such divisions normally would lose their fighting coefficient at a much faster rate than would one of the first class.

The indicated study of their history and rating as to efficiency of enemy divisions and other units enables an answer to be made to the commander's question, "What is the quality of the enemy's troops?" They also assist in arriving at an answer to the ever-present question, "What does the enemy intend to do?" This latter information is deduced by keeping careful watch on the locations and movements of enemy divisions of the different classes. For example, an assembly or drawing together of a number of first class shock divisions into one locality always means "fight," a mixture of several classes of divisions in one locality may mean a training period preparatory to some new operations, while a thin array of fourth class divisions in front line positions generally indicates a "quiet sector."

(d) *Enemy Organization.* The original organization and prescribed strength of enemy units is known in advance from peace time collection of data. If the organization was changed materially or even completely during the war it would not be long before this subsection of the Battle Order section would know all the details of the changes. Its difficult problem is to be able to make an accurate estimate of the actual strength of a particular enemy organization at a specified time. To keep up such an estimate in regard to all enemy units (divisions and higher) is an endless task which requires continuous work. The most important source for gaining this information is through piecing together the statements of prisoners regarding the strength of their companies. By gathering together information concerning losses and replacements and considering these along with the information from prisoners an estimate can be made which while probably not wholly accurate will be much more so than one based merely on a guess.

(e) *Biographies of Commanders and Staffs.* In the World War it was observed that certain corps staffs specialized on particular classes of operations. An example of this was found in the operations at Riga and Caporetto conducted by the same corps staff where the surprise attack was employed. It was a normal assumption, when that corps staff appeared on the western front, that the same character of operations would be undertaken. This turned out to be the correct conclusion in this case for the great German offensives of early 1918, based on surprise tactics, were supervised by the same corps staff that had been so successful at Riga and Caporetto.

Army commanders also generally displayed characteristic individuality. Each was marked by his own type of thought and reaction under like conditions. His habits of command and operations caused him to employ the same methods which had brought success to him in previous campaigns. By studying these habits of a particular commander in connection with the character of his troops a fair estimate of what might be expected was gained. For example, one general seemed to possess a genius for successful defensive fighting and whenever he was found in command it could always be anticipated that no attack from that quarter was in prospect. Another general was a specialist in the surprise form of attack and was always used for that purpose. Another was an expert in counter-attacks and when he was in command that form of attack had always to be guarded against because he always used it.

(f) *Enemy Plans and Intentions.* The officer in charge of this subsection should be charged with the collection and classification of all Intelligence which might be of value as indicating enemy plans or intentions. This must

be gathered from all sections and subsections of the Intelligence Division of the headquarters and prepared in a logical form for study by G-2 in person.

The deductions or conclusions as to the probable plans and intentions of the enemy, as has been noted, is a General Staff function and not an Intelligence Service one.

2. *Enemy Works*

This subsection deals almost entirely in Fixed Intelligence. In the same way that the Order of Battle subsection supplies information concerning enemy units, the Enemy Works subsection secures, evaluates and prepares for dissemination all available information of the physical establishments of the enemy. The term "enemy works" is to be taken in its broadest sense as including not only enemy defensive constructions such as lines of trenches, systems of dugouts, machine gun and artillery emplacements, but all other establishments constructed by the enemy and used by him in his operations. Among these will be found field railway lines, narrow and standard gage; railroad yards and switching facilities; airdromes and aviation fields; engineer, munition and supply dumps; field hospitals and sanitary installations; bridge structures, permanent and temporary; cantonments; camping areas; etc.

The Enemy Works subsection is also charged with gaining information of suitable artillery targets; keeping files of data concerning towns and cities in enemy territory, showing their billeting capacities, water supply systems, public utilities establishments and other matter of value of this nature; suitable targets for bombing operations; geological formations and character of soil for

trench digging; topography of enemy terrain; streams and forests and other such information of interest in planning military operations.

Much of the information required by the Enemy Works subsection should be secured in times of peace and published in monograph form. If this has not been done the efficiency of the Intelligence Service will be greatly impaired since much of the information necessary for operations is difficult to obtain from territory occupied by the enemy after war has commenced. During active operations the Enemy Works subsection must rely upon airplane photographs for much of its information. Restitution of such photographs is an art which stands all by itself. It requires a special type of training, a great deal of practice and considerable experience to master it. Occasionally an enemy prisoner will be found able and willing to attempt to reproduce from memory some physical feature or establishment in hostile territory. Such a description of an enemy establishment may or may not be of use. Enemy maps are sometimes picked up and found to be of great value. Such sources generally are not to be depended upon and experience has shown that the only recourse is for the Enemy Works subsection to decide what it needs and send out its own air reconnaissance and photographic group to get it.

3. Enemy Activity and Movement

This subsection is concerned chiefly with Variable Intelligence. In addition to knowing about enemy units and about his works it is essential to know what he is doing. The mechanism for finding this out starts with the battalion scouts and patrols, extends backward through the division ground observation posts, division and corps airplane observation groups, and winds up with the army

ground observation stations and day and night air observation reconnaissance groups.

Ground observation stations are equipped with high powered telescopes placed in the best possible positions for observation in the sector or on the front assigned. In the ordinary case the division ground observation group confines its attention to the area back of the enemy front line zone for which the division is responsible.

Enemy activity and movement are important factors in gathering Intelligence used in deducing enemy plans and intentions. Careful records of the activities and movements of the several elements of the enemy forces, maintained for a period of days, give sure and certain evidence of coming operations. The comparison of these records over such a period will indicate the nature of the next operation or will give the equally valuable information that no new operation is being made ready. The result of constant observation over a considerable period, not that of the movements and activities of a single day, furnishes the basis from which accurate deductions may be made.

The specialists in charge of this subsection determine the facts as to what have been the movements and activities of the enemy. Their conclusions, based on the information collected from front line units, enables them to submit a definite report of the enemy activity and where and how it has taken place. From this along with other Intelligence evaluated in other subsections the G-2 is able to make his deductions of enemy intentions.

4. Artillery Information

In the Information Service of the artillery there is a technical phase interesting to the artillery and an Intelligence phase interesting to the Intelligence Service. The

movement and activity of enemy artillery give more or less definite indications of the plans and intentions of the enemy. The character and intensity of the fire, the zones fired upon, the targets selected, the kind of shell employed and other similar matters are factors which indicate plans and intentions.

In modern war Intelligence concerning the enemy artillery activity has become so important and valuable that it is always profitable to maintain a separate subsection in the Battle Order section devoted solely to this duty. At its head there should be an expert artilleryman competent to make the studies and comparisons necessary to gain an accurate picture of the enemy artillery activity. Not all of this information comes from the artillery Information Service. Much of it comes through ordinary Intelligence Service channels. This while not accurate enough for counter battery work or for technical artillery use is yet sufficiently accurate for the needs of the Intelligence Service.

5. *Radio Intelligence*

This subsection gathers information concerning the enemy radio activity. It is a development of the World War in which wireless communications work made great strides and improvements in technique.

The subsection is particularly interested in the locations of the several subdivisions of the enemy wireless net. It keeps track of the activity of the various stations, intercepts and decodes their messages and establishes the situation of the enemy in regard to his radio operations. Valuable information of his plans and intentions is deduced from the changes in locations of the several radio substations.

The subsection also supervises and directs the opera-

tion of listening-in sets by which enemy communications by telephone and frequently by telegraph may be overheard through leaky wires.

6. *Airplane Reconnaissance*

This subsection maintains a record of the missions of its own airplane reconnaissances, the requirements of the Intelligence Service in this respect and the information gathered by this means.

It maintains a graphic record of enemy air activity and works in close coöperation with its own Intelligence Service subsection of the Activity and Movements subsection in evaluating the information gained from this and the several other sources.

It plots the positions of enemy anti-aircraft defenses and keeps its own Air Service informed regarding them.

7. *Prisoners and Documents*

The Prisoners and Documents subsection at the higher headquarters exercises general supervision over the handling of prisoners and documents, in so far as gaining information from them is concerned. Its personnel compiles the information so gathered and assists the other subsections in evaluating that part which pertains to them. For this reason it must work in close coöperation with all other subsections and must know their particular needs in the way of information. The examination of prisoners may then be conducted with a view to supplying these special needs in addition to gathering routine information.

The examination of prisoners and documents is done by officers and men who are familiar with the enemy's language and are especially trained in this work. The results achieved rather than the methods by which they

are gained is what interests the commander and the staff.

Prisoners. The questioning of prisoners is as old as war itself, but it remained for the World War really to put the process on a scientific basis. The result was that Intelligence personnel from the top down was keen on the subject.

In addition to the open questioning of prisoners a valuable aid is found in the use of "stool pigeons." These generally are trained Intelligence personnel, placed in confinement along with the prisoners to secure information from them. Individual prisoners generally speaking are of little value. However when large numbers are taken in a single operation or when a few are captured each day over a period of several days, the composite of the information gained from them is of the greatest value. One prisoner may lie, many prisoners may lie, but all prisoners will not lie in the same way or regarding the same things. Nearly all prisoners will tell the truth in certain matters even if they lie in others. One man will talk freely on some matter which he thinks can be of no use to his captors or damage to his country. Another will apparently tell the truth regarding anything he may be asked and 90 per cent. of what he tells will be false. Another will give all the information he has in order to get even with some officer who has abused him. Another, through fright, will be absolutely honest in telling all he knows. The average prisoner will know little except that which relates to the small circle of company or battalion atmosphere in which he has been living.

The result is that through elimination and comparisons of the mass of material collected from a number of prisoners the truth within certain limits can be determined. The accuracy of the information gained from prisoners however should be checked from other sources wherever

possible in order to fully establish the facts as given by them.

The experiences of the First American Army in its operations in France indicated that of all enemy officers captured about 90 per cent. were line officers. Of these about 40 per cent. knew practically nothing which could not more easily have been secured from non-commissioned officers or other intelligent enlisted men. Of the other 60 per cent. 10 per cent. gave information of real value during their official interrogation. 15 per cent. gave information intentionally inaccurate. Of the total number of officers captured about 60 per cent. invoked their military honor as an excuse for not giving information of any kind. Where conditions permitted a "special examination"—one conducted privately where the prisoner felt sure none of his fellow prisoners knew he was being examined—fully 80 per cent. gave some information of value.

Non-commissioned officers were by far the best sources for gaining information. Most of them were well advised concerning matters of company administration, organization, strength and positions. Few of them resisted insistent interrogation. The Alsatians gave valuable information but on the whole were not so well informed as others, possibly because they were mostly without rank or because they had been kept away from places where they might have gained information of value.

Messengers, signalmen, telephone operators, officer's orderlies and the like were found to possess valuable information.

Viewed as a whole prisoners gave accurate information on almost anything that they could be expected to know about. It may be summed up as a result of those experiences that prisoners will tell that the enemy in-

tends to raid our trenches at a certain place and time; that an offensive is being planned; that the enemy plans to evacuate his present line of defense; that a certain battalion is holding the first system of trenches; that three of its companies are in reserve and the fourth in outpost position; they will point out these positions on a map if they can read one, as most enemy soldiers could do. They will tell that a certain path is used to reach certain positions; that the communications trench for food and ammunition supply is such a one; that there are "so many" dugouts with such and such capacity in a given section of trenches. They will point out gun positions, trench lines, machine gun positions, locations of dumps, of water supply, of the several headquarters and anything else that they know about. In fact there is nothing that prisoners will not tell about if there are enough of them and the examination is properly conducted. Almost invariably they will give the names of their officers and also their individual opinions concerning them.

The practical object of this discussion of prisoners is to impress upon every one interested in the Intelligence Service that prisoners are one of the most important sources for securing Combat Intelligence. In war prisoners must be had, the more the better. The front line and advance line commanders must see to it that in some way or other they are gotten.

Documents. In connection with the examination of captured documents it is to be noted that while genuine documents cannot lie neither can they be subjected to cross examination.

Orders and maps captured from the enemy are of course the most important documents. However they lose their value very rapidly and in general may be graded in what they are worth by the period of time that has

elapsed since they were written. It was almost impossible to impress this fact upon American officers and soldiers in the World War and on several occasions maps and captured orders were held as souvenirs or as curiosities until they had lost their value.

Messages from one commander to another or between staff officers frequently give important information regarding tactical operations or supply situations in enemy forces.

Newspapers, personal letters and postcards, magazines and books from enemy countries sent to troops of enemy armies are always a source of information of value in collecting War Department Intelligence. Everything of this nature should be turned in at once to the nearest Intelligence officer to be forwarded for careful examination by the experts serving in the Prisoners and Documents subsection.

Personal letters and particularly postcards written by officers and soldiers with the troops in the theater of operations and their diaries are probably the most valuable documents for the Intelligence Service to get a chance to examine. The information contained in them generally has a direct bearing upon the combat situation and hence is of more use in the immediate local problem than in the broader field of War Department Intelligence.

CHAPTER IX

DISTRIBUTION OF INTELLIGENCE

"Intelligence of the enemy is the basis of all ideas and actions in war."

Definition

The third function of the Intelligence Service, that of distribution, includes all measures taken to put the classified Intelligence in the hands of those who need it.

The term dissemination, frequently used to designate this function, has a restricted and technical meaning when so used. The function is not one of "sowing broadcast" or "diffusing" the Intelligence, but one of distributing or apportioning it to certain designated persons and places.

Intelligence Officer in Distribution

The General Staff officer for Intelligence (G-2) supervises the distribution of Intelligence. He is not however a mere purveyor of information, nor simply a channel through which it passes. He exercises a definite function in the collection and evaluation of the information, and in distributing the resulting Intelligence by determining from its character and from the situation what disposition shall be made of it.

The Intelligence officer on duty with troops has a most delicate part to play. Higher headquarters is often relying upon his commander, or upon him acting for his commander, for information upon which to base its plan of action for the next day. He must constantly keep in mind that his commander must be fully protected in the

discharge of his responsibility of keeping higher headquarters informed of developments. He must relieve his commander of the necessity of examining or of being bothered with seeing every bit of information that comes in. To this end he must have an understanding with his commander as to what information the latter desires to see in its original form and as to his own course of procedure in regard to the disposition of the information collected. Generally he will forward to higher headquarters, after recording a summary of it, all information received and will keep his commander posted regarding it. On the other hand he must always be on the alert for information of particular value and importance to his own command. In addition to his own and higher headquarters he must keep the commanders of adjacent flank units informed of the developments of the situation in order that he may be sure of having similar service from them. Also he must pass down to the next lower headquarters and to the next lower Intelligence Service unit, such information of enemy weapons, enemy tactics, methods of action, insignia, markings for identifications, etc., as he may collect or as he may receive from higher Intelligence Service organizations or from other sources.

From this it is evident that every Intelligence officer must have his Intelligence Service group organized in a systematic manner in order to insure adequate and certain distribution of the Intelligence coming into its hands.

General Considerations

It has been noted that Intelligence is of no value unless it is in the hands of those who need it in time to serve their purposes. From this principle it is evident that time is the element by which the value of Intelligence is measured.

For this reason the function of distribution is of equal importance with the two other functions, collection and evaluation.

Since time is the essence of the value of the Intelligence, the method of its distribution cannot be haphazard or left to chance. It is not practicable under modern conditions to have Intelligence distributed bit by bit as received because much of it is routine in character and much of it, when considered alone, is of trivial nature. The result is that there must be a regular and systematic routine for its distribution. This is accomplished by issuing periodic reports at prescribed hours. When the Intelligence is of a particularly important nature which will not permit of its being held to be delivered in the routine report, there must be some means whereby it may be communicated directly and at once to its destination. From this it is possible to classify Intelligence as to the time of its transmission into—

1. Intelligence of such importance as to require its immediate dispatch to a specific destination.
2. Intelligence of interest to a specific destination but which may be held for periodical transmission.
3. Intelligence of routine character which is included in the periodic report without question.

Responsibility of Commanders

Since each commander is responsible to his next higher commander for distributing Intelligence within his own command as well as to higher headquarters, it is apparent that his Intelligence officer who handles the details connected with these duties must have wide latitude of action. Manifestly the commander in person cannot examine all of the information collected or Intelligence to be

distributed before it is sent to higher or lower headquarters. As a consequence the commander must rely upon his Intelligence officer to do these things for him and to keep him informed of all Intelligence received and distributed.

Communications between Staff Officers

In the discussion of the principles of military organization, it was pointed out that there must be individual responsibility for the performance of every duty. The general responsibility rests upon the shoulders of the commander, but his assistants in the persons of his staff officers are so assigned that each of them has certain duties for whose performance he is responsible to the commander.

The two classes of staff duty—general staff and administrative, technical and supply service staff—have been fully explained and discussed. In connection with the duties of the chiefs of supply services, who are staff officers of the commander, it is to be noted that there are certain purely departmental or technical phases, in the details of which the commander is not concerned, which are handled as a matter of convenience and of efficiency directly by the staff officer of a higher commander with the staff officer of the next lower commander and vice versa. Efficient administration dictates that this shall be done. For this reason direct communication concerning business connected with a particular supply service is always authorized between the staff officers of the headquarters of the several echelons of command.

The temptation for the staff officer of the higher to give orders to the staff officer of the lower command, which involve other than purely technical or departmental matters, is always present and constantly must be guarded

against. However because this is so is no reason why the practice should not obtain since it has been shown by experience to be essential to the proper dispatch of business.

The conception that the Intelligence Service is in one sense a service of supply must again be called to mind in order to understand the mechanism of distribution. In a previous chapter it was pointed out that Intelligence secures its raw material (information of the enemy) and converts it into the product (Military Intelligence) which it issues to those persons who need it (by distribution). Representatives of the Intelligence Service are attached to every command, the same as are the representatives of all other supply services, and each commander is responsible for the supply of Intelligence to his command just as he is responsible for the supply of its other needs.

The outstanding difference between the Intelligence Service and other services is that whereas the raw material and manufactured products for other services are secured through the War Department or from the rear areas the bulk of the raw material for the Intelligence Service must be gathered by the front line troops and sent by the local subordinate commanders on up through successively higher commanders to G.H.Q. and ultimately to the War Department. Each commander, from the very front lines all the way back, converts such part of the raw material into finished product as he may be able to use for his own purposes. He causes the rest of it, along with that converted into Intelligence, to be sent on up to the next higher headquarters. This must be done without undue delay because time is such an important element in the value of the raw material as well as of the product.

There is another important difference frequently not considered. This is that the usual channel for the distribution of supplies is from higher to lower commands, thus flowing with the exercise of command and making it natural and proper for the staff officer of a higher commander charged with the distribution of supplies to communicate directly with the lower commander or with his staff officer regarding their receipt or dispatch. Normally this means direct dealings between staff officers of the same service but of different headquarters. The Intelligence Service supplies however run both ways. The bulk of them follow the opposite direction and go against the channel through which command is exercised. Each subordinate commander thus becomes directly responsible for furnishing this supply to his next superior commander. This reverses the ordinary procedure and makes it necessary for the lower commander or his Intelligence officer to take the initiative in communicating with the higher commander or his Intelligence officer regarding the distribution.

In principle the distribution of supplies of any kind must be done in a regular and routine manner so far as may be possible in order to secure the best results. Ordinarily each commander holds his staff officer charged with the handling of a particular supply such as food, ammunition, etc., responsible for securing and issuing to the elements of his command such quantities of the particular supply as are necessary. This is the chief duty of the supply officer concerned. The same principle must be applied to the Intelligence Service and the staff officers for Intelligence must be authorized to deal directly with the Intelligence officer at the next higher or lower headquarters regarding purely Intelligence Service matters, the same as are staff officers of other services.

Teamplay Essential

If there is a proper understanding of teamplay within a command there will be no difficulty or confusion caused by this direct dealing on the part of staff officers of subordinate commanders with the staff officers of the next higher commanders. Intelligence Service supplies should not cause confusion by going both ways any more than should those going only one way. The service of Intelligence can be carried on successfully only when there is such an understanding of teamplay and of its functions and responsibilities as will permit this to be done.

Manner of Distribution

The function of distribution roughly may be divided into two parts:

- (a) That which relates to the transmission of information of the enemy and of Intelligence within the net of the Intelligence Service, which is accomplished by direct dealings within the service itself.
- (b) That which relates to the distribution of Intelligence to commanders, staff officers and other persons, by means of periodical reports, maps, summaries, etc.

The first named function has been fully discussed in the chapter on Collection.

The second named function relating to periodic reports, summaries, etc., constitutes the chief means whereby the distribution of Intelligence outside its own net is accomplished. Every advantage is taken by the use of maps, charts, documents and messages, either written or verbal, to picture the situation of the enemy so that a minimum of time will be required to understand it.

Intelligence Report

The Intelligence Report is the most important document issued by the Intelligence Service. It is made at as frequent intervals as conditions demand but in active operations is always issued daily. It includes the gist of the information received and evaluated during the period since the last report. It is prepared according to a standard form because of the advantages which come from having definite headings to consider, thereby reducing to a minimum the chances of leaving out important matter. It is not requisite that every item be fully covered in each report. In case there has been no change reference may be made to the Situation Map or to previous reports.

The Intelligence Report is made use of by the Intelligence officer in setting forth the results of his study of the enemy situation as a whole and of the enemy's point of view. It contains his deductions and his conclusions as to the probable plans and intentions of the enemy. This conclusion, which is that of the commander for whom G-2 has made the detailed study, constitutes the basis from which the commander, after consideration of his mission and the state and condition of his own forces, arrives at his decision as to his proper course of action.

In the report all possible Intelligence concerning the enemy is included but this does not mean that all of the various factors upon which G-2 based his deductions as to enemy plans and intentions are contained in the report.

The primary object of the report is to acquaint the staff and command with the situation of the enemy at a given hour. It does this by recounting the activities and movements and the changes in enemy situation brought

about by them and by our own movements since the issue of the last report.

It was found to be impossible by means of a written report alone or by the use of a map alone to convey both Fixed and Variable Intelligence. Neither was sufficient to portray the enemy situation and at the same time to describe the movements which brought about the constant changes in his situation. The result was to adopt for this purpose both the Intelligence Report (or Summary of Intelligence as it used to be called) and the Situation Map. They supplement each other in picturing the daily situation of the enemy.

The following form of Intelligence Report has recently been adopted as a result of the study of the lessons of the World War. It is important that every officer in the military forces be thoroughly familiar with it.

FORM FOR $\left\{ \begin{array}{l} \text{G-2} \\ \text{B-2} \\ \text{R-2} \\ \text{Bn-2} \end{array} \right\}$ REPORT

Hq. $\frac{(\text{unit})}{(\text{date})}$

.....REPORT

.....Report No.....

Maps:.....

From: (date and hour)

To: (date and hour)

1. ENEMY FRONT LINE (or nearest elements).

2. ENEMY'S STRENGTH, DISPOSITION AND MOVEMENTS.

a. Units in Contact

Unit; location of flanks; estimated strength, training (combat rating); physical condition; morale.

b. Reserves

Unit; kind of reserves; location; estimated strength, combat rating; time necessary to engage.

c. Changes Since Last Report

Unit; nature of change, time.

d. Movements

Kind; amount	$\left\{ \begin{array}{l} \text{from} \\ \text{to} \\ \text{or} \\ \text{direction} \end{array} \right\}$	time; unit, if known or deducible.
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3. ENEMY'S SUPPLY AND EQUIPMENT, including location of establishments.

4. WEATHER AND VISIBILITY.

5. ENEMY'S OPERATIONS OF THE PERIOD.

*a. Cavalry**b. Infantry and auxiliary weapons**c. Artillery**d. Tanks**e. Airplanes**f. Balloons**g. Chemical Warfare**h. Miscellaneous*

6. MISCELLANEOUS.

*a. Estimated enemy's casualties (including prisoners)**b. Enemy's defensive organization (trenches, emplacements, observation posts, command posts, etc.)*

7. ENEMY'S KNOWLEDGE OF OUR SITUATION.

*a. Observation**b. Reconnaissance**c. Our prisoners and documents lost, inhabitants*

8. ENEMY'S PROBABLE INTENTIONS.

*a. Lines of action open to enemy**b. Conclusion as to line of action that will be adopted*

Signed

Intelligence Officer.

The items covered in the above report are self-explanatory and require no comments other than to call attention to the fact that important items are: the headquarters from which issued, the date and hour of issue, the changes since last report and the conclusion as to the probable plans and intentions of the enemy.

The conclusions of G-2 as to enemy plans and intentions are the results of his study of the enemy situation from a broader point of view than could be gotten by a mere study of the data contained in his daily report and map. Intelligence from other sources, knowledge of enemy psychology, of enemy point of view, of enemy methods and practices of tactics, of characteristics of enemy commanders and staff, and innumerable other items enter into the G-2 study of the enemy. The Intelligence report may contain a notation of an enemy activity or movement which apparently indicates an intention to attack or to retire. Experience has shown however that no detached incident of itself may be relied upon to indicate the enemy's intentions. There may be a thousand reasons for the particular incident other than an intention to do a certain thing.

There was shown at times in the World War a disposition on the part of officers who had made no special study of the enemy nor had any opportunity to do so to make their own estimate of the enemy intentions. They would look over a few Intelligence summaries and a few situation maps and draw their own conclusions as to what the enemy element opposed to their command proposed to do. Being trained officers of wide experience in military operations their conclusions so far as their study of these documents was concerned were generally sound. Unfortunately they had not the conception of the enemy as a whole or the background of the enemy point of view to enable them to get the whole picture and their conclusions invariably reflected this lack of understanding of the enemy and his intentions. Such a background only comes to those, who also are trained and experienced military men, who have made it their business to study the enemy. Manifestly of two officers, both trained of-

ficers of experience, the one who has made it his sole business to study the enemy is the more competent to make an estimate of the probable plans and intentions of the enemy under given conditions. Yet because of the disposition just noted this truth was not always recognized.

A study of the form of the Intelligence report will at once disclose how important is the situation map to supplement it. Without the latter it would be necessary to go into great details regarding items of information which are easily shown on a map but difficult accurately and clearly to describe.

Preparation of Intelligence Report and Situation Map

It is to be noted that the Intelligence report is so divided into subheads as to permit each of the several subsections of the Information section to have a place in which to put a paragraph bearing on its own particular responsibility. The other subheads in the report are prepared by G-2 or his assistant in person.

Experience has shown that at some hour in the evening, probably between seven and nine P.M., the work begins to ease up so that the several section and subsection chiefs have opportunity to study the results of the day's work and to make up in a brief report their conclusions as to the facts shown. These are generally submitted in a paragraph ready, if approved by G-2, to be incorporated in the proper place in the Intelligence report.

In this way much time and duplication of effort are saved and the matter reported is in such shape as to be conveniently examined and studied by G-2 in preparing his deductions and conclusions. This he does in person where possible or has done by his assistant who is also a trained General Staff officer.

Time of Issue

The hours for the submission of the Intelligence reports of the several headquarters by which distribution is accomplished, are determined by the requirements of army or higher headquarters. As Intelligence forms the basis for the decision of the army commander as to his plan of action for the next day, the report must arrive at his headquarters early enough in the evening to serve that purpose. For example if army headquarters should set 7 P.M. as the hour at which the corps Intelligence report must arrive, the corps would have to set a time for the receipt of the reports of its divisions far enough in advance of 7 o'clock to permit of preparing the corps report and getting it delivered to army by the prescribed hour. Likewise each successive headquarters would have to fix a time based upon the requirements of the next higher headquarters which would permit preparation of its own report in time to get it to its destination at the set hour.

As the Intelligence report of each lower headquarters is necessary at the next higher headquarters in preparing its own, it is apparent that the report of the battalion Intelligence officer frequently will have to be sent in early in the afternoon. Where it is practicable to do so these early reports are supplemented at specified hours by special communications to the next higher headquarters by telephone, telegraph or other rapid and convenient means. In this way each headquarters is given the latest information of developments and is able to make its report complete practically up to the hour of its issue.

Meanwhile the Intelligence Division at army headquarters having received full Intelligence reports from the headquarters of its several corps by 7 P.M. makes up its report and transmits a copy to G.H.Q., to adjacent army

headquarters and to each of its corps headquarters. Each corps headquarters in turn, upon completion of its report to army, had transmitted a copy to the headquarters of its several divisions. Each division and lower headquarters upon completing its report, likewise had sent a copy to the next lower headquarters. Thus each headquarters from the army down had received Intelligence from its next higher headquarters within a short time after having submitted its own report.

Enemy Situation Map

The situation map is issued at such intervals as circumstances may demand. It usually accompanies the Intelligence report. In active operations a daily issue would probably be required. It includes all Intelligence relating to the enemy area and to the situation of the enemy which it is practicable to convey by means of map representation, conventional signs, legends and marginal notes. It shows all changes in the situation since the issue of the last similar map. It is preferable to have as large a scale map as practicable without its being unwieldy to carry or handle. The smaller the command the larger the scale that may be used.

The Intelligence conveyed by the situation map primarily is that of importance to the command which issues it. The general rule given elsewhere that Intelligence Service personnel primarily is concerned with that information which pertains to the interests of its own command holds good in respect of the situation map and the Intelligence report. In each command therefore the Intelligence given in the situation map will be that calculated to serve the needs and interests of its own command.

In general it may be noted that on the situation map the most important items, almost always present, are: the

location of the enemy's front line; enemy's battle order; location of hostile batteries and their direction of fire and objectives; shelled and gassed areas within our own lines; fires, explosions or other unusual events within enemy lines; enemy airplane activity, routes of travel, etc.; locations of enemy balloons; enemy infantry activities, patrols, raids, etc.

The Intelligence contained in the situation map primarily is in the nature of classified facts concerning that described as Fixed Intelligence. This class of Intelligence is required chiefly by staff officers of services and commanders of tactical units to enable them to make their plans for maintaining the supply and progress of their troops in action after having entered enemy territory. The map shows all Intelligence concerning the physical and geographical features which might have any effect upon troop operation. For example: It would show the location and condition of topographical features such as streams, woods, hills, ridges, valleys, etc. It would picture the location, character and state of repair of all artificial features constructed by the inhabitants or by the enemy such as roads, railroad bridges, villages, telegraph or telephone lines, storehouses, airdromes, enemy works, trenches, artillery and machine gun positions, etc. It would convey all information possible to be shown graphically on a map or by marginal notes concerning the activity and movements of the several elements and branches of the enemy forces since the issue of the last situation map. Experience indicates that it is a good thing to include as much Variable Intelligence on the situation map as practicable, although the bulk of that class of Intelligence can only be shown in the Intelligence report.

It may be repeated that the system of distribution of

the Intelligence report and situation map should be such as will insure that copies shall be sent to all who may need them in a regular and routine manner and without unnecessary delay.

Message Center

As a matter of administration it is essential that the Intelligence officer at each headquarters shall have a definite system for handling the raw material and the Intelligence which come to him. The larger the command the more necessary is such a system. As previously noted the information is received in a conglomerate mass. It comes by telephone, telegraph, verbal and written messages and reports, copies of orders, Intelligence reports and situation maps from various headquarters, prisoners and documents, and in short, by every means that can be utilized to convey information.

The result of this, particularly at higher headquarters, is that it is necessary to establish a message center or place where all information is received and through which all messages or reports are sent out.

The duty of the message center personnel is primarily to make a record of everything received and to send it to its proper destination. In matter received from outside sources this involves sending it to the appropriate Intelligence Service section chief for transmission to the proper subsection.

In matter received from within the Intelligence Service group itself to be sent out it involves dispatching it to the given address and insuring its delivery. The distribution of Intelligence reports and situation maps and of special Intelligence reports is a routine matter and for purposes of record should be done through the message center.

The message center should maintain two lists for distribution. One for inside distribution to personnel at the headquarters, and another for distribution outside its own headquarters. The inside list should include beside the Intelligence Service personnel the Commanding General, Chief of Staff, the Assistant Chief of Staff, G-1, G-3 and G-4, and the chiefs of arms, branches and services at the headquarters with a notation of the number of copies to be sent to each.

The outside list should include Intelligence officers at next higher headquarters, the commanders and Intelligence officers at the next lower headquarters, the commanders of adjacent commands of equivalent size, and the names of other persons or places to which copies are to be sent.

The message center at corps and higher headquarters is a very important agency because the efficiency of the Intelligence Service group largely will be measured by the speed and accuracy gained by it in the distribution of both incoming and outgoing matter.

Special Distribution

The Intelligence officer as a rule will have more Intelligence to distribute than that contained in the daily report and the situation map. The amount will vary with the size of the command but in general it will approximate the same at each headquarters as at every other like headquarters.

Distribution of this matter may be taken care of by means of Intelligence documents, maps, or charts, with appropriate names to designate their particular character. Examples of these were found in all armies during the World War.

The Intelligence officer at each headquarters must

determine according to the circumstances how best to accomplish the proper distribution of particular items of Intelligence. To this end he should carefully examine the several methods which might be used and select the most practicable and effective one for the items in question. He may devise a new method of representation adapted to the conditions and use it if it promises to bring better results in that particular instance. The object is to get the Intelligence distributed. The means or methods of representing and conveying it are not material so long as the object is accomplished.

CHAPTER X

SECRET SERVICE AND MAPS

"If we at any time were to be aware beforehand of the intentions of the enemy, we should always, though with an inferior army, be superior to him."

The Popular Conception

Probably no war time activity contains a greater appeal to the interest of the non-combatant than that of the Secret Service. Every war brings out a new crop of stories reciting the exploits of agents and spies who risk their lives by stealthy incursions into enemy country or make adventurous expeditions in disguise to observe the movements of hostile armies.

The atmosphere of mystery is heightened by descriptions of midnight visits, secret shadowings and clever foiling of desperate enemy agents by Secret Service personnel.

The popular conception of the duties of the Intelligence Service includes not only the thrilling adventures of the old time sleuth and detective with false whiskers and gum shoes but also many romantic tales of Intelligence Secret Service work as pictured in the modern movie.

These misconceptions of the Intelligence Service make it difficult to set down in cold type a description of the war time Secret Service machine built up in the military forces for the military purposes of helping to win the war.

Representatives of the Department of Justice, the

Treasury Department and City Police Departments operating in time of peace as well as war to protect the government against the pilferings of organized gangs of counterfeiters, smugglers, criminals and others are engaged in the popular kind of Secret Service and necessarily must use every available secret agency for the successful prosecution of their work.

Intelligence Secret Service

Intelligence Secret Service has an entirely different objective although its operations also to be successful must be as secret as practicable. In theory, it has nothing to do with crime or criminals unless the criminal happens to be suspected of being an enemy agent or connected with enemy agencies. It has nothing to do with the morale of its own army nor with graft and fraud practiced against its own government unless these things are being carried on by agents of the enemy as a part of his espionage system. In practice, for various reasons, many of these duties were assigned to and carried on by Intelligence Secret Service personnel during the World War.

Intelligence Secret Service has a definite part to play in the field of military activity in gaining and in countering the efforts of the enemy to gain information. Its methods of operation have been altered and its field of activity narrowed by conditions of modern warfare but its prescribed functions are still essentially military in their nature. It is no longer the home of heroic individual service but rather the center of a prosaic, systematic and methodical agency designed little by little to gather in all classes of information regarding the situation and plans of the enemy and at the same time to keep him from gaining like information of its own forces.

As a highly specialized branch of the Intelligence Service of the army, the Secret Service section, one of the four sections of the Intelligence Division of the General Staff, was developed during the World War far beyond a strictly military activity. In coöperation with other government agencies, it extended its field and became a war time creation serving the interests of the country as a whole rather than the military forces alone. It was largely because of this that the popular idea of Secret Service was attached to it.

In this chapter it is proposed to discuss the two phases of Secret Service which present themselves in its military character and to point out the changes which modern organization, weapons of war and methods of combat have brought about in its practical use for military purposes.

Secret Service Section

The Secret Service section is charged with the supervision of all offensive and defensive measures carried on for military purposes by the use of secret agencies. It is organized into an Espionage subsection which takes care of its offensive functions and a Counter-espionage subsection which takes care of its defensive functions.

The Espionage Subsection

The duties of the Espionage subsection embrace the selection, training, and assignment of missions, of Secret Service agents; the examination, analysis and verification of their reports, and the distribution of the items of information thus gained to their appropriate destinations.

Espionage is concerned with Positive Intelligence. It is carried on by the use of spies, agents and emissaries who by secret measures and through under-cover chan-

nels gather information of enemy countries, peoples and armies.

Espionage or spying as used in this discussion must be understood as meaning the practice of stealth and deception on the part of the individual engaged in the effort to gain information in time of war. It is the insidious nature of espionage, against which defense is difficult, that has made it customary summarily to hang a spy or agent in time of war when his disguise is penetrated or his deception discovered.

The information collected by means of espionage is promptly transmitted to the Information of the Enemy section or the appropriate section of the Intelligence Division to be evaluated and converted into Intelligence.

The value of the information gained by espionage methods is dependent upon the reliability of the agent (always an unknown quantity), and the time elapsed since the information was procured.

Espionage has two fields of operations. One is in the enemy country itself in which the activity is directed toward gaining information of the economic, political, psychological and military situation of the enemy nation by sending spies and agents to travel among and observe his people.

The other comprises the theater of operations and the enemy military forces. Efforts are made in this field to gain information concerning the situation, plans and intentions of enemy armies by sending spies and agents to mingle with his troops.

Espionage in Enemy Countries

In former days when armies rather than whole peoples fought the war and when armies were small, spies and agents were able to go among the people of the country

and frequently to come close enough to observe the armies with little fear of discovery. Weapons of war were comparatively few and simple so that information gained by agents unskilled in military matters was readily understood and transmitted by them.

In modern war between "nations in arms," where the thoughts and energies of every man, woman and child of the nation are devoted to war activity, each of the warring countries gradually turns itself into something in the nature of a great armed camp filled with a suspicious people intently examining every stranger to determine if he be friend or enemy. For this reason the agent who can enter an enemy country to-day must be so familiar with the language, customs and characteristics of the enemy people as to be able to pass as a native of the country. It is scarcely possible that a trained military officer, who necessarily must have spent many years in the army of his own country, could succeed in doing this. The civilian agent who might pass himself off as a native of an enemy country would not be likely to know enough concerning modern military organization, armament, etc., to be of much use in gaining military information. His greatest value would be for the purpose of gaining information not of military nature, or as an emissary to gain some specific item of information.

It is thus seen that modern warfare and the conditions surrounding it have caused the profitable use of spies and agents in enemy countries to be very greatly limited in comparison with what it was in former days.

There are so many agencies such as newspapers, cables, wireless, statistics, etc., from which information may be gotten in time of peace that the efforts of an individual to gather information by personal observation after war has started probably will be productive of such slight return

as to render doubtful the advisability of attempting to send individual spies and agents into a hostile country. Occasionally such an agent may gather something of value but in general the information that one man might gain as to the military activities of a great nation through his own personal observation would scarcely be worth the effort made to secure it.

A possible method of acquiring information of value under such conditions but one whose use would not even be considered by the United States lies in establishing within the enemy country a system whereby local resident inhabitants act as spies and agents and make their reports to representatives who pass through at irregular periods. Such a system to be effective must be one that has been built up years before the commencement of the war. After war has started it will be found extremely difficult to discover inhabitants who will undertake such character of work against their own people.

Espionage in Enemy Military Forces

Espionage activity necessarily decreases as the front lines are approached because of the immense difficulties encountered in passing from the front line of one force into that of the other and because of the impracticability of gaining information of value by this means in a modern army.

Modern battle lines will always cover a wide extent of front. Each side will always have its barbed wire or other obstacles out in advance along the border of a No Man's Land. No civilian will be tolerated alone in the battle zones. The wide extent and the great depth covered by the lines and the necessity of traveling on foot make it impossible for a man to get anywhere and back again within a reasonable time. In addition to this the danger

of discovery and sudden death in the shelled areas of the battle zone render it impracticable and useless to place much reliance upon espionage activities in the front line zones.

Spies may come among front line troops from rear areas and an occasional one may ultimately get away with some information. The information he could secure however would probably be of such an unimportant nature as to make it scarcely worth the risk of trying to get it.

Spying in enemy front line zones by military personnel is an impracticable, difficult and unprofitable task under present conditions of warfare. A good airplane photograph of the front and rear areas of a division sector will convey more information of value in a few moments of study than could be produced by the long-continued efforts of many officer or soldier spies.

A result of these conditions is that espionage is an activity of such a nature that the Intelligence Service group at the headquarters of armies, corps, divisions and lower units has little or nothing to do with it. This does not mean that military personnel will not be sent into enemy lines to gain specific information if the occasion should arise and it should seem probable that such an effort would be successful. But the personnel engaged in a task of this nature even if only one man, would be regarded as on reconnaissance and not espionage duty.

Functions of Counter-espionage

The other part of Secret Service includes the supervision and coördination of all activities and measures designed to prevent enemy spies or agents from securing information concerning our own country or military forces. It is called counter-espionage and its operations

are centered in the Counter-espionage subsection of the Secret Service section of the Intelligence Division.

The results of its work are so largely negative in character that the general term Negative Intelligence has come to be regarded as synonymous with counter-espionage.

There are two distinct fields of operation for counter-espionage. The first lies in our country itself in which it is necessary to counter the efforts of the enemy Intelligence Service to gain information of the political, economic, military and psychological situation of our own nation. The second lies in our military forces.

Counter-espionage in Own Country

The extensive border lines of the United States make it possible for enemy agents to enter the country with comparative ease. The many means of communication found in the United States make it probable that an agent once in the country would be able to send out an occasional message. The large heterogeneous population affords opportunity for such an agent to remain in the country undiscovered for a long period. Assuming that an enemy had many such agents in the United States in time of war and that they were well protected by friends in the various communities, it is interesting to consider just what information they could gain and of what value it would be.

They might ascertain that certain divisions were being mobilized and trained at certain places; that the strength at various concentration points was so and so at such a time; that certain industrial plants were making war material; that there was a strong feeling for or against the war among the people in a particular community; that

prices were low and supplies for inhabitants were plentiful or the reverse. The agent might gain an immense amount of such information and much else of similar character.

The picture of the United States at war would be one of intense activity of over one hundred millions of people feverishly engaged in their innumerable individual occupations designed directly or indirectly to forwarding the interests of the country in winning the war. The enemy government would have gained this picture from sources other than visiting spies or agents long before it could get it from them.

Possibly the agent would be able to send some of the most important information in code by telegraph, cable or wireless through a neutral country. The bulk of it however would have to be written and sent by a messenger direct. This would be rather unsafe and would take considerable time. It might be sent by mail to some neutral country and from there forwarded by mail or messenger. This also would take a good deal of time. Assuming however that a considerable amount of such information was received by the enemy government, of what value would it be to him? In the first place the enemy would know from peace-time sources the man-power, economic situation at the beginning of the war and the industrial possibilities of the United States. In the second place he would know from other sources the approximate size of the forces called to service by Congress and the composition, armament, etc., of the various units and organizations. He would know that the average citizen in the United States would not have in his possession much information of value concerning military plans or troop movements even if he was disposed to tell all he knew to a stranger. In addition to this, which might be

amplified by citing many other things which already would be known to the enemy, much of the information would be dead when received due to the time required to transmit it. Even if the enemy government should get it before it was dead there would probably be but little of value in it that was not already known. The point of this is that under the conditions brought about by the "nation in arms" state of war the probabilities are that agents operating in enemy countries would be unable to gain information of sufficient value to pay for the expenses incurred, and the risks run, in sending them.

If there is special information of some particular activity to be gained, such as the time of sailing of convoys of ships and their destination, spies may be used to get it, but the day of sending spies into the enemy country to seek general information of enemy activity has passed.

Granting that there is little likelihood of enemy spies coming into the country in time of war solely to gain information, it is nevertheless essential that every practicable counter-espionage measure be taken to guard our country and make the enemy pay as high a price as possible if he attempts to use agents for this purpose.

Counter-espionage in Military Forces

With regard to counter-espionage in the military forces, it has been noted that the opportunity to prosecute this character of work decreases as the forward battle zones are approached, for the reason that present day conditions of warfare render it extremely difficult and practically impossible for spies or agents to cross from one military force and enter the lines of the other. Within the rear areas of the theater of operations, however, there is need for considerable activity in looking out for enemy agents.

One of the most effective means to counter the effort to

gain information from our troops is to have officers and soldiers thoroughly understand the dangers which arise from communicating to strangers or to any one, either verbally or in writing, unless in an official capacity, any information concerning the situation, plans or contemplated movements of their own organizations. The average officer or soldier knows little except matters regarding his own immediate command, but a clever enemy agent, acting as an innkeeper or salesman, or in some capacity enabling him to gain contact with the officers and men of many units, may gather a great deal of valuable information by piecing together the tidbits collected from the many individuals. The same result may be gained when the reports of a number of agents, each operating with a single unit, are received and pieced together by a centrally located enemy agent.

The counter-espionage operations with troops primarily should be carried on through the personnel of the Military Police and other agencies of the Provost Marshal's Department in accordance with policies prescribed by the Intelligence Division. A small number of Intelligence police for special work in checking up on suspects may also be used in this field, but a minimum of Intelligence Service personnel need be engaged on counter-espionage duty with our own troops.

Present-Day Secret Service

The foregoing explanation of the two sub-divisions of the Secret Service section is made in order to point out their strictly military functions as practiced in former days as affected by modern conditions of war.

The development of the "nation in arms" during the World War brought about quite a different conception of the functions of Secret Service. It even changed the

former significance of the terms espionage and counter-espionage.

In the World War the term espionage came to be loosely used to designate the activity in an enemy country carried on by the use of agents, emissaries and alien sympathizers for the purpose of damaging the enemy in his own country and crippling his war effort. The gaining of military information became a negligible part of its function.

Counter-espionage became the term broadly used to indicate the measures taken to counter the efforts of such agencies and in addition included the investigation of criminal graft and fraud in government contracts and many other activities entirely distinct from countering enemy efforts to gain military information.

Present-day Espionage Activity

While espionage is still one of the recognized agencies in the collection of military information, its field of action has been so extended by the activities mentioned as to make its military phase an unimportant one. That which to-day is generally designated as espionage has an entirely different objective from that of seeking military information. It may be called War Propaganda, if that term can be used to describe a new weapon of war, for espionage in this sense constitutes a most effective instrument for aiding a nation in war although it is of such a detestable nature that it will never be employed by the United States.

One form it now takes is that of sending agents and emissaries into an enemy country for the purpose of attacking his industrial and economic life by violence or by any means at hand. Its agencies blow up industrial plants where munitions or military supplies are being manufactured, destroy railway bridges, docks and other

facilities used to keep up the supply of the armies, and foment strikes and labor troubles. No measure is too insignificant to be employed if it will embarrass the war-making power. Another form it has shown is that in which it is used to operate against the enemy people so as to stir up among them disloyalty, discontent and opposition to the war. It seeks to undermine the morale of the enemy population by spreading stories and rumors throughout the country by use of every available means of publicity. It joins hands with disloyal or discontented groups of emotionalists and fanatics in their opposition to government institutions. It stimulates radicalism, internationalism and pacifism and uses every possible means to weaken the war effort of the nation by encouraging the people to oppose their government.

In time of peace war propaganda, directed by unscrupulous governments with definite national objectives or by groups of people having designs on the present system of organized society, is still active in its campaign whereby it presents the point of view of its own special interest and seeks to gain favor for it with foreign peoples regardless of their own best interests.

Modern methods of communication and of transportation, and the increasing circulation of newspapers, books, magazines, etc., have developed the use of this weapon to such an extent as to compel its recognition as a dangerous threat against any government not only in time of war but also in time of peace.

It is not a military weapon but a national one. It is not operated by military personnel but by civilians. Even in war the attack chiefly is directed against the civilian population in the homeland and only partially against the military forces. Its main object in war is to weaken the enemy by destroying the faith of his people in their gov-

ernment. Its main object in peace is to select and prepare agencies which will be of value to it for these purposes when the time for the use of military force arrives.

Present-day Counter-espionage Activity

As espionage took on a different meaning so counter-espionage widened its field. The defense against war propaganda of the character described came to be regarded during the World War as a counter-espionage function of the Intelligence Service and a considerable number of officers and men were employed in the United States on this duty.

To use military personnel for the purpose of combating civilian activities is not only a waste of military forces, but, particularly in the United States, is poor policy because it puts the military service in a bad light among its own people since it makes the military too active in purely civil affairs.

The situation in the United States at the beginning of the World War was one for which the country was unprepared. An untried and unknown offensive weapon was brought to bear against the nation and a defense was necessary. Counter-espionage personnel of the War Department Intelligence Division in the emergency of war quickly built up a defense against the new enemy weapon—war propaganda. It fashioned a system and operated it to defend against the attack until it could turn over the duty to the operating services and agencies, civilians as well as military, designed to combat the new weapon. It deserves great commendation for that service.

It performed duty in the nature of investigations of criminal or suspicious characters such as is performed by the agencies of the Provost Marshal in the military forces in time of war, and by the Department of Justice in times

of peace and war in hunting down graft and fraud criminals among the civil population. It also took care of certain duties of industrial plant protection and prevention of sabotage by enemy agencies.

The development of the war, however, saw a gradual straightening out of the functions through the creation of new agencies and the assignment to their proper services of the several types of duty.

Defense of Country

Having in mind the limited field of action open to the enemy agent in gaining military information in time of war and the peace-time opportunities and many sources open to the enemy for gaining information of the nation as a whole, it may be concluded that in time of war enemy agents will be sent, if at all, chiefly for purposes other than to gain and transmit military information. Their mission will be to attack the country by means of "war propaganda" as described.

In former days the information collected by spies and agents within enemy countries was purely military and the protection against them was clearly a function of the military forces. In the last analysis of the situation, as it is to-day, the defense against enemy war propaganda agencies lies in the hands of civilian agencies of the nation, state and municipal governments. The civilian population must protect itself. To defend the country against such enemy activity is not a military duty nor one that can be performed by military personnel with anything like the efficiency that can be developed by civilian officials whose real business it is. Such an attack directed by an enemy government must be met by a defense directed by the government of the nation attacked.

The modern agent employed to take part in war propa-

ganda work as a rule is brazenly out for money. He or she is almost invariably of the criminal class. The idea of patriotic service to country is seldom encountered among them. In fact experience indicates that practically all war propaganda agents are of the criminal class. The names and records of such of these criminals as are employed by the enemy Intelligence Service are the only ones in which counter-espionage personnel of the Intelligence Service is interested.

Defense of Military Forces

A possible objective of the campaign of war propaganda may be to weaken the morale of the military forces in their own country by spreading the poison of discontent among the troops. The defense against this is clearly a function of military commanders. They must be held responsible for the morale of their own commands and must protect themselves with the military agencies provided for discharging this duty. Such duty in the military forces in our own country is not however a function of Intelligence Service personnel but rather of the Provost Marshal General's Department.

The Counter-espionage section of the War Department Intelligence Division necessarily has its responsibility in protecting against enemy Intelligence espionage. It does this by maintaining close liaison with the agencies of the national government, prescribing policies for and exercising general supervision over all counter-espionage measures pertaining to troops, camps, stations or military establishments.

World War Defense

The Department of Criminal Investigation (D.C.I) of the Provost Marshal General's Department, was one of

the most important agencies created during the World War. It was organized for the purpose of rounding up personnel of all sorts with the military forces who were interfering with the prosecution of the war. It was charged with investigating and prosecuting the several classes of criminals which gained entrance into the military forces for the purpose of exploiting officers and soldiers. Among these were found those camp followers and hangers on with the armies who might be employed by enemy agents to do damage to industrial plants or destroy material needed for military purposes. Another class was found in those persons who appeared in civilian communities wearing the uniform and pretending to be officers and soldiers while they passed worthless checks and otherwise plied their criminal trade of robbery and theft. Finally there was found the small class represented by the officer or soldier who indulged in petty thefts from the government or who disloyally and deliberately did what he could to prevent his own army from winning the war.

The Department of Criminal Investigation and its detective personnel directed by officers trained in handling criminals was especially fitted for this class of duty in the military forces. Its personnel was experienced in the ordinary police methods of going after and running down criminals. Investigation of such criminals in the theater of operations and within the military forces is not a legitimate responsibility of Intelligence counter-espionage personnel but properly one for such agencies as the Department of Criminal Investigation and the Military Police.

The Inevitable Conclusion

Summarizing the foregoing discussion of modern secret

service duties of the Intelligence Service it appears to be evident that a new agency with a new method of attack has come into existence. It was born out of the modern industrial necessities of armies and the need for having full support of the public in prosecuting a war. New methods of attack require new methods of defense. The new weapon, war propaganda, as described, has developed the new method of attack and has brought us to the point where we must create a new agency and method of defense.

The Military Intelligence Service might be charged with this defense but to do so would divert it from its military duty. The logical principle appears to be to regard such a defense as a responsibility of the civil authorities under the direction of and coördinated by an agency to be constituted by the Federal Government.

In the purely military aspects of the matter the mission of the Intelligence Secret Service is identical with what it has always been, that is, to use spies and agents if practicable for gathering military information and for countering the efforts of the enemy Intelligence Service agencies to gain it. Its opportunities for carrying on these functions have been reduced by the difficulties encountered by spies and agents to-day in attempting to acquire military information from the enemy's country or military forces, but that is no reason why new duties foreign to its primary, basic, military mission should be imposed upon the Intelligence Service.

MAPS

Topography and Maps Section

The third named section of the Intelligence Division of the General Staff is known as the Topography and Maps section.

The Corps of Engineers is charged with responsibility for the production, supply and distribution of maps and for all technical and mechanical work in connection with these functions. This duty is discharged by it in accordance with policies formulated by G-2, who, through the Chief of the Topography and Maps section, coördinates the activities pertaining to these matters.

Experience has demonstrated that there is need for personnel, skilled in topographic work and in interpretation of airplane photographs in each Intelligence Service group at division and higher headquarters. Such a group is found in the Topography and Maps section.

Its personnel is utilized for work in the interpretation and restitution (in the form of maps) of airplane photographs of enemy territory and in drafting hasty sketches, drawings and diagrams for use of the staff in its studies. It may be used also to keep up the sector maps of the command for the staff and commander, showing both Intelligence (G-2) and Operations (G-3) information and to assure to the commander and staff an adequate supply of maps at all times. One of its important duties is to collect and forward to higher headquarters at prescribed intervals the corrections, resulting from changes in the enemy situation or from errors discovered in existing maps, for incorporation in the new editions of the battle order or other maps made at army or higher headquarters. Such duty requires officers and men trained in topographic work.

The officers and men composing the Topography and Maps section at division and higher headquarters should be provided from engineer personnel but should not be taken from the strength of the engineer unit belonging to the headquarters.

Topographic Maps

The modern development of warfare has emphasized the importance of good topographic maps for military operations. Not only is it essential to have reliable maps of the territory held by the enemy but it is equally important with regard to the territory held by our own forces.

Modern mapping methods, including airplane photography, supplemented by facilities for rapid reproduction in quantity has made it practicable to extend the use of maps for operations to the lowest elements. Battalion and regimental commanders make use of maps on every possible occasion to supplement their tactical orders. Division and higher commanders and staffs are entirely dependent upon maps in issuing their instructions. Artillery firing is largely done from maps.

The preparation of reliable maps covering all territory where operations may occur is vitally important to efficient operations. Equally vital is an adequate supply of up-to-date maps to each element of the command. No matter how excellent an attack order may be or how well planned the distribution of troops for action, the operation will be successful, other things being equal, only in proportion to the accuracy and reliability of the maps upon which the orders are based.

By means of preparing maps in several editions, as determined by the requirements of scales and according to the uses to be made of them, a sufficient variety to meet all calls may be provided.

Base maps containing topographical and certain artificial features are overprinted for illustrative purposes. By such means it is possible for each arm, branch or service to visualize the distribution of its elements and the installations erected for its own particular uses.

A consolidation of such information into the G-3 situation map gives the commander and staff full information of the locations of the supply establishments and the dispositions of all elements of his command.

In a similar manner the G-2 situation map made up of overprints from the various maps showing dispositions and installations of enemy arms and services provides the commander with a complete picture of the latest known situation and activity of the enemy.

Scales of maps are determined according to the special needs of the commanders or staff concerned. Every effort is made by means of surveys, special reconnaissances or mapping parties and airplane photographs to keep the several map editions up to date and as accurate as possible.

CHAPTER XI

CENSORSHIP

"The opponent who is better informed than his adversary is at once in a position possessing immense advantages, as his plans are based on better known and safer data. He, in fact, knows where his adversary has to guess. The incalculable advantage of a good system of obtaining Intelligence is at once apparent."

Development in Censorship

Censorship originally was designed to prevent the leakage of information by which the enemy might be benefited or one's own army or country be damaged. Fundamentally it was a counter-espionage measure. As with all negative Intelligence activities, there was no way to determine the benefits of censorship because it was impossible to say how much information had been or was being kept from the enemy by its practice.

In former wars when communication agencies were few in number and slow in transmission, the practice of censorship was confined to the narrow field of examining letters and news dispatches and deleting unfavorable or harmful matter. Local commanders were able to censor matter sent from their own commands while higher commanders could take care of visitors and press representatives at their own headquarters. Counter-espionage personnel aided by civil agencies could easily handle censorship matters in the homeland.

Modern facilities of communication, advertising and publicity have developed censorship into a national agency with offensive powers unknown to it in the past. These powers give it greater potentiality for use in war and in

war prevention than any other single agency. The extent to which it may be developed can only be estimated for no nation so far has done more than experiment with it.

During the World War censorship grew from an almost purely military defensive function charged with guarding military secrets into an offensive-defensive activity with a world-wide field of operation. It may now be used in taking the initiative, not only in preventing the publication of harmful matter, but in securing the publication of matter helpful to a national cause, in keeping a people informed of the progress of the war and in acquainting the world at large with the principles for which that nation is making war.

Experience has shown that censorship in the popular mind is regarded as an unnecessary evil imposed by the military tyrant. As a matter of fact if properly organized and operated as modern conditions permit it to be, it can be a powerful agency to assist in saving lives on the battlefield and gaining victory in war. This fact apparently was recognized and acted upon by Great Britain during the World War and the result was the development of a coördinated, national, intercommunicating agency extending its activities into its military forces and its civilian population and eventually into all parts of the world. Under the general control of a central authority which prescribed its policies of operation, its various duties were carried on in the several spheres of its activity by civilian or military personnel as circumstances required. The power derived from this control of world publicity channels which permitted the nation to present to the world its own as well as its enemies' war aims and acts was one of the factors contributing to the successful outcome of the war.

The development of censorship has carried it on into

a field in which there are four separate classes of activity. While each of these has a definite function all are interdependent and should be subordinate to and coördinated by the same authority in their policies of operation.

The four classes of activity referred to are as follows :

Censorship System

Modern means of communication by radio, telegraph, telephone, rapid mail service extending all over the world, and innumerable newspapers, magazines, moving pictures, photographs, and other agencies, have brought about such an advance over the methods of communication of former days as to demand the organization and development of a comprehensive and all embracing system of censorship for the protection of the country and its military forces in war. The original conception of censorship which was to protect purely military secrets has now developed so as to cover the whole nation against leakage of information.

Publicity

The support of the entire population of the country must be had for the successful outcome of a modern war. The most effective means by which the population may be reached is through the daily press and similar publicity agencies. If an authorized agency is not charged with giving out information Dame Rumor and enemy "war propaganda" agencies will make up their own stories of the state of affairs to the injury of the national cause. For these reasons a definite agency should be assigned the duty of giving to the public through the press and by every other available means all proper information concerning the progress of the war, the activities of the military forces and the measures undertaken by the government to develop the war effort of the nation.

The organization, supervision and operation of such a publicity agency logically should be the responsibility of the chief of the censorship activity of the nation. He would be charged also with determining what should not be published. No opportunity for publicity of this nature should be overlooked but while the public should be intelligently informed of the situation, it should not be misinformed or given false information.

Visitors and Travelers

The rapid transportation of to-day has played its part in compelling, as a measure of censorship, the adoption of a system for the uniform control of visitors or travelers, not only in the theater of operations, but in so far as practicable in the homeland itself. The control of visitors requires especially selected and trained personnel. The function has its offensive as well as its defensive uses in that the visitors may be made acquainted with the situation and authorized to inform the public of their own country of the true state of affairs.

Propaganda

The people of neutral and of enemy countries if practicable should be informed of the political ideals and the cause for which the nation is fighting. It is logical to charge the national censorship agency with the dissemination of information of this character and to charge it also with taking such other measures by means of propaganda as may seem advisable to assist in the successful prosecution of the war. Certainly no other government will tell its people of your national ideals in war, to your advantage. Your government must do that for itself or expect to be misrepresented to other peoples either through the operations of enemy agencies or through the circulation of uncontrolled rumor and gossip.

The four functions mentioned are so far reaching in their nature and so potential in their influence on the course of a modern war as to suggest that their discharge be made the responsibility of a national agency separate from any now existing and under the direct control of the highest powers of the central government in order that their activities may be coördinated.

Principles of Censorship

The basic principles for the operation of censorship will be the same in all wars. The character of activity of the censorship required in any particular war, however, will be determined by various factors such as the object of the war, the proximity of the theater of operations to the homeland and to the enemy's country, the character of the enemy, the size of the war with relation to the number of allied nations involved, the interest of our own public, the necessity of arousing its support for the war, etc.

The censorship with its opportunity to gain the confidence of the public and to enlist and hold its support for a national struggle must be honestly as well as wisely conducted. Otherwise it will do more harm than good to the cause it is created to serve.

In principle its rule should be to regard the public as entitled to know at least as much about the war measures of the government and movements and operations of its military and naval forces as the enemy reasonably may be assumed to know, or as it is certain he is aware of. There is no reason why the people of the United States should be kept in ignorance of matters which every one else in the world knows about.

The disposition on the part of censors should be to publish every item of interest to the public, unless specific reasons against it are apparent, rather than to release

nothing for publication until evidence is produced to show why it should be published.

There is always a balance in the proper application of censorship. On one hand is the desirability of keeping from the enemy, information concerning the war measures of our own country and the military activities of our fighting forces which might be of advantage to him. On the other hand is the advisability of acquainting our own public with the progress of the war and the operations of our armies so as to gain and hold the most complete support of the population in the war effort.

As a result of a consideration of these two extremes it will be seen that there is often much information of value to the enemy that should be made known to our own people even though it also becomes known to the enemy. Frequently it will be of more value to our cause that our own public should know the exact state of affairs than it will be damage to us to permit the enemy also to know.

In censorship there is thus always a choice between two evils. In any case that arises in affairs of the nation in time of war some one must make a decision as to whether to publish the matter proposed or to censor it out. Such decisions must be made intelligently in time of war by trained men of national vision. They must be made with the best interests of the nation in view and in accordance with prescribed principles.

National Censorship Agency

A national censorship agency if established by our national government in time of peace might soon become a definite influence in correcting the false impressions of the United States and its people which to-day exist in many nations of the world. It would help our business

in foreign markets by reason of its systematic effort to let foreign peoples understand us and for this same reason might prove to be an important factor in the prevention of war.

Such an agency developed in peace could be conducted so as to serve as a training school for those who would be called to duty with the national censorship when it expanded into a war time agency if unfortunately war should come upon us again. The decisions mentioned, wisely made by those so trained, would mean shortening the war and saving lives and money. It invites disaster to leave such decisions to be made in haphazard fashion by men, picked up after war has started, whose training, to say the least, has not given them a national perspective. They should have an acquaintance with the machinery for securing publicity in foreign countries, a knowledge of the peoples and governments of other nations, and an understanding of the close relations existing between the public at home and the military and naval forces in time of war.

Field Censorship

Field Censorship, the term applied to censorship exercised in military forces, is an activity which must necessarily be carried on by military personnel. It is prescribed as a function of the Intelligence Division of the General Staff and constitutes the last named of its four sections.

The chief of the Military Censorship section at the headquarters of the theater of operations and at each army headquarters, should have the training of a General Staff officer in order to insure that the military situation shall be thoroughly understood and that the significance of any press matter referred to him may be gaged as to

possible military value to the enemy before being finally released.

The object primarily is the protection of armies by keeping secret their future plans and preventing the leakage of harmful information. Secondly it may serve the armies as an immediate aide to esprit, morale and discipline by a proper use of publicity agencies among the troops. The A.E.F. newspaper, the *Stars and Stripes*, is an example of such an agency.

In so far as practicable the censorship of communications such as letters, postcards, telegrams, etc., from individuals of the military forces should be performed under the supervision of their respective commanding officers.

Press censorship is a matter of special training for those performing it in the military service. It involves the understanding of publicity values, the psychology of people in the mass, an appreciation of the effect upon military plans, of the premature publication of military information, and the immense value of broadcasting or releasing good news at the right time and in the right way.

Letter and Mail

It is evident that the less the amount of information of war activities conveyed in letters, published in the newspapers or communicated by other means, the less the chance for the enemy to gain information of our military forces from such sources.

An intimate knowledge of the methods of deducing facts and making inferences from a mass of seemingly trivial news items discloses that a considerable amount of information of the highest importance may be gathered from such matter. An accumulation of a number of postcards, letters, and newspaper items collected over a

short period of time often furnishes specific information of the location, movements, morale, etc., of enemy units which greatly assist in establishing "identifications" and maintaining battle order data.

The amount of information to be gained by the enemy from the people at home who receive letters from officers and soldiers with the fighting armies will probably be small if such correspondence is controlled and censored. However if the letters and postcards written home by one or two millions of men were uncontrolled by orders as to what might be written and were not censored, there might be a considerable amount of information of value gained by the enemy.

An immense quantity of information concerning the enemy was gained in the World War from the careless and ill-considered statements contained in captured letters and postcards addressed to their homes by enemy officers and soldiers, and from the casualty lists, death notices and notations of locations of enemy units published in the enemy press. It was surprising that this should have been the case with a people commonly believed to be thoroughly imbued with the spirit of "verboten." One explanation, made by an enemy officer, was that the morale had come to be so low after three years of war that it was necessary to be easier and more liberal in the enforcement of the censorship.

Censorship in armies is not so much to protect against letting information get to the enemy through letters arriving home, as it is to prevent leakage of information through letters before they get home. Its chief benefits are derived from the training in self-control which comes from its practice and the definite reduction of the opportunity for the enemy to gain information of value from letters captured from prisoners.

The chances are against any one letter falling into the hands of the enemy but many letters do come into his hands through captures. Therefore lives will surely be saved if officers and soldiers are so trained that the letters which fall into the enemy's hands are harmless from the point of view of containing battle order information.

An Example of Thoughtlessness

An example of one letter whose writer was responsible for the death of more than one hundred of his fellow soldiers illustrates this point. A young soldier one evening after doing a day's duty with his battery wrote a letter to his mother in which among other things he included something to this effect: "All day long our battalion of heavy artillery located about two miles west of Sourayville has been shooting up the enemy with its big guns. We were firing from this round clump of woods where we are now and all day long never received a shot. The enemy seemed to think we were in a similar clump of woods about four hundred yards north of us for he shelled it heavily several times. We are going to give him a good trimming early to-morrow." The young man having finished his letter stuck it in his shirt pocket intending to mail it the next morning and went to sleep. About 2 A.M. however, he was awakened and sent with his lieutenant as a member of a communication detail to the front-line trenches to observe the artillery fire and telephone the results to headquarters. Soon after their arrival in the front-line position and just about daylight the enemy put over a raid on that section of trench and among others captured the young man with the letter. About fifty-five minutes afterwards there came a heavy, concentrated fire of large as well as small caliber high

explosive shell on the clump of woods in which was located the artillery battalion to which the unfortunate young man belonged. The right woods were the target this time. Over a hundred men—comrades of the young letter writer—were killed and more than that number were wounded.

This was simply an incident in the World War and rather an unusual one to be able to tell of. It came to light a few days after the incident through the capture of an enemy Intelligence officer who had the letter in his possession and told what had happened. The story is useful however, to emphasize the importance of training in this respect because it illustrates one of the innumerable ways in which loss of life may come about through thoughtlessness and lack of training.

Local Censorship

The system whereby local commanding officers are made responsible for the censoring of letters and mail matter written by the personnel under them generally will be satisfactory if the principles of censorship are clearly understood by the officers or non-commissioned officers who actually do the censoring.

It was demonstrated by service in war that the natural disposition of the average man was blindly to follow some rule in censoring rather than to use common sense and apply the principle to the matter being censored. If there was no rule covering the particular case he generally would censor out the matter in the letter anyway and consequently would draw down the anger of the writer not on himself who had censored so stupidly but on censorship as an institution. No officer or soldier will deliberately endanger the lives of his fellows by careless letter writing but most of them ignorantly will do so unless they

have been trained to control the use of the pen as they should be trained to curb the indiscriminate use of their tongues. To have officers and soldiers appreciate that the underlying reason for censorship is to protect their lives and not to make it hard for them to write letters home, will go a long way toward making it effective.

In this connection it may be noted that in our own experience in the A.E.F. the state of the morale and efficiency of a division was indicated by the censorship violations noted against it and the complaints about the censorship received from it. While all divisions sent home approximately the same amount of mail, invariably the divisions lowest in efficiency and morale showed the largest percentage of violations of censorship while the more efficient divisions showed the smallest.

Press Censorship

It is interesting to note that the Russo-Japanese War was the first one in which there was established and made effective a press censorship system in which correspondents were controlled and required to conform to established rules.

That war however was not one of the "nation in arms" type as was the World War and the measure of control referred to was largely applied by the Japanese for the handling of foreign correspondents who hastened to the scene of conflict to report the progress of the war to their own countries. The Japanese authorities appreciating the dangers of their army movements and plans becoming known to the enemy through the cable and telegraph, if reported in the newspapers of neutral countries, put on the censorship lid. So effectively did they do this that their press regulations and methods of handling foreign correspondents practically put an end to the free lance

methods of the old time war correspondent in reporting military operations.

Since that time press censorship has been recognized as an important agency in war not only for protecting plans of operations against too early disclosures but also for utilizing the power of the press as an aid to keeping the objectives and war necessities of the nation before the public.

Press Problem in United States Forces

The problem facing the military forces of the United States in the administration of a press censorship with its armies in time of war is very different from that of any other nation. In England a maximum of half a dozen correspondents will represent the English newspaper world which heads up into eight or ten big papers in London. In France, to care for the Paris papers in effect takes care of the French press. It is similar in nearly all other countries.

The United States possesses the greatest newspaper reading public in the world. It has an immense number of news sources to serve. Besides having the Associated Press and several newspaper syndicates it has a dozen or more large cities whose newspapers must be considered. The newspapers of these several great cities furnish their particular centers of population with the news of the day in their own peculiar fashion. In a great war these newspapers must be allowed their proportionate representation in correspondents with the armies. The result is that a great many correspondents must be accommodated with the military forces of the United States in the field if the fullest advantage is to be taken of the opportunity to keep our people informed of the progress of the war.

In the A.E.F. in the World War there was no need for

regulations regarding foreign correspondents. Such of these as desired to visit the American forces, if they were found to be desirable or acceptable were invited to come as visitors for a tour of observation. Upon their arrival they were conducted to such places as advisable in accordance with a prepared itinerary and then terminated their visit.

Each of the great warring nations faced its press censorship problem in its own way and according to its own needs and national characteristics. In the A.E.F. the American press was recognized as a powerful instrument for holding the support of the public in prosecuting the war and every effort was made to assist the press representatives in doing their work. There was never any question as to the willingness of the military authorities to give the correspondents of the American press the fullest opportunity to accompany the troops to report events, so far as would be consistent with the protection of the military movements and plans and the maintenance of cordial relations with the allies of the United States.

The mechanics of handling large numbers of correspondents and the difficulties of conveying the right point of view to the large personnel concerned, both military and civilian, were the greatest press censorship difficulties in the A.E.F. The main question was one of the practicability of handling such a large number of correspondents as wanted to come. Another question was as to the possibility of making clear to so many correspondents the necessity of strict observance of censorship principles because of the fact that failure to observe them might bring about the loss of lives of American soldiers or otherwise invite disaster to the American forces or the Allied cause.

Information from Newspapers

Because of their general reliability as to facts and because their news is up to date, newspapers are favorite sources of information for the Intelligence officer seeking information. Intelligence Service agencies on both sides will always have the important newspapers of enemy countries in their hands in a minimum of time after publication.

It was possible in France in the A.E.F. to have delivered at headquarters the daily newspapers of enemy and neutral countries in a very few hours. In fact their delivery was often accomplished almost as promptly as if in time of peace. There is little doubt but what newspapers printed in London, Paris and Rome were received in Berlin within a short time after they were published. Even in the case of newspapers published in the United States it was practicable for the enemy to have important news items sent in code by telegraph, radio or cable to a neutral country and thence to the headquarters of the enemy Intelligence Service in a few days if not hours. The newspapers containing the full matter could be sent later by messenger or mail.

Unless each correspondent as well as each press censor thoroughly appreciated these things some matter vitally important to the success of an Allied operation might have been cabled home and published with disastrous results. No one would do such a thing intentionally but the results would be just as bad as if it were done on purpose.

For these reasons it is essential that correspondents understand the serious damage that might result from indiscreet statements in dispatches and the necessity of their conforming to censorship principles and the rules to make them effective.

Press Censorship Principles

The organization of the Military Press Censorship section in the theater of operations should provide sufficient personnel to care for its duties.

There should be adequate facilities for the housing, transportation and care of correspondents.

The chief censor should carry on his censorship duties under the authority of the headquarters of the commander-in-chief of the theater of operations in accordance with policies prescribed by G-2.

No one should be permitted to hamper the movements or performance of duty of the censoring officers and the accompanying correspondents so long as they comply with the local regulations within the command or area.

Press Censor Duties

The officers on duty as press censors have a difficult task. They should appreciate the value of publicity for the support of the government in the war and at the same time should know something of the value of news to the enemy in deducing information. The censor must make a decision on each press dispatch submitted to him. To blindly follow a rule will always get him into difficulties. This was the case with one censor who cut out the name of the town Sedan contained in a dispatch submitted for censorship. In comparing the military operations of the Franco-Prussian War of 1870-71 with Allied operations, the correspondent mentioned the surrender at Sedan. The rule said names of places were not to be mentioned so the censor cut out the name regardless of the fact that its use had no reference to the current operations. He spoiled an interesting story and did no good except to make a correspondent mad and himself ridiculous.

It is difficult to find good censors. A man trained in

news values who can weigh the psychological reaction of people to news is a specialist of the highest type in the newspaper world. A man trained to estimate the value to an enemy of information contained in news items, in making up his war plan and in collecting Intelligence must needs be a military specialist in drawing up such plans and gathering such information.

The news specialist and the military specialist must each have become such by years of study of his particular specialty. The ideal censor would be the one who best combined the qualities of the two. To secure the ideal type is seldom possible. The next best thing then is to find specialists in news and give them a course of training in methods of gathering Intelligence and to find specialists in military matters and give them some smattering of news values. Having done what is possible to secure a balance in the qualities of the censors it is then essential before sending them to their censorship duties to impress upon them that they must do their censoring in accordance with certain established principles and not by rules alone.

Correspondent's Duties

The attitude of the censor must be to assist the correspondent as much as possible. The correspondent on his side should be made to feel that he is doing his share towards winning the war in his work as a correspondent. For the time being the interest and welfare of the fighting soldier and the interests of the country must supersede his natural desire to publish all the news. He should realize that his coöperation with the press censor is essential to the best interests of both. If the correspondent does not like the censorship rulings and his appeal to higher authority is not satisfactory to him he should ask to be relieved and return home.

No matter what else may be said, the military commander in the field, responsible for gaining success in military operations against an enemy, is entitled to the support of every one of his countrymen whom he permits to accompany or visit his armies so long as that person is with the armies. If he or she does not like the way matters are being conducted he ought to return home and voice his criticisms to the authorities of the government and not attempt to tell his troubles through the press to the public and the world at large. Doing this he interferes with and makes harder the task of the commander who already is fighting real battles in the interests of the country.

In the World War experience of the A.E.F. it was noted that the correspondents who played the game in the interest of their paper and of their country were the most efficient ones, while those who were unreasonable, impatient and critical of the censorship were the least efficient. The former as a rule would write their complaints, get a decision and abide by it without further trouble. The latter however were never satisfied. No matter what decision was made it was wrong. The trouble with such a correspondent was that the idea of any censorship at all was hateful to him and nothing connected with it could be right.

Other Censorship Duties

Censorship of photography, telephone, telegraph and cable is largely a matter of organization of personnel to handle the particular activity and of training of the officers and soldiers in their observance of the prescribed principles and rules.

Publicity

Within the theater of operations the most valuable sources for providing amusement and occupation for offi-

cers and soldiers are found in newspapers, movies, magazines and other publicity agencies. Americans are accustomed to reading and in time of field operations every effort should be made to supply them with reading matter of every kind.

Almost every regiment in the A.E.F. at some time or another wanted to publish or did publish its own little news sheet. There is no greater aid to morale and esprit for an organization than for it to have its own paper. Every encouragement should be given to activity of this nature. The censorship of such papers is a simple matter which should be attended to by a trained censor rather than by an inexperienced one because the latter invariably will have difficulties which to say the least will result in discouraging the publisher.

Propaganda

The term propaganda in the sense used in connection with the military censorship activity has no meaning which can be construed as an effort to spread false information. It is the word commonly used in military circles to convey the idea of sending information into the enemy country or military forces which will tend to discourage enemy people and soldiers from continuing the war.

With the airplane to drop leaflets in enemy towns or into the areas occupied by enemy military organizations, it is an easy matter to convey information of this nature. More than three million leaflets were dropped by A.E.F. agencies over enemy lines in the last few weeks of the World War. The results were excellent. The field for this activity however has scarcely been touched. It will be of little value against troops in high morale but of immense value if general conditions are such as to discourage them.

Visitors

In the theater of operations the reception and care of visitors is a very trying problem. For the protection of the armies against leakage of information and in order to conduct the visitors to the places where it is desired to have them go it is essential to provide personnel to take charge of them. American visitors to armies in war, from the experience in the A.E.F., may be grouped into four classes. (1) Officials of government and other distinguished persons who have legitimate interests to serve by making such visits. (2) Publicity representatives of all classes and kinds who secure permission to visit the armies for observation in order to write or lecture in the interests of the national cause in the war. (3) Welfare workers representing organizations who desire to do something for the fighting men. These have legitimate business and are in general of great service. (4) Sight-seeing, joy-riding persons who gain admission from high authority to "visit the boys" for their own selfish gratification. These are an unmitigated nuisance.

Future Censorship Development

In the conception of censorship as a national agency the military censorship must function in its own field in handling its military problems. However it ought to be under the control of a national censorship agency so that all activities of this nature may be coördinated in the interests of the nation as a whole.

The future probably will find the four censorship functions concentrated into one national service under the control of a central head appointed by the highest power of the government. Not to do this would be a failure to take advantage of an opportunity to use a far-reaching

and powerful instrument for forwarding the interests of the nation in war.

With the highly trained and expert personnel in the newspaper profession of the United States who are pre-eminently fitted by their advertising and publicity experience to handle such an activity there may be perfected a most effective organization for working in the interests of the United States both in time of peace and of war.

With many other nations organized in this respect, serving their national interests in time of war and commercial interests in time of peace by the judicious use of publicity agencies in foreign countries it is hard to see how the United States is going to continue much longer without following suit. The only difference would be that such an agency established by the United States would be in the open and not in secret. To have the world know that the United States definitely plans to tell every other country in the world of its institutions and what they stand for, of its principle of fostering self-government, of what it has to sell and of what it wants to buy, would not be a bad thing for the United States nor for the peace of the world.

CHAPTER XII

REQUISITES OF PERSONNEL

"The first condition, however, of accurately appreciating such information (that of foreign military establishments) is the most thorough and accurate knowledge of one's own army, for without this it is impossible to draw comparisons or estimate matters with sound professional judgment."

General Principles

No discussion of the subject of Military Intelligence would be complete without a brief consideration of the qualities and training requisite in Intelligence personnel for the efficient discharge of their duties.

It must be recognized that the Intelligence Service as a weapon in war will be effective in direct proportion to the ability of its personnel to concentrate its efforts upon its essential business of providing the commander with Military Intelligence and that it will become progressively non-effective as it permits its personnel to disperse its activities and energies in attending to duties not pertaining directly to this basic and fundamental mission.

An effective weapon must be fashioned for the particular use to which it is to be put. To have an agency designed to look after information of the enemy also charged with duties relating to our own forces complicates the problem of providing it with efficient personnel. The mission of Military Intelligence in its original field of information of the enemy is large and complicated enough under modern conditions without its also taking up and developing the duties of modern counter-espionage and

modern censorship with its publicity, visitors and propaganda activities. These latter duties pertain almost exclusively to our own people and our own troops. In so far as they relate to enemy military activity and enemy military information, the Intelligence Service can handle them but it should not be charged with functions which do not directly relate to enemy military activities.

Intelligence Personnel

Intelligence personnel naturally divides itself into two general classes because there are two broad functions charged to it.

One class is that of the General Staff officer for Intelligence found at the several headquarters from the War Department on down to the division.

The other class is that of the Intelligence Service officer and soldier specialists and experts found in all Intelligence groups.

General Staff Class

In this class are included the Intelligence personnel having General Staff functions to perform.

The officers in the Second (Intelligence) Division of the War Department General Staff charged with the collection and study of information of foreign countries and with assisting in the preparation of war plans require General Staff training and necessarily are in this class.

At G.H.Q. of the theater of operations, the A.C. of S.G-2, certain assistants and the heads of the four sections of the Intelligence Division, are performing General Staff duties and require General Staff training for their efficient performance.

At army, corps and division headquarters successively the number of officers requiring General Staff training for

the performance of their Intelligence Service duties grows smaller until at division headquarters the Intelligence officer himself is the only one who does need such training.

At brigade, regimental and battalion or equivalent headquarters the Intelligence officers assist their respective commanders in a manner similar to that of General Staff officers at the higher headquarters. However, they do not require General Staff training because their commander has more time to give to the personal exercise of his command functions.

Qualities Requisite for G-2

The requisite qualities for a General Staff officer for Intelligence are primarily experience and training as a line officer, an understanding of the principles of command and staff duties and thorough knowledge of combat methods and tactical handling of the combined arms in battle.

Much might be written of the qualities requisite in such an officer but it will suffice to note the fact that the qualities which make for success in the exercise of command or the performance of staff or any other military duty will serve the same ends for the officer on Intelligence duty.

Probably the most important quality for the successful discharge of military duties is that which may be called "personality." Without attempting to define the term as used in this connection it may be said that it is construed to include not only consideration for others and an understanding of their points of view but also a confidence born of knowledge of one's professional fitness to discharge the assigned duties. Such confidence begets confidence in others and makes easier the task of every one with whom its possessor comes into contact.

There is a false kind of confidence encountered at times which is easily detected. It comes from a combination of ignorance of the duties to be performed and a personal conceit that will not permit its possessor to ask information or assistance of any one. Such a type of confidence is fatal to military success.

Lack of confidence is equally fatal to successful leadership or General Staff duty. No matter how well informed professionally an officer may be, if he has not sufficient confidence in his judgment to accept the responsibility for doing that which his judgment dictates be done, he will fail in the military service. Indecision and vacillation are worse than poor judgment.

Personality may be cultivated in many ways. Among them may be noted some of the things that will help to do this. Acquiring the habit of study of the military profession and of history; perfecting oneself in drill regulations of one's own arm or branch and later in the tactical use of combined arms in battle; practicing getting the other man's point of view and his reaction to one's own views; devising ways for being considerate of one's subordinates as well as equals and superiors and at the same time accomplishing desired results; learning to make decisions as to courses of action, study or work and sticking to them; developing one's judgment by practice in exercising it in any practicable way; learning self control and practicing personal discipline; learning to take responsibility without fear of consequences when one's best judgment says one should; and doing one's work thoroughly no matter how unimportant it may seem to be.

The cultivation of the quality of personality (almost synonymous with the term leadership) is possible to any man at any time and in any kind of occupation. It is largely a matter of cultivating good habits or work. It

is an equally valuable asset to the military man and the civilian but it is an essential quality in the successful military commander or General Staff officer.

In this connection it may be noted that some men are believed to be born leaders of men. Occasionally one is instanced who, apparently without any previous training, has come to the front in an emergency and saved the day. Invariably such men have developed in themselves the quality of personality as outlined herein and have acquired habits similar to those indicated. They may have done this merely for the general development of their character but they will always be found to have done it. Some men by temperament and disposition find it easier to develop this quality. Others for the same reason find it more difficult, but no one is endowed with this quality by nature or gains it without effort.

Training of A.C. of S.G-2

The training of the General Staff officer for Intelligence should be that prescribed for all General Staff officers. Added to this there should be cultivated an ability to study matters out and make a critical analysis of the situation, plans and intentions of the enemy. This is best practiced by the study of map problems involving military units of appropriate size. It may be done in time of peace, using war strength organization of one's own forces to work with rather than trying to use those of an assumed enemy. If one has learned the organization, combat principles and tactical combinations of one's own army it is a very simple matter to learn those of an enemy.

In time of war the analysis mentioned must be made by G-2 without being influenced by the situation of his own forces. It is difficult at army and lower headquarters to do this because of the close contact with battle condi-

tions. The human disposition to see things favorable to one's own side in the movements and actions of the enemy is as strong as human nature itself. To avoid being influenced and giving way to this weakness G-2 must detach himself as much as possible from the rest of the staff while actually making his studies. He should think himself into the situation of the enemy, consider what information of his own (G-2's) forces is probably known to the enemy, estimate the enemy's situation from the enemy side of the line and arrive at a decision as to what his course of action would be if he were in the enemy's place.

Such a line of reasoning furnishes a basis for a checking up on his estimate of the probable plans and intentions of the enemy.

Training for General Staff duty in War Department Intelligence involves the same general principles but includes a much wider scope and broader point of view.

Intelligence Service Officer and Soldier Specialist

In each Intelligence Service group there will be found officers and soldiers whose duties are along lines of specialization.

In the War Department Intelligence Service group these experts and specialists work in their respective channels to bring to the highest state of efficiency their own particular activity. Some are engaged in the collection and study of information of the political situation of the various countries of the world. Others are conducting similar studies regarding the geographic, economic, military or psychological situation of other countries. The object of these studies is to gain information as to facts which will be of value to the A.C. of S, G-2 and his assistants in determining the aims and ambitions of other nations. This information is used by G-2 in con-

junction with members of other divisions of the War Department General Staff in preparing national war plans.

Other personnel is occupied in specialist activity of various kinds such as foreign language translations, counter-espionage, map collections, censorship, battle order map maintenance, armament, combat methods, codes and ciphers, characteristics of arms and branches, etc.

At G.H.Q. and army headquarters there are specialists in the Intelligence Division whose work, while similar in character to that of the War Department Intelligence Division, is more narrow in its scope. Some of these deal with strategical considerations of the enemy military situation. At corps and division headquarters the work of Intelligence Service specialists is more largely in the field of study of the tactical situation of the enemy military forces.

Qualities Requisite in Intelligence Service Personnel

In addition to professional knowledge of their own particular activity the qualities most valuable to Intelligence Service personnel engaged in work as experts and specialists are patience, application, persistence and thoroughness. The work of the Intelligence Service specialist is never finished. There is always something more to be learned because the situation of the enemy is always changing.

The determination of facts relating to the enemy, the object of the labors of Intelligence Service personnel, is not arrived at by inspiration nor by any divine gift from a higher power. It is gained by the application of hard and patient work to the matter in hand, based upon knowledge, experience and common sense. There is no

mystery about it, only painstaking and systematic study of the recorded information. There is no royal road to success in the work of the Intelligence Service specialist.

Training Intelligence Service Personnel

There is no more important matter in connection with the successful operation of an Intelligence Service system than the training of its personnel. It is to be noted that all Intelligence Service units with troops are members of the organization with which their unit serves. The officers and men composing the Intelligence Service platoon of the 1st Regiment of Infantry for example are infantrymen of the 1st Infantry. The Intelligence Service units of cavalry, air service, artillery, engineers or other arms are composed of officers and enlisted men of their respective arms.

This characteristic of the organization of the Intelligence Service emphasizes the peculiar responsibility of the commanding officers of the several arms for the efficiency of their Intelligence Service personnel. Primarily it is a part of their own command and not the personnel of a Service detailed for duty with their command by other than their own authority.

In the training for Intelligence Service duty which is highly specialized it is essential for the efficiency of the several organizations to which Intelligence Service units belong and for the success of the Intelligence system as a whole that the instruction of all of its personnel be uniform in its nature and cover a definite specified field. It is necessary for example that the scouts and observers of a battalion shall be instructed regarding the gaining of information of all kinds whether or not it is of value to the battalion commander in his operations. All observers must be so trained as to be able to report intelligently any

enemy activity of artillery, air service or other arms observed by them. All scouts, likewise, must be so trained as to recognize information of value when they find it in the enemy lines and to know what to do with it when they get it. That the map or order or other document found in the enemy lines pertains to a higher enemy unit than that of his own commander is no reason why a patrol leader or a scout should keep it as a souvenir. In order to secure this uniformity of instruction throughout all elements of the military forces, Intelligence officers of division and higher headquarters must exercise general supervision of the training of all Intelligence Service units of lower elements. This is accomplished through the commanders of the lower organizations who are responsible for the efficiency of their respective Intelligence Service groups.

Commanders of organizations having Intelligence Service units should realize the importance of the training of the Intelligence personnel not only for the benefit of their own command but for the whole army. Officers and men for Intelligence Service duty should be selected by the commander with a view to their efficiency and capabilities as soldiers.

Scouts and observers are found in groups at all headquarters from battalion to army. These men should be regarded as specialists and so trained. The subjects in which they should be experts for the efficient discharge of their duties are too numerous to mention here. Some of the things required of them however are to read military maps accurately and quickly, to interpret airplane photographs, to make simple military sketches as well as panoramic ones, to write messages and reports clearly and to receive or send verbal messages accurately, to use a telescope or field glasses readily and expertly, to plot

observations, to repair and operate a field telephone, to receive and send visual signals by any and every means used in the army, to identify airplanes by silhouette, to accompany patrols into enemy lines, to be familiar with the appearance of the several arms and branches of the enemy forces, to use a compass day or night, to handle prisoners, to know what documents are of value, to identify artillery shells and material, to know enemy insignia, trench weapons, customs, and methods of combat.

There are so many things to be learned by observers and scouts that it is difficult to have them proficient in all of them. The best method probably is to keep the men in good physical condition and steadily at work learning thoroughly all that they can of those things which seem most likely to be of use to them in their work.

The important thing in the training of Intelligence Service personnel is to keep on teaching them something of military nature. The disposition of many commanding officers and Intelligence officers in time of peace is to stop Intelligence Service training because there is no enemy to study. The Intelligence officer, scout or observer, who knows his own forces, will easily learn about the enemy's when he has the opportunity but if he doesn't know the organization, composition, methods of combat, artillery material, airplanes, etc., of his own forces, he will learn these things about the enemy with great difficulty if at all.

The same principles mentioned in connection with training of scouts and observers may be applied to Intelligence Service training in higher groups.

It also applies to the training of other specialists and experts. Here also the instruction and subjects covered and methods of handling information must be uniform for the success of the Intelligence Service system. Each

group must understand each other group in the exchange of Intelligence. They must all talk the same language or there will be lost motion and wasted effort.

In practically all of the sections of the Intelligence Division in time of war there will be found groups of specialists whose training must largely be accomplished in time of peace. It is impossible to have war time organizations of Intelligence Service units higher than divisions in time of peace. Therefore the selection of the officers and men to fill these expert places will have to be made at the beginning of the war from the specialists of the various arms and branches of the army at large. Many of these places will undoubtedly be filled by Reserve or National Guard officers, whose occupations in civil life are of such nature as to fit them for the work. This is particularly true with regard to the War Department, G.H.Q. and Army Intelligence Divisions, in connection with the study of information of political, economic and psychological nature and also to a larger extent with regard to the duties of counter-espionage, censorship, visitors, publicity and propaganda. Such officers may be selected and assigned in time of peace and possibly may be given some special training.

Thoroughness in details, accuracy in checking up the information received and the deductions made, and good judgment in coming to conclusions, acquired only from tactical knowledge and hard study, are requisites in Intelligence officers everywhere.

In general it may be said that experience indicates that the best results in training for Intelligence Service duties are gained by what is known as the applicatory system of instruction.

It consists in requiring the student actually to solve his problem or make his report, as he would under service

conditions, in accordance with the assumed situation given him in the problem.

By the exercise of ingenuity and care in preparing the course of study and the problems or tests, practically any kind of instruction may be given by this method. It is equally of use in learning the duties of the Intelligence scout of an infantry battalion, those of an Intelligence officer doing specialist's work at an army or other headquarters, and those of a counter-espionage or censorship officer.

THE END



